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Procedure in 1938. Those Rules created a procedural system giving a
litigant, using plain language and presenting the essential elements of
a claim for relief, an opportunity to pursue discovery and have his or
her rights adjudicated on the merits. This Article discusses the basic
values underlying that system and its importance in promoting broad
citizen access to our federal courts and enabling the private
enforcement of substantive public policies.
The Article then discusses how Twombly and Iqbal have
destabilized both the pleading and the motion-to-dismiss practices as
they have been known for over sixty years. The cases are seen as the
latest in a sequence of increasingly restrictive changes during the last
quarter century. These have created expensive and time-consuming
procedural stop signs that produce earlier and earlier termination of
cases, thereby increasingly preventing claimants from reaching trial—
particularly jury trial. This Article contends that there has been too
much attention paid to claims by corporate and other defense interests
of expense and possible abuse and too little on citizen access, a level
litigation playing field, and the other values of civil litigation. Much
fine-grained empirical research is needed to separate fact from fiction.
This Article finds that setting significantly higher and more
resource-consumptive procedural barriers for plaintiffs and moving
to the ever-earlier disposition of civil suits—now exacerbated by the
two Supreme Court decisions—runs contrary to many of the values
underlying the Federal Rules. Concluding that the Court’s
preoccupation with defense costs is misplaced and its belittlement of
case management as a way of cabining those costs is unpersuasive, the
Article offers several proposals that the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules (or Congress) might consider to reverse recent developments
and ameliorate some of their negative aspects.
Ultimately, the Article asks a basic question: after Twombly and
Iqbal, is our American court system still one in which an aggrieved
person, however unsophisticated and under-resourced he may be, can
secure a meaningful day in court? Finding that the important values
of civil litigation are in jeopardy, this Article urges that the egalitarian,
democratic ideals espoused by the original Federal Rules not be
subordinated to one-dimensional claims of excessive litigation costs
and abuse that have not been validated.
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INTRODUCTION
History matters. When adopted in 1938, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure represented a major break from the common law and
code systems. Although the drafters retained many of the prior
procedural conventions, the Federal Rules reshaped civil litigation to
reflect core values of citizen access to the justice system and
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adjudication on the merits based on a full disclosure of relevant
1
information. The structure of the Rules sharply reduced the prior
emphasis on the pleadings and the extensive related motion practice
that served more to delay proceedings and less to expose the facts,
ventilate the competing positions, or further adjudication on the
2
3
merits. According to the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson,
pleadings only needed to “give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” to survive a
4
motion to dismiss. Fact revelation and issue formulation would occur
5
later in the pretrial process.
6
Moreover, rather than eliminating claims based on technicalities,
the Federal Rules created a system that relied on plain language and

1. See Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 188, 190
(1958) (discussing how the philosophical ideals of allowing any individual “to come in and put
his claim before the judge” and putting “truth ahead of cleverness and tactics” shaped the
Federal Rules); see also Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551,
554–62 (2002) (providing a more thorough treatment of the history of Rule 8 and the liberal
ethos of the Federal Rules); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 912, 943–1002
(1987) (discussing “the inherent nature of the Federal Rules and . . . the basic choice of
procedural form made by their promulgators”).
2. See AM. BAR ASS’N, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES WITH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES AT CLEVELAND,
OHIO 240 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938); see also Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a
Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 108 (2008) (“When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first
adopted in 1938, ‘they were optimistically intended to clear the procedural clouds so that the
sunlight of substance might shine through.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, The
Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988))).
3. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Conley’s philosophy of pleading was previsioned
in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1202 (3d ed. 2004)
(discussing how Rule 8 is the “keystone” of the pleading system created by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
4. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
5. Id. at 47–48.
6. Under common law and code pleading, there “seem[ed] to be a persistent idea that you
could get the other fellow to prove your case by making a misstep or by saying too much in his
pleading.” AM. BAR ASS’N, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM IN NEW YORK CITY 40 (Edward H.
Hammond ed., 1939).
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minimized procedural traps, with trial by jury as the gold standard
for determining a case’s merits. Generalized pleadings, broad
discovery, and limited summary judgment became integral,
8
interdependent elements of the pretrial process. Although so-called
notice pleading allowed a wide swath of cases into the system,
9
discovery and summary judgment were designed to expose and
separate the meritorious from the meritless.
Beneath the surface of these broad procedural concepts lay
several significant policy objectives. The Rules were intended to
support a central philosophical principle: the procedural system of the
federal courts should be premised on equality of treatment of all
parties and claims in the civil adjudication process. It should abjure
10
technical decisionmaking and “promote the ends of justice.” The
simple but ambitious notion was that the legal rights of citizens
should be enforced. This idea was a baseline democratic tenet of the
1930s and then of postwar America with regard to such matters as
civil rights, the distribution of social and political power, marketplace
11
status, and equality of opportunity.
As significant new areas of federal substantive law emerged and
existing ones were augmented, the importance of private enforcement
of key national policies, of litigation as an instrument of social policy,
and of expanding state-based tort and consumer-protection theories
12
came to the fore in numerous contexts. The openness and simplicity
of the Rules facilitated citizen enforcement of congressional and
constitutional policies through civil litigation. The federal courts
increasingly were seen as an alternative or an adjunct to centralized,

7. “The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 48.
8. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“This simplified notice
pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define
disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”).
9. In seeking summary judgment, the movant always has “the burden of showing the
absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
157 (1970). Cases generally narrowed in scope as they approached trial.
10. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1029 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the purpose
and construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
11. See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000) (discussing the evolution of the American judiciary in
the context of the Erie doctrine).
12. See infra notes 275–92 and accompanying text.
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or administrative governmental oversight in fields such as
competition, capital markets, product safety, and discrimination.
Even though private lawsuits might be viewed as an inefficient ex
post method of enforcing public policies, they have dispersed
regulatory authority; achieved greater transparency; provided a
source of compensation, deterrence, and institutional governance;
and led to leaner government involvement. Without this privateattorneys-general concept, the substitution of an alternative
methodology would be necessary. This probably would mean the
establishment of the type of continental-style, centralized
bureaucracies and administrative enforcement that many think are
13
inconsistent with our culture and heritage.
Perhaps the case that best represents the access-minded and
merit-oriented ethos at the heart of the original Federal Rules is
14
Dioguardi v. Durning. As many may remember from their law
school civil procedure course, John Dioguardi, an immigrant and pro
se plaintiff, asserted various grievances against the Collector of
15
Customs of the Port of New York. His home-drawn complaint
alleged in broken English a number of factual circumstances but
failed to make any coherent legal presentation. Judge Charles E.
16
Clark, the principal draftsman of the Federal Rules, wrote for the
Second Circuit in overturning the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
17
dismissal of Dioguardi’s action. The court found enough information
within the complaint’s allegations to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading
18
standard. Judge Clark’s opinion reminded the profession that the

13. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY
LAW (2003) (arguing that the United States, unlike other industrialized nations, relies on an
adversarial legal system to develop law and public policy rather than on judges and professional
bureaucrats). For additional discussion of the phenomenon, see infra notes 275–92.
14. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). See generally 5 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 3, § 1220 (showing how Dioguardi is illustrative of the pleading philosophy created
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
15. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 774.
16. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing Judge Clark as the “principal draftsman” of the Federal Rules).
17. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775. Rule 12(b)(6) provides for a motion to dismiss the
complaint for its “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6). See generally 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1355–1357 (discussing the
history, purpose, and practice of Rule 12(b)(6)).
18. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775. The rule requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). See generally 5A–B
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1315–1354.
OF
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then-relatively new Rule 8 required only “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and no
longer demanded “facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,” as
19
was required under code pleading. Judge Clark’s lecture on the new
pleading standard was confirmed thirteen years later by the Supreme
20
Court’s ruling in Conley v. Gibson, in which it famously stated, “[A]
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
21
support of his claim . . . .” That philosophy was recited by the Court
22
on several occasions during Conley’s fifty-year reign.
Much, however, has changed in the world of litigation in the
sixty-six years since Dioguardi. The cultures of the law and of the
legal profession are far different. Long gone are the days of a fairly
homogenous community of lawyers litigating relatively small numbers
of what today would be regarded as modest disputes involving a
limited number of claims or parties. Law practice today has many
attributes of a business and has succumbed to various marketing
practices, including television advertising. And litigation in the
federal courts has become a world unimagined in 1938: often a
battleground for titans of industry to dispute complex claims

19. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)); see also Charles E. Clark,
Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458–60 (1943) (discussing how the cumbersome pleading
requirements led to a call for reform). In his dissent in Twombly, Justice Stevens noted that
Judge Clark’s opinion in Dioguardi “disquieted the defense bar and gave rise to a movement to
revise Rule 8 to require a plaintiff to plead a ‘cause of action,’” but that the effort failed.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also O.L. McCaskill, The Modern
Philosophy of Pleading: A Dialogue Outside the Shades, 38 A.B.A. J. 123, 125–26 (1952)
(discussing how a plaintiff’s lawyer could use the Dioguardi ruling to more liberally plead
cases). In 1955, the Advisory Committee rejected a proposal that Rule 8(a)(2) be amended to
require the complaint to plead “facts constituting a cause of action.” ADVISORY COMM. ON
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 18–19 (1955), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV10-1955.pdf.
20. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (citing Dioguardi in support of a liberal
pleading standard).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“[I]mposing the Court
of Appeals’ heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases conflicts with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) . . . .”); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (“We think that it is impossible to
square the ‘heightened pleading standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the
liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules.”); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
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involving enormous stakes; a forum in which disparate ideological
forces contest some of the great issues of the day; and the situs for
aggregate litigation on behalf of large numbers of people and entities
pursuing theories and invoking statutes unknown in the 1930s and
1940s. Complicated issues of technology, science, and economics are
commonplace. In some cases, the size of the claims and the litigation
costs are stunning. Over the years the number of lawsuits filed has
23
increased, but judicial resources have not kept pace. Opposing
counsel compete on a national and even a global scale and employ an
array of litigation tactics often designed to wear out or deter
opponents (or mount billable hours), making the maintenance of
shared professional values difficult, if not impossible.
Many cases seem interminable. The pretrial process has become
so elaborate with time-consuming motions, hearings, and discovery
that it often seems to have fallen into the hands of some systemic
Sorcerer’s Apprentice. Yet trials are strikingly infrequent, and, in the
unlikely event of a jury trial, only six or eight citizens typically are
24
empanelled. What some would call cults of judicial management and

23. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 59–95
(1985). A sharp increase in criminal matters, coupled with the federalization of such matters as
securities litigation and class actions, may have outstripped the growth of the federal judiciary. I
do not believe, however, that the data support the notion that we have been struck by a
“litigation explosion.” See generally Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46
MD. L. REV. 3 (1986) (arguing that American litigation rates are not much higher than in the
recent past and are not dissimilar to other industrialized countries); Marc Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (tracing the decline in the percentage of cases that
terminate at trial and the decline in the absolute number of trials in American courts); Jack B.
Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice
Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1909 (1989) (stating that businesses’ concerns about
judicial caseloads are a “weapon of perception, not substance”).
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 48(a) (setting the number of jurors between six and twelve). In
Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, ‘A Grin Without a Cat’: Civil Trials in the Federal Courts
(May 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/
LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/AD5073BA32C448C18525771F0038C680/$File/Marc%
20Galanter%20and%20Angela%20Frozena%2C%20A%20Grin%20Without%20a%20Cat.pdf
?OpenElement, the authors note the percentage and absolute drop in federal court trials over
the past quarter century despite the growth in the legal system and conclude “that the civil trial
is approaching extinction.” Id. at 1. See generally 9B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 2491
(3d ed. 2008) (discussing the size of the jury); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of
Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (2005) (stating that “an abundance
of data shows that the number of trials—federal and state, civil and criminal, jury and bench—is
declining”); William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40
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alternative dispute resolution have arisen, eroding certain aspects of
the adversary system and blocking access to the courtroom for a trial
on the merits. In short, the world of those who drafted the original
Federal Rules largely has disappeared, causing one district judge to
remark that the “reality” is that our “system [is] becoming
25
increasingly inaccessible to the average citizen.” Sadly, in some
respects today’s civil litigation is neither civil nor litigation as
previously known.
Along with these changes in litigation realities have come
corresponding judicial shifts in the interpretation of the Rules and the
erection of other procedural barriers to a meaningful day in court. To
some degree these shifts are a response to a powerful drumbeat of
criticism from the business community, the members of the legal
profession representing that constituency, and conservative political
forces that have secured a significant change in the demographic
26
character of the federal bench. Deregulation is the watchword; socalled American litigiousness is decried and lawyers demonized; the
system’s costs and delays are deplored; and litigation is characterized
27
as a lottery. Federal civil procedure has been politicized and
subjected to ideological pressures. Thus, the Supreme Court’s recent

SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 73 (2006) (“For some time now, circumstances and anecdotal evidence
has been mounting that jury trials are, with surprising rapidity, becoming a thing of the past.”).
25. Scheetz v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 628, 630 n.2 (D. Mont. 1993)
(quoting Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal, Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284,
286 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (“[N]or can justice long remain available to deserving litigants if the costs
of litigation are fueled unnecessarily to the point of being prohibitive.”).
26. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES
SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
(2006) (claiming that judges’ political convictions affect their decisions in cases when the law
does not provide a clear answer); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008) (charting the development of the
conservative legal movement from the 1970s); Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most
Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at A1 (arguing that the Supreme Court
under Chief Justice Roberts has become “the most conservative [Court] in living memory”).
27. The appointment of a Council on Competitiveness under the leadership of Vice
President Dan Quayle was designed to protect and promote American business in the global
marketplace. Its Agenda for Civil Justice Reform proposed many probusiness changes in the
civil-justice system. See generally M.E. BEESLEY, PRIVATIZATION, REGULATION AND
DEREGULATION (1997); WILLIS EMMONS, THE EVOLVING BARGAIN: STRATEGIC
IMPLICATIONS OF DEREGULATION AND PRIVATIZATION (2000).
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decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal
should be seen as the latest steps in a long-term trend that has
favored increasingly early case disposition in the name of efficiency,
economy, and avoidance of abusive and meritless lawsuits. It also
marks a continued retreat from the principles of citizen access, private
enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in
favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth. To a significant
degree, the liberal-procedure ethos of 1938 has given way to a
restrictive one.
A few illustrations of what has transpired should suffice. Two
decades before these two pleading decisions, the 1986 trilogy of
30
Supreme Court summary judgment cases broke with prior
jurisprudence that sharply restricted the motion’s application to clear
31
cases in which no genuine issue of material fact was present. The
three decisions in one term sent a clear signal to the legal profession
that Rule 56 provides a useful mechanism for disposing of cases short
of trial when the district judge feels the plaintiff’s case is not
32
plausible.
Many courts responded to this invitation with
considerable receptivity.
A further exemplar of the shift in the focus of federal litigation to
the pretrial phase occurred a few years after the summary judgment

28. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The complaint charged the “Baby
Bells” with anti-competitive conduct in the form of parallel conduct discouraging competition
and their failure to compete with each other. Id. at 548–49.
29. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). The plaintiff asserted a wide range of
constitutional and statutory violations of his civil rights by governmental officials, which was
challenged by a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Id. at 1942.
30. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
31. The Court previously had said:
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust
litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands
of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the
witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the
weight to be given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute
for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of “even handed justice.”
Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (footnote omitted); see also
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970) (holding that it was error to grant
summary judgment because the respondent did not meet its “burden of showing the absence of
a genuine issue as to any material fact”).
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. For a more in-depth discussion of the impact of the 1986 trilogy,
see Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1044–73 (2003).
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trilogy when the Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow
33
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which established judicial gatekeeping on the
introduction of expert testimony. The resultant challenge and hearing
process—often time consuming and expensive—has provided
defendants with another opportunity to eviscerate cases that depend
on experts and proliferate the pretrial process, thereby supporting
34
strategies of attrition and delay.
On the legislative front, and with the supposed aim of reducing
“frivolous suits,” Congress, having been lobbied by corporate,
accounting, and investment interests, enacted the Private Securities
35
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995. The statute created a
super-heightened pleading standard for certain aspects of securities
claims and deferred discovery until after resolution of an inevitably
protracted motion to dismiss, often based on complex questions such
36
as scienter, loss causation, reliance, and materiality —questions that
formerly would have been considered trial worthy.

33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
34. Id. at 597; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999) (holding
that expert testimony could be excluded); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146–47 (1997)
(upholding the district court’s exclusion of expert testimony). Closely analogous is the intense
judicial examination of class certifiability. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the
Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 100 (2009) (“Class certification is not a matter of
mere pleading but, rather, of affirmative proof that the requirements stated in Rule 23 have
been satisfied. The court must make a ‘definitive assessment’ that these requirements have been
met, even if that assessment entails the resolution of conflicting proof and happens to overlap
with an issue—even a critical one—on the merits.”); see also cases cited infra note 185.
35. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Three years later, Congress
enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006)), which preempted almost all class
actions related to “covered” securities, thereby virtually ending the growth of state remedial
securities law. The same interests secured the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453 (2006), which effectively gives the supposedly defense-friendly
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over almost all significant class actions denying plaintiffs
access to supposedly more receptive state courts. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due
Process: Preserving the Right to Affordable Justice, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 437, 448–49 (2010) (“In
literally ‘making a federal case’ out of the vast majority of class actions, Congress intentionally
or otherwise complicated and marked up the price tag on the delivery of ‘fair and prompt
recovery to class members with legitimate claims’ by forcing class actions into competition for
the scarce judicial resources of a well-respected, but under-populated, federal judicial
community.”).
36. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; H.R. CONF.
REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731. In Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007), the Court adopted a test for pleading a
“strong inference” of scienter under the PSLRA. Id. at 314. In examining a complaint for
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Despite the well-established position of notice pleading under
Conley, and absent any revision of Rule 8 by the rulemaking process,
a number of lower court federal judges—perhaps emboldened by the
summary judgment trilogy or feeling overburdened by their
caseloads—frequently applied more-demanding pleading standards in
many types of cases, resulting in a greater number of Rule 12(b)(6)
37
dismissals over the years. This arguably unauthorized shift in the
pleading sphere provided a foundation for the Court’s Twombly
38
decision.
Responding to the business community’s complaints about costs,
amendments to the Federal Rules and changes in various judicial
practices have been designed, for more than a quarter century, to
contain or control discovery and enhance the power of judges to
39
manage cases throughout the pretrial process. These developments
seem to reflect a growing emphasis on efficiency, which some believe
has enabled defense interests to employ the procedural system to
avoid, or at least delay, reaching an adjudication of a dispute’s merits.
Finally, the great expansion of contractual limitations on private
law enforcement by consumers through the insertion of arbitration
clauses into agreements that are often adhesive—and the validation
40
by the Supreme Court of such clauses —may be seen as part of an

sufficiency, “an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must
be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.” Id.
37. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010) (finding that after Conley, Rule 12(b)(6)
motions were granted 46 percent of the time, after Twombly, the number increased to 48
percent, and after Iqbal, the number increased to 56 percent). See generally Christopher M.
Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 989 (2003) (stating that “notice
pleading as a universal standard is a myth”); Fairman, supra note 1, at 574–90 (discussing the
rise and proliferation of judicially imposed heightened pleading requirements); Richard L.
Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 433, 435 (1986) (stating that fact pleading “seems to be enjoying a revival in a number of
areas”). In the years between Conley and Twombly, attempts to convert Rule 8(a) from notice
to fact pleading were rejected by the Advisory Committee. See supra note 19.
38. See Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560–63 (2007).
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26. Rule 16 was amended in 1983 and 1993, and Rule 26 was
amended in 1993, 2000, and 2006. For more information about the revisions, see the Advisory
Committee’s Notes to these changes. There have been other constraints imposed on discovery.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2), 33(a). See generally Richard Marcus, Essay, Only Yesterday:
Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7 (2004)
(discussing the Advisory Committee’s response to electronic discovery).
40. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587 (2008) (holding that a court
“must grant” an application for the confirmation of an arbitration award unless certain
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overall campaign to reduce the effectiveness of federal regulatory law
41
and public enforcement proceedings. These clauses impair citizen
access to a judicial forum with the possibility of jury trial. And quite
recently the Supreme Court indicated that the availability of the class
42
action in arbitration may be extremely limited, potentially impairing
the effectiveness of consumer remedies in various contexts.
In the background, several commentators have criticized
rulemaking—once thought to reflect the efforts of neutral
professionals—as being overly politicized by economic and
43
ideological forces. Increasingly, it has been recognized that
procedural rules are a source of societal power, that the formulation
and application of those rules often are not value neutral, and that the
manipulation of procedural rules frequently is used to advance or

“prescribed” exceptions apply); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) (“Contracts to
arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing one party to ignore the contract and resort to the
courts.”).
41. See generally Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in
Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s evolving role as “superlegislator”). One accomplished
empiricist has suggested, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the relatively limited use of
arbitration clauses actually suggests that corporate defendants are less concerned about, and in
need of less protection from, litigation than the Supreme Court’s Twombly and Iqbal decisions
suggest. Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 158–59 (2009) (statement of Theodore Eisenberg, Henry
Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University).
42. See Stolt-Nielson v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
43. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 888–89 (1999) (discussing criticisms of
court rulemaking); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2010) (manuscript at 2–19) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (discussing the political stress that creates a crisis in federal rulemaking); Jack H.
Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 673, 685 (1975) (recommending changes in Supreme Court rulemaking); Richard L.
Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 903 (2002) (discussing the
“pervasive and valid concerns about a crisis in rulemaking”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and
Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 613–17, 636–37
(2001) (noting the conservative and defense orientation of rulemaking and recommending
greater “socio-political makeup”). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience:
Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 798–99
(1991) (discussing the “politicization of the civil rulemaking process”).
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44

retard substantive goals. Viewed realistically, rules of procedure
45
represent policy tradeoffs.
Yet, until Twombly in 2007, the Supreme Court stood firm in its
commitment to the rulemaking process and to the principle of access
46
at the pleading stage. But the Court’s opinion in Twombly “retired”
Conley’s “no set of facts” language and insisted on “more than labels
and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
47
of action.” The Court demanded “enough facts to state a claim to
48
relief that is plausible on its face.” With the advent of “plausibility”
49
pleading, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion seems to have stolen center
stage. It has become the vehicle of choice for both disposing of
allegedly insufficient claims and protecting defendants from
supposedly excessive discovery costs and resource expenditures—
objectives previously thought to be achievable through the utilization
of other rules and judicial practices.
The cumulative effect of these procedural developments may
well have come at the expense of access to the federal courts and the
ability of citizens to obtain an adjudication of their claims’ merits.
Some proceduralists have suggested that what has been established is
not a neutral solution for an important litigation problem, but rather
the use of procedure to achieve results that undermine important
national policies by limiting their private enforcement through

44. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
517, 519–25 (2010).
45. See Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 840 (1993) (discussing the challenge of “mov[ing] forward without
losing hold of the basic elements that make our legal system so successful”). See generally Alan
B. Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Procedure System (Apr. 14,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/
dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/7F15D55E983415D085257707004A6316/$File/Alan%20Morrison%2
C%20The%20Necessity%20of%20Tradeoffs.pdf?OpenElement (discussing the tradeoffs
inherent in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
46. See supra note 22.
47. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 555, 579 (2007). The Court ignored its
admonition in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962). See supra note
31.
48. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The Supreme Court of Arizona has retained its noticepleading standard and has not adopted Twombly. See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d
344, 348 (Ariz. 2008) (en banc) (vacating the portion of the lower court’s opinion that cited
Twombly).
49. For a description of “plausibility” pleading, see infra Part I.
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various systemic and process changes designed to benefit special
50
economic interests. In recent years, the business community has
used its influence to weaken the enforcement of public laws and
51
policies regulating their activities. Procedural modifications have
been employed to achieve substantive changes for defense interests.
With Twombly and Iqbal, the favored disposition technique has
moved earlier in time from summary judgment to the motion to
dismiss.
52
Recognizing the importance of Twombly and Iqbal, most —but

50. To paraphrase a friend who is an accomplished proceduralist, it is the view of some that
what we have seen is the “subversion of statutory protections to benefit Wall Street at the
expense of Main Street.”
51. See TELES, supra note 26; see also Leslie M. Kelleher, Amenability to Jurisdiction as a
“Substantive Right”: The Invalidity of Rule 4(k) Under the Rules Enabling Act, 75 IND. L.J. 1191,
1194 (2000) (“On occasion, lobbyists have convinced Congress to bypass the rulemaking process
entirely, and provide special procedures for specific classes of cases by legislation, in order to
favor certain interest groups.”). For a highly partisan and rather distorted view of plaintiffs’
lawyers and private enforcement, see James R. Copland, A Message from the Director, TRIAL
LAWYERS INC.: K STREET, http://www.triallawyersinc.com/kstreet/kstr01.html (last visited Aug.
25, 2010).
52. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly Pleading Rules and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 882–90 (2009) (discussing Twombly’s impact); Stephen B. Burbank,
Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 110 (2009)
(stating that Iqbal “exacerbated confusion about pleading standards”); Kevin M. Clermont &
Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010)
(opining that these cases “have destabilized the entire system of civil litigation”); Thomas P.
Gressette, Jr., The Heightened Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal: A New Phase in American Legal History Begins, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 401, 455
(2010) (explaining that Twombly and Iqbal mark “the beginning of a new phase in the history of
American pleading requirements”); Gregory P. Joseph, Trial Balloon: Federal Litigation—
Where Did It Go off Track?, LITIGATION, Summer 2008, at 5, 62 (stating that “Twombly
reversed a 50-year-old precedent”).
Even judges and academics who one assumes are sympathetic to the decisions
recognize their significance. See, e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of
Adjustment, Cent. Region v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 537 F.3d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Easterbrook, C.J., joined by Posner, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“In Bell
Atlantic the Justices modified federal pleading requirements and threw out a complaint that
would have been deemed sufficient earlier . . . .”); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 61, 64 (2007) (“The Supreme Court in Twombly held that the phrase ‘no set of facts’
has been ‘questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough.’ But on this matter Justice
Stevens’s dissent surely has the better argument. Conley has long been treated as an
authoritative statement of the law that has been followed uniformly in the Supreme Court and
elsewhere and the plaintiffs’ allegations are quite in the spirit of the Federal Rules. The Conley
complaint is fact-free but gives notice of the basic elements of the claim. Twombly can not be
defended if the only question is whether it captures the sense of notice pleading in earlier
cases.” (footnotes omitted)).

MILLER IN FINAL

16

9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1

53

not all —observers believe these two cases represent a major
departure from the Court’s established pleading jurisprudence and
that the decisions have brought the long-simmering debate over the
proper role of pleadings and pretrial motions to a fever pitch in some
quarters. The defense bar, along with the large entities it typically
represents, asserts that a heightened pleading standard is necessary to
reduce the cost of litigation, weed out abusive lawsuits, and protect
54
American business interests at home and abroad. The plaintiffs’ bar,
supported by various civil rights, consumer, and environmental
protection groups, argues that heightened pleading is a blunt
instrument that will keep out or terminate meritorious claims before
discovery, undermine various state and national policies, and increase
the burden on under-resourced plaintiffs who typically contest with
industrial and governmental Goliaths in cases in which critical
information is largely in the hands of defendants and is unobtainable
55
without access to discovery. This sharp divide even may imperil the
credibility and effectiveness of the rulemaking process as rulemakers
56
try to chart a path from this point.

53. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 175–214 (statement of Gregory G. Garre, Partner,
Latham & Watkins, LLP) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal were rightly decided and that
Congress should not try to override these decisions); Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 33 (2009) (statement of Gregory C. Katsas, former
Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (claiming that Twombly and
Iqbal “faithfully interpret” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are consistent with
precedent); Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2009)
(arguing that the plausibility standard is both coherent and required by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure). For a moderate view of the effect of the two decisions, see Adam Steinman,
The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010), and see also Dobyns v. U.S., 91 Fed. Cl.
412 (2010). An optimistic view of what may be feasible under Twombly and Iqbal is offered in
Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010).
54. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AM.
COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYSTEM 2–3 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4053.
55. See generally Letter from John Vail, Vice President, Ctr. for Const. Lit., to the
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/2008%20Comments%20Committee%20Folders/CV%20Comments%2
02008/08-CV-046-Testimony-Center%20For%20Constitutional%20Litigation%20(Vail).pdf
(arguing for greater flexibility in summary judgment practice).
56. The cleavage between the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ bar regarding pleading and
motion to dismiss practices is manifest throughout AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG.,
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Given the dramatic changes and sharp debate precipitated by
Twombly and Iqbal, the Federal Rules—indeed, federal civil practice
in general—stand at a critical crossroads. It is incumbent upon the
courts and rulemakers to consider the full range of important
questions and policy choices that have surfaced not just in Twombly
and Iqbal, but as a result of the overarching trend toward pretrial
disposition. That wide-angle consideration should take account of the
various policy objectives of federal litigation, many of which have not
been accorded sufficient weight in connection with the procedural
57
alterations of the past quarter century. Those alterations have been
accreting slowly. But now, with Twombly and Iqbal, their cumulative
effect and inexorable movement toward earlier case disposition have
become quite apparent.
Part I of this Article explores the nature and implications of the
new plausibility-pleading standard. Part II critiques the Court’s
disparagement of case management and the role that the fears of
discovery abuse, meritless lawsuits, and litigation costs have played in
influencing changes in pleading and pretrial motion practice. It also
explores some of the competing system values that may have been
impaired in recent years. Part III discusses the impact of the Court’s
decisions in Twombly, Iqbal, and the 1986 summary judgment trilogy
on the continued viability of the rulemaking process; the future of the
Federal Rules’ transsubstantivity; and the possibility of corrective
legislation. Part IV offers some suggestions for tackling the difficult
issues and questions that have arisen concerning the pretrial process.
The Article concludes by asking how the new pleading and pretrialmotion philosophy might lead a judge to rule on Dioguardi’s
complaint or a contemporary variant thereof. Because of my sense of
the dimension of the subject and its ramifications, I have written at
length and asked many questions, some of which, of necessity, have
been left unanswered. For that I apologize to the reader.
I. PLEADING UNDER TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
The Supreme Court’s enhancement of the Rule 8(a) pleading
burden and its extension to all cases has far-reaching consequences.
As argued in this Part, the center of gravity of federal litigation has

MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT (2009), as well as other surveys
presented at the Duke Conference.
57. See infra Part II.C.
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been shifted forward in time and the Court has accorded the Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss potentially life-or-death significance for
58
the pleader of an affirmative claim. The enhanced scope of the
district court’s inquiry on the motion established by Twombly and
Iqbal, especially its extra-pleading and discretionary elements, alters
the motion’s limited historic function, obscures the long-standing
distinction between Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions, and poses a
number of other difficulties for judges and lawyers.
A. Plausibility in the Eye of the Beholder
1. The Transmogrification of Notice Pleading and the Motion to
Dismiss. Under Conley’s notice-pleading standard, courts were
authorized to grant motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) only when
“it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff [could] prove no set of
59
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Judges were to accept all factual—but not conclusory—allegations as
true and draw all inferences in favor of the pleader. With limited
exceptions, they were not to look beyond the pleading. Despite the
vagueness of the Conley standard, judges employing it on a motion to
dismiss had years of precedent providing some consistency and
continuity. Moreover, they understood, in accordance with Conley,
60
that the motion should be denied except in clear cases. The Rules, it
was thought, were designed to keep cases in court at the pleading
stage, rather than to exclude them. Something in the nature of a
bend-over-backwards principle favoring the pleader was in force.
Although in the decades immediately preceding Twombly and Iqbal a
number of lower courts effectively ignored the standard while
insisting on heightened or what amounted to fact pleading in certain

58. See infra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
59. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). This passage applied to the legal
sufficiency of the complaint—whether any legally cognizable wrong has been stated—not the
quality of its notice-giving content. The former is a Rule 12(b)(6) function; the latter should be
addressed under Rule 12(e). See Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 108 F.2d 302, 305–06
(8th Cir. 1940). This distinction was ignored in both Twombly and Iqbal, and that has recurred
repeatedly ever since.
60. For numerous cases illustrating the liberal and simplified pleading regime under
Conley, see 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1202, 1215–1218.
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61

types of cases, Conley’s notice-pleading approach remained the
62
accepted, articulated benchmark.
By establishing plausibility pleading, Twombly and Iqbal, have
transformed the function of a complaint from Conley’s limited role by
imposing a more demanding standard that requires a greater factual
63
foundation than previously was required or originally intended.
Indeed, it is striking to note that the Iqbal majority did not once use
the word “notice” in its opinion or cite the Court’s other basic pre64
Twombly decisions. After Twombly and Iqbal, mere notice of a
claim for relief likely does not satisfy the Court’s newly minted
65
demand for a factual showing. To state it differently, whereas Conley

61. Fairman, supra note 37, at 988; Marcus, supra note 37, at 435.
62. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). As Justice Stevens noted in his
Twombly dissent, “today’s opinion is the first by any Member of the Court to express any doubt
as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. For a glimpse at the initial application of the enhanced factual pleading established by
Twombly and Iqbal in a variety of substantive contexts, see Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp.,
605 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010) (RICO and conspiracy claims; Rules 8 and 9(b) applied); Sanchez
v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (Fourth Amendment rights and supervisory
liability claim); Hensley Mfg., Inc. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2009) (consumer
confusion regarding trademark and fair use claims); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252
(11th Cir. 2009) (Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victims Protection Act claims); Moss v. U.S.
Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) (First Amendment viewpoint-discrimination claim);
Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009) (employment standards); St. Clair v.
Citizens Fin. Group, 340 F. App’x 62 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (RICO claim); Farash v. Cont’l
Airlines, Inc., 337 F. App’x 7 (2d Cir. 2009) (negligence and assault claims under New York
law); Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (Eighth Amendment
deliberate-indifference claim); Sheehy v. Brown, 335 F. App’x 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (§§ 1983 and
1985 claims); Lopez v. Beard, 333 F. App’x 685 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (First, Eighth,
Fourteenth Amendment, and Age Discrimination Act claims); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel,
Civil No. 05-3091 (JBS/JS), 2010 WL 2557250 (D.N.J. June 22, 2010) (§§ 1981 and 1985 claims);
Spencer v. DHI Mortg. Co., Ltd., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (negligent breach of
duty claim); Logan v. Sectek, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D. Conn. 2009) (Age Discrimination Act
claim); Vallejo v. City of Tucson, No. CV 08-500TUC DCB, 2009 WL 1835115 (D. Ariz. July 26,
2009) (Voting Rights Act claim).
64. The Court seemed to reaffirm notice pleading in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007), three weeks after Twombly, id. at 93, but its unique facts and Iqbal cast doubt on the
significance of that case, see A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2009); see also Dottolo v. Byrne Dairy, Inc., No. 5:08-CV-0390 (GTS/ATB), 2010
WL 2560551, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 22, 2010) (stating that Erickson was merely an application of
the statement in Twombly that a pleading does not need to set out in detail the facts upon which
a claim is based).
65. See Tahir v. Import Acquisition Motors, L.L.C., No. 09 C 6471, 2010 WL 2836714, at *1
(N.D. Ill. July 15, 2010) (holding that “simply providing a defendant with notice of the claims
against her is not enough”); Ghaster v. City of Rocky River, No. 1:09CV02080, 2010 WL
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accepted complaints showing the possibility of a right to relief,
Twombly requires a pleading to show the plausibility of a claim; the
Court has not demanded that the pleader demonstrate a probability
of the claim prevailing on the merits, however. At a minimum, the
pleading requirement has become one of notice-plus. In reality, that is
66
a form of fact pleading by another name.
The Court’s signal was loud and clear. Motions to dismiss based
on Twombly and Iqbal have become routine, and the perception
among many practicing attorneys and commentators is that the grant
rate has increased, particularly in civil rights cases, employment
discrimination, private enforcement matters, class actions, and
proceedings brought pro se. Some initial empirical evidence supports
67
these impressions. A two-year study of post-Twombly antitrust cases

2802682, at *3 (N.D. Ohio July 13, 2010) (holding that “fair notice” cannot be enough to survive
dismissal); see also Spencer, supra note 64, at 19–21 (“[A] complaint that adequately provides
notice is not necessarily sufficient to state a claim.”). One hopes that Judge Wood was not being
too optimistic in her majority opinion in Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL
2977297 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010), when she wrote: “The Court was not engaged in a sub rosa
campaign to reinstate the old fact-pleading system called for by [New York’s 1848] Field Code
or even more modern codes. We know that because it said so in Erickson . . . .” Id. at *2.
66. See Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the
Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 918 (2010) (claiming the complaints in both
Twombly and Iqbal would have been sufficient under Conley and would have survived had they
pled more facts, thereby suggesting a heightened fact-pleading requirement).
67. See Schneider, supra note 44, at 519–26. As of this writing, only a small amount of data
is available. Moreover, the research techniques employed thus far generally have been limited
to what is reported in Westlaw and LEXIS, which omits decisions from the bench, thought by
some to be more commonly denials than grants of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. There are, however,
a few studies suggesting a greater frequency of dismissal under Twombly and Iqbal than under
Conley. See Hatamyar, supra note 37, at 556 (finding that after Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal,
respectively, Rule 12(b)(6) motions were increasingly granted); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading
Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 118 (2010) (finding dismissals increased from 54.2 percent to 64.6
percent in disability cases after Twombly); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A
Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011,
1014 (finding a higher rate of dismissals in Title VII cases after Twombly); see also Kendall W.
Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2008) (stating that Twombly has had
“almost no substantive impact” except in civil rights cases). But cf. Memorandum from Andrea
Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, to the Civil Rules Advisory Comm.
and the Standing Rules Comm.: Application of Pleading Standards Post-Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Nov.
25, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Memo%20re
%20pleading%20standards%20by%20circuit.pdf (providing a summary of cases). Some
fragmentary statistics from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts show little
change in the frequency of the motion to dismiss. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
MOTIONS TO DISMISS (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/motions
%20to%20dismiss.pdf.
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by a prominent New York City defense firm, after noting a 2 to 1
dismissal ratio, concludes that the case has had a “substantial impact”
68
and has “raised the bar” for plaintiffs. The Supreme Court’s change
in policy seems to suggest a regression in time, taking federal civil
practice back toward code and common law procedure and their
heavy emphasis on detailed pleadings and frequent resolution by a
69
demurrer to the complaint or code motion to dismiss —all of this
without any real reason to believe that demanding stricter pleading
provides an adequate basis for identifying meritless claims.
Twombly and Iqbal, in fact, have altered the Rule 12(b)(6)
procedure even more dramatically. By insisting on a showing of
plausibility, the past practice of construing the complaint in the light
most favorable to the pleader and drawing all inferences in his favor
effectively has been replaced in some quarters by the long-rejected
70
practice of construing a pleading against the pleader. In the same
vein, some lower court opinions appear to reflect an impairment of
71
the principle that allegations of fact are to be accepted as true, even
though the Iqbal opinion states that a court should assume the
72
veracity of “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Most significantly, the

68. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, ANTITRUST DIGEST: EMERGING TRENDS AND
PATTERNS IN FEDERAL ANTITRUST CASES AFTER BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY 3, 6
(2009), http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/AT-030609-Antitrust%20Digest.pdf; see also
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS
FOR PLEADING IN FEDERAL LITIGATION 18–19 (2010), available at http://www.nysba.org/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=URL_Manager&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONT
ENTID=37197 (“[S]tatistics . . . do not tell the whole story.”).
69. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 2, at 225.
70. See, e.g., Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1296 (11th Cir. 2010)
(affirming dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578
F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the court was “not required to admit as true this
unwarranted deduction of fact”). Although a PSLRA case, In re Synchronoss Securities
Litigation, No. 08-4437, 2010 WL 1409664 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2010), shows an extremely grudging
application of Rule 8 and Rule 9(b). Similarly, in Market Trading, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, No.
09-55445 (GEB), 2010 WL 2836092 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to accept a
“bare allegation” of the pleader’s intent. Id. at *1.
71. See, e.g., Phillips v. Bell, 365 F. App’x 133, 141 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding it “fairly
implausible” that the defendant would use self-damning information for the purposes the
plaintiff contended); Hollis v. Gonzalez, No. 1:08-cv-1834 OWW DLB PC, 2010 WL 2555781, at
*5 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2010) (finding the same factual allegations plausible to state a retaliation
claim against a prison guard, but not the prison director). See generally A. Benjamin Spencer,
Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 196–97
(2010) (noting that Iqbal clearly challenged the principle that a plaintiff’s allegations are
assumed to be true).
72. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
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decisions have unmoored our long-held understanding that the
motion to dismiss simply tests a pleading’s notice-giving and
substantive-law sufficiency.
The Federal Rules replaced the demurrer and the code motion to
dismiss with the Rule 12(b)(6) motion in order to reduce
73
adjudications based on “procedural booby traps.” Yet even the more
technical and much harsher demurrer and code motion focused
exclusively on the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s statement of each
substantive element of a cause of action, and did not involve a judicial
74
assessment of the case’s facts or actual merits. Twombly and Iqbal
may have transformed the relatively delineated purpose of the Rule
12(b)(6) motion into a potentially draconian method of foreclosing
access based on an evaluation of the plausibility of a challenged
pleading’s factual presentation, filtered through the Court’s
invocation of extra-pleading “judicial experience and common sense”
75
factors. But should the motion to dismiss be transmogrified in this
fashion? How far should this threshold procedure be allowed to drift
from its historical function and defined scope of inquiry?
Not only has plausibility pleading undone the relative simplicity
of the Rule 8 pleading regime and the limited function of the Rule
12(b)(6) motion, but it also has granted virtually unbridled discretion
to district court judges. This enhanced discretion has sparked a
concern that some judges will allow their own views on various
substantive matters to intrude on their decisionmaking and no longer
will feel bound by the four corners of the complaint, as historically
76
was true. Over two decades ago, Professor Richard L. Marcus

73. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966).
74. For discussions of the earlier procedures, see 1 CHITTY’S TREATISE ON PLEADING AND
PARTIES TO ACTIONS 692–702 (J.C. Perkins ed., Springfield, G. & C. Merriam 16th Am. ed.
1876) (describing the requirements for a demurrer); CHARLES EDWARD CLARK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING §§ 78–79 (2d ed. 1947); HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 157–62 (Samuel Tyler ed., Washington,
William H. Morrison 3d Am. ed. 1882) (same); Robert Wyness Millar, The Fortunes of the
Demurrer, 31 ILL. L. REV. 429, 429–30 (1936) (comparing the Anglo-Saxon demurrer with civil
law equivalents).
75. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. As the famed fictional English barrister Horace Rumpole
might say: “I’m afraid what we have here is a case of premature adjudication.” JOHN
MORTIMER, RUMPOLE MISBEHAVES 176–77 (2007).
76. See Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852–53 (2008)
(“As both district court and appellate court judges try to parse the meaning of a few key phrases
in the Twombly decision, what was once uniform dogma about the pleading standard for most
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recognized the reemergence of fact pleading and cautioned that a
threshold filtering system based on individual judicial discretion
carried dangerous implications for the Federal Rules’ foundational
77
principles. He explained that the application of Rule 12(b)(6) would
depend on “the very real attitudinal differences among judges,” who,
lacking the benefit of a developed record, would feel free to decide
78
motions on instinct. Professor Marcus’s forewarning appears to have
materialized.
2. Iqbal’s Two-Step Process. Under the plausibility-pleading
standard, the Court has vested trial judges with the authority to
79
evaluate the strength of the factual “showing” of each claim for
80
relief and thus determine whether it should proceed. In Iqbal,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court described a two-step
approach for the plausibility inquiry that is quite different from the
questions of legal sufficiency and notice giving that were the focus of
the “showing” required under prior Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(e)
81
practice. First, district court judges are to distinguish factual

causes of action is being fragmented on a circuit-by-circuit—or sometimes a judge-by-judge—
basis. We district court judges suddenly and unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled over
something we thought we knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a motion to dismiss a
case for failure to state a claim.”).
77. See Marcus, supra note 37, at 482 (noting that increased judicial discretion could allow
judges to dismiss claims simply because they disfavor them).
78. Id. at 482–83; see also Burbank, supra note 52, at 115–16 (arguing that increasing
judicial discretion allows judges to rely on their personal preferences when deciding motions).
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). It appears that the textual core of the Twombly decision,
namely its focus on the sufficiency of a complaint’s factual “showing,” is the first time the Court
emphasized that word in Rule 8 in considering a motion to dismiss. In Iqbal, the Court offered
what many would regard as a new construction of the word “generally” in the second sentence
of Rule 9(b) relating to that provision’s mandate allowing the simplified pleading of conditions
of a person’s mind. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (explaining that the term “generally” is relative
and should be construed in light of the particularity requirements necessary to show fraud or
mistake under Rule 9).
80. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 & n.3 (2007). See Kilaru, supra note 66,
at 910–11 (clarifying that the Supreme Court set forth a legal plausibility standard that assesses
whether the facts plausibly suggest illegal conduct, rather than factual plausibility, which
questions whether the conduct actually occurred).
81. The critical allegation in Iqbal stated that Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director
Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to harsh
conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of [Iqbal’s] religion, race,
and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological reason.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944
(quotations omitted). Ashcroft was alleged to have been the “principal architect” of the plan
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allegations from legal conclusions, since only the former need be
82
accepted as true. Then, they must decide on the basis of the factual
allegations and their “judicial experience and common sense”
83
whether a plausible claim for relief has been shown.
The fact–legal conclusion dichotomy presented by Twombly’s
first step is shadowy at best. Worse, the categories are likely to
generate motion practice unrelated to the merits. Moreover, it is
precisely what the drafters of the original Rules intentionally rejected
as counterproductive and sought to eliminate by substituting “short
and plain” and “claim for relief” for any reference to the troublesome
code categories of “facts,” “conclusions,” “evidence,” and “cause of
84
action.”
Although Justice Souter, Twombly’s author, consented to the
theory of this first step, his disagreement with the Iqbal majority lay
in the undefined method by which the Court distinguished the
85
complaint’s factual allegations from its legal conclusions. In his
dissenting opinion, the Justice criticized “[t]he fallacy of the
majority’s position” because it classified many of the allegations as
conclusory and considered only a select number of factual allegations
in isolation, rather than construing the entire pleading in the
86
plaintiff’s favor. He and three other dissenters argued that the
majority’s classification was entirely arbitrary and failed to guide the
87
lower courts on how to draw the fact-conclusion distinction.
Some post-Iqbal decisions suggest the Justice’s concern may have
been well founded. The conclusion category is being applied quite
expansively, embracing allegations that one reasonably might classify

and Mueller was alleged to have executed it. Id. at 1944, 1951. The Court found these to be
conclusions. Id. at 1951.
82. The classic article on the subject is Walter Wheeler Cook, ‘Facts’ and ‘Statements of
Fact,’ 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233 (1936).
83. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
84. See generally 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1215–1218 (discussing the pleading
requirements of Rule 8); Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes,
21 COLUM. L. REV. 416 (1921) (noting that there is no logical distinction between categories
such as “statements of fact” and “conclusions of law”); Miller, supra note 32, at 1082–93
(describing the conceptual and practical difficulties inherent in the law-fact distinction); Subrin,
supra note 1, at 963, 975–77 (describing how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure avoided the
factual and cause of action requirements of civil codes).
85. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1960–61.
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88

as factual and therefore potentially jury triable, including the key
allegations in Iqbal itself. It is now fairly common for federal courts to
channel words used in Iqbal and characterize allegations as merely
“formulaic,” “conclusory,” “speculative,” “cryptic,” “generalized,” or
89
“bare.” By transforming arguably factual allegations into legal
conclusions and refusing to draw favorable inferences from them—
thereby ignoring portions of the complaint—judges are both failing to
construe the complaint in favor of the pleader as prior Rule 12(b)(6)
doctrine required and performing functions previously thought more
appropriate for the factfinder. And they are doing so based only on
90
the complaint. If nothing else, the emerging case law is revealing

88. See sources cited supra note 63; cf. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 975–77 (9th Cir.
2009) (distinguishing the complaint before the court from the complaint in Iqbal and finding
sufficient facts to satisfy plausibility).
89. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.2d 263, 274 (1st Cir. 2009) (characterizing some
allegations as “conclusory” before determining whether the remaining facts plausibly stated a
claim); Knaus v. Town of Ledgeview, No. 10-C-502, 2010 WL 2640272, at *3 (E.D. Wis. June 24,
2010) (characterizing the plaintiff’s allegations as “conclusory”); Ocasio-Hernandez v. FortunoBurset, 639 F. Supp. 2d 217, 222 (D.P.R. 2009) (characterizing the allegations as “generic” and
“conclusory”); Air Atlanta Aero Eng’g Ltd. v. SP Aircraft Owner I, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 185,
200 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (characterizing the allegations as “cryptic”); Consumer Protection Corp. v.
Neo-Tech News, No. CV-08-1983-PHX-JAT, 2009 WL 2132694, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 16, 2009)
(holding that the complaint contained enough factual allegations to be more than “conclusory”);
Fletcher v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., No. 3:09CV284-HEH, 2009 WL 2067807, at *6 (E.D. Va.
July 14, 2009) (characterizing the allegations as “conclusory”). In Starr v. Sony BMG Music
Entertainment, 592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010), an antitrust case, the court asserted, without
explanation, that an allegation that the defendants agreed to a price floor “is obviously
conclusory” and would not be accepted as true. Id. at 319 n.2. A number of courts have
acknowledged that complaints that would have survived under Conley do not (or might not)
survive under Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g., Coleman v. Tulsa Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, No.
09-3008, 2009 WL 2513520, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the complaint might
have survived under the pre-Iqbal standard); Ansley v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 4:09cv161RH/WCS, 2009 WL 1973548, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 8, 2009) (noting that the allegations might
have survived a motion to dismiss prior to the Twombly and Iqbal decisions); Kyle v. Holinka,
No. 09-cv-90-slc, 2009 WL 1867671, at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 29, 2009) (noting that conclusions
about allegations must be revisited in light of Iqbal).
90. This concern and the ramifications of it are strikingly demonstrated in Dan M. Kahan,
David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009). Professor Suja Thomas
discussed a similar principle. See Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 759, 760–61 (2009) (asserting that judges dismiss cases based on their own views of the
facts). Examples may be Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2007), where
the First Circuit upheld the discharge of a government worker allegedly based on political
activity, and Adams v. Lafayette College, No. 09-3008, 2009 WL 2777312, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
31, 2009), where the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upheld an employment discipline measure
allegedly based on age. With a few exceptions, the application of facts to legal principles
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that, like the Emperor in the well-known fable, the fact–conclusion
91
dichotomy has no clothes.
As to Iqbal’s second step, once trial judges have identified the
factual allegations, they then must decide whether a plausible claim
for relief has been shown. They may do so, according to the Court’s
majority opinion, by relying on their “judicial experience and
92
common sense,” highly ambiguous and subjective concepts largely
devoid of accepted—let alone universal—meaning. Further, the
plausibility of factual allegations appears to depend on the relative
likelihood that legally actionable conduct occurred versus a
hypothesized innocent explanation. In both Twombly and Iqbal, the
Court proposed explanations for the alleged factual pattern that were
93
94
thought to be an “obvious alternative” to or “more likely” than the
plaintiffs’ inferences of wrongdoing—findings strikingly analogous to
those made by factfinders in the trial setting.
As Justice Souter stated during oral argument in Iqbal, Twombly
presented “an either-or choice” between conspiracy and lawful
parallel conduct, which made the “obvious alternative explanation”
95
of a lack of wrongdoing highly logical given the case’s context. This
in turn made it easier for the Court’s majority to demand more than
what it characterized as legal conclusions to support a plausible
96
antitrust conspiracy claim. In Iqbal, however, the majority’s
description of the alleged conduct—the rounding up of Muslim men
following the September 11 terror attack on New York City—as
merely having incidental disparate impact on the plaintiff seemed
neither obvious nor more likely to the dissenting Justices because the

historically has been left to the jury. See generally James B. Thayer, Law and Fact in Jury Trials,
4 HARV. L. REV. 147, 170 (1890) (describing the jury’s role in weighing facts).
91. In Steinman, supra note 53, an excellent and highly analytic article, the author argues
that the key to Twombly-Iqbal is that critical allegations were conclusory and that the Court’s
new pleading paradigm is that a complaint will be sufficient if it “provides non-conclusory
allegations for each element of a claim for relief.” Id. at 1314. But that simply is another way of
describing fact pleading. The author offers what he calls a “transactional approach,” calling for
the pleader to provide a narrative that identifies “real-world acts or events underlying the
plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 1344. He acknowledges that there is no formula for distinguishing
between an adequate and inadequate identification of the liability-creating events. Id. at 1335.
92. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). A newly or recently appointed judge
theoretically is relegated to his or her common sense.
93. Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007).
94. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
95. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015).
96. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57.
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97

same simple dichotomy was not present. This point seems enhanced
by the fact that several critical allegations involved the defendants’
98
states of mind, which may be alleged “generally.”
At the same time, it is not entirely clear how this either-or
concept fits in. It seems that any issue essentially could be reduced to
an either-or choice. In Twombly, the conduct was either
conspiratorial or it was not. In Iqbal, the either-or choice was
between the plaintiffs having been affected by the rounding up of
Muslim men, or not having been impacted. The latter situation may
be more ambiguous, but is the inquiry really analytically different? Is
the argument that no cases can be reduced to an either-or
determination, or that most cases cannot be analyzed in that way?
Was that analysis appropriately applied in Twombly but not in Iqbal,
or was it inappropriate in both cases?
There are reasons to believe that Iqbal actually establishes a
99
more demanding pleading standard than Twombly. First, whereas
the earlier case only requires the complaint to suggest plausibility, the
later case calls for a reasonable inference of plausibility. Second,
Iqbal seems to favor a somewhat sterilized evaluation of the
complaint by stating that conclusions may be disregarded on a motion
to dismiss. The plausibility analysis is thus limited to what the court
deems to be the purely factual allegations. This analysis is
inconsistent with the notion that the entire complaint should be
100
examined holistically on a motion to dismiss. The effect of this
limitation is compounded by the aforementioned tendency to expand
the conclusion category, thereby inevitably contracting the fact
category and the judge’s field of vision. This phenomenon is
exacerbated by yet another development: dismissals based on the
court’s use of what has been termed a “slice and dice” technique of
making a sufficiency judgment by telescopically looking at each
element separately rather than taking a wide-angle view of the

97. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959–61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 1954 (majority opinion).
99. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 851 (2010) (arguing that the Iqbal standard is
stricter than the Twombly standard).
100. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007) (stating
that courts must consider complaints in their entirety).
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101

pleading. Thus, Iqbal may eliminate a range of arguably weak but
potentially meritorious cases, not merely meritless actions. Twombly
seemed to focus only on the latter. Obviously, that heightens the risk
of premature terminations.
Many, if not most, aspects of judicial experience and common
sense—which have become elements of balancing potential litigation
102
costs against the likelihood that a claim plausibly has merit —are not
matters found within the four corners of a pleading. Thus, the Court
in Twombly and Iqbal implicitly rejected the long-standing
proposition that only matters found within or integrally related to the
complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss, unless the
district judge chooses to convert the motion into one for summary
judgment, which would make the full discovery process available to
103
the parties, thereby further confusing Rule 12(b)(6) practice.
This radical departure from prior practice raises novel questions
of how the new pleading-motion regime will work going forward, and
whether efficiency actually is achieved by it. Given the expanded
judicial scope of inquiry on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, is it now
incumbent on a plaintiff to negate any and all potentially innocent
explanations for the defendant’s challenged conduct, a long104
proscribed form of anticipatory pleading? If a plaintiff must plead

101. See, e.g., In re Synchronoss Sec. Litig., No. 08-4437 (GEB), 2010 WL 1409664 (D.N.J.
Apr. 7, 2010).
102. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940 (citing Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
Surprisingly, the Court cites to Twombly for the proposition, but the Twombly opinion makes
no explicit mention of these two terms. Twombly does indicate that sufficiency “turns on the
suggestions raised by this conduct when viewed in light of common economic experience.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565. In addition, the judge only is authorized to consult “prior rulings and
considered views of leading commentators.” Id. at 556. The Iqbal interpretation of this passage,
one that should have been construed in the antitrust context, seems like an overly broad
expansion of a minor suggestion.
103. Before Twombly and Iqbal, trial judges only had the ability to consider “matters
incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of
public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the
complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned; these items may be considered by the district
judge without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” 5B WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 3, § 1357; see also Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322–23 (stating that courts may consider
documents incorporated by reference and items subject to judicial notice). If “matters outside
the pleadings” are presented and not excluded by the court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it “must
be treated” as one for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
104. See sources cited infra note 137. The Second Circuit, however, has stated that an
antitrust complaint does not need to allege facts that exclude independent, self-interested
conduct. Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 325, 327 (2d Cir. 2010).
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self-protectively, will it result in “phone book” pleading? Is this
specter a realistic one? Should parties be permitted to explore and
contest the relevance as well as the content of a judge’s experience
105
and common sense in their Rule 12(b)(6) motion submissions?
Since the costs of and time needed for discovery and a possible trial
often cannot be appraised accurately by examining the complaint,
should those issues also be a matter of adversarial combat on a
motion to dismiss? This expansion of pleading under Rule 8(a)(2) and
Rule 12(b)(6) may well dissipate the supposed time and resource
economies early termination is thought to achieve.
As is true of the division between facts and legal conclusions, the
Court provided little direction on how to measure the palpably
subjective factors of “judicial experience,” “common sense,” and a
“more likely” alternative explanation it has inserted into the Rule
106
12(b)(6) dynamic. Although judicial discretion normally is to be
applauded, it should be constrained in the context of a threshold
motion theoretically addressed solely to the notice-giving quality and
legal sufficiency of the complaint. If unconstrained, it allows judges to
deny access to a merits adjudication whenever an equivocal set of
107
facts can be interpreted as “more likely” to reflect lawful conduct.

105. The decisions are an invitation to counsel to investigate the background of district
judges, not only for purposes of the motion to dismiss but also for forum selection. The
existence of websites such as THE ROBING ROOM, http://www.therobingroom.com (last visited
Aug. 26, 2010), suggest that judicial privacy may be at risk.
106. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1257
(2008) (“Virtually everyone (except, perhaps, the five Justices in the majority in Twombly)
regards plausibility as an ambiguous standard.”). For a particularly striking example of this
subjectivity, see Mangum v. Town of Holly Springs, 551 F. Supp. 2d 439, 443–46 (E.D.N.C.
2008).
107. There is no obvious benchmark for what information is necessary to overcome a “more
likely” explanation. Some courts are more lenient than others in allowing a claim to go forward
even if there is an alternative explanation. Compare Foust v. Stryker Corp., No. 2:10-cv-00005,
2010 WL 2572179, at *4–5 (S.D. Ohio June 22, 2010) (“The fact that Plaintiff’s hip replacement
could have failed for multiple reasons is not relevant at this stage in the pleadings.”), and Cole v.
FBI, No. CV-09-21-BLG-RFC-CSO, 2010 WL 2541216, at *22 (D. Mont. June 17, 2010) (finding
facts sufficient even though there “may be alternative explanations”), with Am. Dental Ass’n v.
Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2010); and Phillips v. Bell, No. 08-1420, 2010 WL 517629,
at *7 (10th Cir. Feb. 12, 2010) (dismissing the complaint because it was “fairly implausible”
given there were more plausible reasons). Many are concerned, however, that the “more likely”
explanation analysis will impact civil rights claims disproportionately because discrimination
may be viewed as “an aberration from 21st century norms . . . [and] thus considered an
implausible explanation for a particular event or occurrence.” Has the Supreme Court Limited
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This process is uncomfortably close to a weighing of the evidence and
an invasion of the jury’s domain, suggesting that the Court’s decisions
represent a potentially significant change in the division of functions
108
between judge and jury. In other words, a trial-like scrutiny of the
merits is being shifted to an extremely early point in the pretrial
phase. This concern is compounded by the fear that rulings on
motions to dismiss may be affected by differences in background and
pre-judicial life experiences or turn on individual ideology regarding
the claim being advanced or personal attitudes toward the private
enforcement of federal statutes and other public policies, perhaps
coupled with an evaluation of extra-pleading matters hitherto
considered far beyond the legitimate scope of a motion to dismiss.
As a result, inconsistent rulings on virtually identical complaints
may well be based on individual judges having quite different
109
subjective views of what allegations are plausible. For instance, the
Iqbal majority decided that its “judicial experience” and “common
sense” refuted Iqbal’s claims of intended invidious discrimination by
110
government officials. Yet the four dissenting Justices—and a

Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at
70 (statement of John Payton, President, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund).
108. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 445 (2008) (noting
that plaintiffs no longer can survive a motion to dismiss by pleading equivocal facts); see also
Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851,
1867–71 (2008) (analyzing the constitutional implications of the Twombly standard on the role
of the jury); Kilaru, supra note 66, at 925–26 (comparing the plausibility standard to the
standard for the weighing of evidence in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)).
109. Cf. Hoffman, supra note 106, at 1259–60 (“A more significant, though less well
publicized, finding reached by the FJC [Federal Judicial Center] was that summary judgment
filing and grant rates vary—and sometimes wildly—by case type and by court. . . . These stark
disparities in filing rates and, more importantly in grant rates, offer a powerful reason to be
wary of expanding the scope of judicial pleading review authority, at least if the goal of
transsubstantive rules is not to be entirely jettisoned.”).
110. Relying on facts found outside Iqbal’s complaint, the majority reasoned as follows:
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who
counted themselves members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist
group. Al Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim—Osama bin Laden—and
composed in large part of his Arab Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise
that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental
impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to target neither
Arabs nor Muslims.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009). But cf. Tim Reid, George W. Bush ‘Knew
ONLINE
(Apr.
9,
2010),
Guantánamo
Prisoners
Were
Innocent,’
TIMES
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7092435.ece
(reporting
that former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s chief of staff had signed a declaration stating that
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111

majority of the Second Circuit panel —disagreed and found that his
112
allegations established a plausible claim of constitutional violations.
If each of the nine Supreme Court Justices had been serving instead
as district court judges in separate cases, Iqbal’s complaint would
have survived the motion to dismiss nearly half the time.
Other inconsistencies and uncertainties of application have
arisen, causing confusion and disarray among judges and lawyers. For
example, the Third Circuit has ruled that the 2002 Supreme Court
113
decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., which upheld notice
114
pleading in employment discrimination actions, was no longer
115
authoritative after Iqbal. Iqbal did not refer to Swierkiewicz. The
116
117
Seventh Circuit and courts in other circuits have disagreed.

the president, the vice president, and the Secretary of Defense knew that “hundreds of innocent
men” were sent to the Guantánamo Bay prison camp).
111. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 177–78 (2d Cir. 2007) (Newman & Sack, JJ.), rev’d sub.
nom. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 137; id. at 178 (Cabranes, J., concurring).
112. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954–61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
113. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
114. Id. at 513. The continued validity of this decision seemingly was accepted in Twombly.
Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007).
115. Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc., 346 F. App’x 774, 776 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009);
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588
F.3d 186, 192 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The standard that the plaintiffs quoted from
Swierkiewicz . . . was explicitly overruled in Twombly.”). According to Steinman, supra note 53,
the Third Circuit’s “logic is deeply flawed.” Id. at 1332. However, a different panel of the Third
Circuit now has referred to its previous analysis of Swierkiewicz in Fowler as dictum and
approvingly cited the Second Circuit’s analysis that Twombly is consistent with Swierkiewicz. In
re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., Nos. 08-1455, 08-1777, 07-4046, 2010 WL 3211147, at *9, n.17
(3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). (stating that although Fowler said Twombly and Iqbal “repudiated”
Swierkiewicz, “we are not so sure”); see also Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120
(2d Cir. 2010) (stating that Twombly and Iqbal were consistent with Swierkiewicz in not
requiring heightened fact pleading).
116. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 2977297 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010). The
court’s division is an exemplar of the problem. Chief Judge Easterbrook joined in Judge Wood’s
opinion finding plausibility in a pro se plaintiff’s housing discrimination complaint relying on
Swierkiewicz. Id. at 4. Judge Posner dissented, concluding that the plaintiff’s “hypothesis of
racial discrimination does not have substantial merit; it is implausible,” id. at *9 (Posner, J.,
dissenting in part), and finding Swierkiewicz distinguishable.
117. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting in dictum that Twombly
“reaffirmed the holding of Swierkiewicz”); EEOC v. Universal Brixius, LLC, No. 09-c-774, 2009
WL 3400940, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2009); Gillman v. Inner City Broad. Corp., No. 08 Civ.
8909 (LAP), 2009 WL 3003244, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009) (“Iqbal was not meant to
displace Swierkiewicz’s teachings about pleading standards for employment discrimination
claims because in Twombly, which heavily informed Iqbal, the Supreme Court explicitly
affirmed the vitality of Swierkiewicz.”); see also Arista Records, 604 F.3d at 119–21 (citing and
implicitly recognizing Swierkiewicz’s continued vitality). But see Argeropoulos v. Exide Techs.,
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Moreover, in some instances when a multiparty or multiclaim case is
partially dismissed, the plaintiff has been authorized to use discovery
in connection with the surviving portion of the litigation to see if it
118
will yield information that will resuscitate the dismissed portion,
creating a practice that is discontinuous with what is possible in a
dismissed single-defendant-single-claim dispute. The ability to access
the discovery system should not turn on the particular party structure
or substantive complexity of an action.
It is possible that the Iqbal Court’s willingness to substitute a
benign explanation for the government defendants’ alleged
purposeful discrimination and illicit treatment of the plaintiff may
have been based on the case’s sensitive nature—a terrorism suspect
claiming discrimination by federal officials in the wake of September
11—as much as it was on an assessment of the legal standards
119
involved. But allowing trial judges to take external considerations
into account on a threshold motion that historically has been resolved
on a pleading’s contents may provide yet another avenue for
unrestrained discretion to deny a plaintiff access to an adjudication

No. 08-cv-3760, 2009 WL 2132443, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009) (“[T]his kind of non-specific
allegation might have enabled Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim to survive under the
old ‘no set of facts’ standard for assessing motions to dismiss. But it does not survive the
Supreme Court’s ‘plausibility standard,’ as most recently clarified in Iqbal.” (citation omitted)).
118. See, e.g., Arocho v. Nafziger, 367 F. App’x 942, 954–55 (10th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v.
Township of Pemberton, Civil No. 09-810 (NLH) (AMP), 2010 WL 2540466, at *6 (D.N.J. June
17, 2010); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2009 WL 2246194, at *12
(N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009); Kyle v. Holina, No. 09-cv-90-slc, 2009 WL 1867671, at *3 (W.D. Wis.
June 29, 2009). However, one academic who is in favor of exploiting discovery for related claims
cautions that if such a procedure is followed, judges should toll the statute of limitations on
dismissed claims while discovery is underway so plaintiffs are not disadvantaged if they uncover
facts sufficient to state a claim. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to
Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 245 (statement of Alan
B. Morrison, Professor, George Washington University Law School).
119. The majority cited Judge Cabranes’ concurring opinion in the Second Circuit, which
“expressed concern at the prospect of subjecting high-ranking Government officials—entitled to
assert the defense of qualified immunity and charged with responding to ‘a national and
international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic’—to
the burdens of discovery on the basis of a complaint as nonspecific as respondent’s.” Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1945 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, J.,
concurring), rev’d sub. nom. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 137). Arguably, by terminating the case on the
complaint, the Court preempted what might have been a useful constitutional exploration of
governmental immunity by substituting something tantamount to absolute immunity for what
only should have been an issue of qualified immunity. See, e.g., al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 957–79
(distinguishing between claims of absolute and qualified immunity). That, however, should have
been treated a matter of substantive law, not pleading.
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based on a developed summary-judgment or trial record. Given the
realpolitik of modern litigation, the two Supreme Court decisions
have provided defendants with a plethora of possibilities for attacking
complaints.
Although
judicial
discretion—and
its
potential
for
inconsistency—is hardly a novel aspect of Rule 12(b)(6) motion
practice, the invocation in Twombly and Iqbal of highly subjective
factors may have made it the determinative factor in deciding
whether a plaintiff will be allowed to proceed to discovery. Without
question, according discretion to experienced, talented judges is a
valuable keystone of the federal civil-justice system; but it threatens
to become excessive when taken to the extreme of causing
unpredictability and permitting reliance on individual predilection,
especially in light of the terminal potential of pretrial motions to
dismiss and summary judgment. Both jurists and academics
frequently have suggested that the application of a judge’s subjective
impressions can lead to inappropriate and inconsistent results if
120
devoid of strictures.
121
It is somewhat ironic that in Burnham v. Superior Court,
Justice Scalia, who joined the majority in Twombly and Iqbal, argued
that Justice Brennan’s dissenting proposal for using “fairness” and
“contemporary notions of due process” in deciding personal
jurisdiction questions based on the defendant’s physical presence in
the forum was grounded in the “subjectivity” of a presiding judge
and, thus, provided an “uncertain[]” and “inadequate” standard for
122
lower courts to apply. Yet by instructing judges to use their “judicial
experience” and “common sense” to determine the plausibility of
complaints, the Court has introduced the subjectivity and resulting
variances that Justice Scalia suggested in Burnham should be
123
If the protection of constitutional norms and the
avoided.

120. See McMahon, supra note 76, at 867 (noting that different courts invariably will reach
different results when confronted with complaints that do not contain detailed facts); Michael S.
Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing over
Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 809–10 (2004) (arguing that judicial subjectivity produces
inconsistent results). See generally Hoffman, supra note 106, at 1259–60 (detailing the disparities
in summary judgment filing and grant rates across court and case types).
121. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
122. Id. at 623, 626.
123. Not surprisingly, as of this writing, courts have adopted varying approaches to
interpreting Twombly and Iqbal. Although many courts have applied a demanding reading of
the decisions in cases dealing with a defendant’s mental state—such as agreement, conspiracy,
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enforcement of substantive legislation and common law principles are
to be entrusted in significant part to federal civil litigation,
consideration must be given to whether the pleading and motion
structure currently evolving strikes a proper balance between the
need to rely on private attorneys general to effectuate important
policies and responding to the concerns about costs and abusive
litigation that apparently has motivated the Court.
3. A New Model of Civil Procedure. Plausibility pleading and
trial-type determinations on a motion to dismiss are the latest step
toward a far different model of civil procedure than previously has
existed: the Federal Rules once advanced trials on the merits, but
cases post-Twombly and Iqbal now turn on Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule
56 motions; jurors once were trusted with deciding issues of fact and
applying their findings to the applicable principles of law following
the presentation of evidence, but now judges are authorized to make
these determinations using nothing but a naked complaint and their
124
own discretion. In sum, this new reliance on judicial experience and
common sense to the exclusion of juror experience and popular
common sense comes at the expense of the democratic values
inherent in a jury-trial system and the utility of private enforcement
125
of a wide range of public policies.
Even if our civil litigation system has moved from a trial to a
settlement culture, the pretrial process should not simply be a series
of procedural stop signs. Rather, it should be crafted to permit the
parties to achieve resolution of their dispute on the basis of an
intelligent and fair agreement, which often can be achieved only if
both parties have the information needed to appraise the costs and
126
risks of continued litigation. It is imperative that policymakers on

and discrimination—others apply a liberal repleading approach to ensure that plaintiffs have
another opportunity to meet the standard. See supra note 63; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv.,
572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Having initiated the present lawsuit without the benefit of
the Court’s latest pronouncements on pleadings, Plaintiffs deserve a chance to supplement their
complaint with factual content in the manner that Twombly and Iqbal require.”).
124. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873) (Story, J.) (“It is assumed
that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw
wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.”).
125. For an expression of concerns along these lines, see In re Travel Agent Comm’n
Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 912 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
126. Professor Richard A. Nagareda, who also sees the developments of the last quarter
century as erecting a series of procedural cost-imposition stop signs and the replacement of trial
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and off the bench give thought to what is a critical inquiry: identifying
what type of pleading and pretrial-motion system would be
appropriate for the future, and determining what is really meant by
127
the words “just,” “speedy,” and “inexpensive” in Federal Rule 1.
Are the conventions regarding the construction of pleadings and
the inferences to be drawn therefrom a thing of the past? Is there an
inverse relationship between whether a stated claim is plausible and
the projected extent and resource burdens of continued litigation—
the claim being treated as less plausible when the assumed discovery
activity appears extensive and vice versa? And has the traditional de
novo standard used on appellate review of a grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion been compromised by the subjective appraisals the Court has
authorized? If the answer to any of these questions is yes, then
federal practice has moved even further from its original premises
than the Court may have realized when it decided Twombly and
Iqbal.
There are a few rays of light for parties asserting claims,
however. The Court’s opinions do not call for a probability showing
128
or “detailed factual allegations” or require the pleading of evidence.
Fortunately, they merely require “enough fact to raise a reasonable
129
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal[ity].”
Moreover, in reaching its conclusions in Twombly, the Court stated
130
that it did “not apply any ‘heightened’ pleading standard.” Nor did

with pretrial, has noted that in our settlement-oriented culture, the procedural system should
develop mechanisms that would help parties appraise the value of their cases rather than simply
give them a binary choice between dismissal and full-throttle movement forward. Richard A.
Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pre-trial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1–6, 33–34), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568127; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 165, 167–68 (proposing that the use of preliminary judgments as “tentative
assessment[s] of the merits of a case” would “provide litigants with a highly credible evaluation
of the case” and avoid settlement obstacles).
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Spencer, supra note 64, argues that Twombly (and he presumably
would extend his view to Iqbal) has “determined that efficiency is the priority.” Id. at 23–25. See
generally Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Uncovering Discovery 3 (2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/12C00D
75EEE2711D8525764800454561/$File/Elizabeth%20Cabraser%2C%20Uncovering%20Discove
ry.pdf?OpenElement (summarizing various proposals to solve discovery problems and modify
pleading standards).
128. See Steinman, supra note 53, at 1328–33 (noting that Twombly and Iqbal commonly are
misread to require evidentiary support at the pleadings stage).
129. Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
130. Id. at 569 n.14. This statement is questioned in Part I.C, infra.
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the Court overrule its decision in Swierkiewicz. Perhaps the most
significant source of optimism is that the concepts articulated by the
Court are malleable enough to enable federal judges to apply them in
a manner consistent with systemic values other than cost and
efficiency. In that vein, the Seventh Circuit took a restrained view of
132
Twombly and Iqbal in Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., a case alleging
racial discrimination in connection with the denial of a housing loan.
In her majority opinion, Judge Diane P. Wood remarked,
“Plausibility” . . . does not imply that the district court should decide
whose version to believe, or which version is more likely than
not. . . . As we understand it, the Court is saying instead that the
plaintiff must give enough details . . . to present a story that holds
together. . . . [C]ould these things have happened, not did they
133
happen.

If Judge Wood proves accurate, we may be entering an age of
storytelling pleading. But will the tales be happy or sad ones? The
answer may lie in the eye of the beholder.
B. Should the Plausibility Standard Be Cabined?
In Iqbal, the Court laid to rest any thought that Twombly might
be limited to antitrust actions by announcing that plausibility pleading
“governs . . . all civil actions and proceedings in the United States
134
district courts.” The Court did not have to reach that far. Nothing in

131. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569–70 (explaining why the Court’s holding accorded with
Swierkiewicz). The Second Circuit, in Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010),
adverted to a number of these factors in concluding that the notion that Twombly imposed a
heightened pleading standard including “specific evidence, factual allegations in addition to
those required by Rule 8, and declarations from persons who collected the evidence is belied by
the Twombly opinion itself.” Id. at 119–20; see also Dobyns v. U.S., 91 Fed. Cl. 412, 425 (2010)
(holding that notice pleading is affirmed by the “part of Twombly in which the Court stated that
‘once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.’ This statement would not be accurate, of
course, if all the facts ‘consistent with the allegations in the complaint’ had to be in the
complaint” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561)).
132. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 2977297 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010).
133. Id. at *3. Judge Posner’s dissent concluded that Twombly and Iqbal established a much
more demanding pleading standard than his two colleagues acknowledged. Id. at *8–10 (Posner,
J., dissenting in part).
134. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Some courts and commentators had concluded that the Twombly
opinion was narrow and possibly applied only to antitrust cases. E.g., Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic
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its pre-Twombly jurisprudence suggests that the plausibility
requirement somehow has been embedded in the word “showing,”
135
which has been in Rule 8 since 1938. Nor did the situation in Iqbal
require the universal application of plausibility pleading. The official
immunity at issue in that case is a judicially created doctrine. Thus,
rather than altering the Rule 8 pleading regime, a limited fact- or
heightened-pleading requirement obliging the plaintiff to negate that
defense in the complaint could have been mandated as a matter of
136
federal common law to effectuate the doctrine’s underlying policies,
although that would have created a somewhat awkward anticipatory137
pleading requirement.
Despite the Court’s global statement, the Iqbal majority made
clear that the determination of a complaint’s plausibility is a context138
specific task. It requires courts to examine “the [substantive]
139
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim,” a concept firmly
140
embedded in the case law. But context is not a simple, unitary

and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2):
Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604 (2006).
135. None of the hundreds of pre-Twombly cases cited in 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
3, §§ 1202, 1215–1219, place any emphasis on “showing.”
136. Other academics also have questioned the Iqbal Court’s decision to extend its holding
beyond the qualified immunity context. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access
to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 93 (statement of
Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of
Pennsylvania Law School) (“Alternatively, the Court should have forthrightly required fact
pleading as a matter of substantive federal common law, that is, as a necessary protection for the
judge-made defense of qualified immunity.”).
137. Anticipatory pleading long has been thought inappropriate in federal practice because
it violates the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley,
211 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1908) (holding that plaintiffs could not establish federal question
jurisdiction by anticipating a defense); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638–42 (1980)
(holding that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense and need not be negated by the
plaintiff). See generally Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1783–85 (1998) (noting that federal courts generally dislike attempts by
plaintiffs to fashion federal question jurisdiction by anticipating defenses).
138. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940.
139. Id. at 1947.
140. See, e.g., Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 323–27 (2d Cir. 2010)
(reversing the lower court’s dismissal on grounds that the plaintiff had asserted sufficient, nonconclusory factual allegations); Breaux v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 554 F.3d 854, 862 (10th Cir.
2009) (reversing the lower court’s dismissal because it had interpreted the plaintiff’s complaints
too narrowly); Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA), 524 F.3d 217, 225 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing
the lower court’s dismissal because plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient injury in fact for purposes
of standing); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting the importance
of context in examining factual allegations).
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measure. Not only does it refer to the substantive law governing a
case but also, among other things, to whether the action turns on
objective facts or subjective matters such as the intent or motive of
the parties, the complexity or simplicity of the case, and whether or
141
not the litigation will be resource consumptive. These variations in
context may confine the seemingly unbridled grant of discretion and
universality that the Court appears to have promised for plausibility
pleading.
For instance, in the antitrust context, substantive precedent
clearly influenced the Court’s judgment in deciding Twombly, leading
the Justices to reach a similar conclusion on a motion to dismiss as it
did on summary judgment in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
142
Zenith Radio Corp., in which the Court found that circumstantial
evidence of parallel conduct was not enough to make claims of
143
conspiracy factually or economically plausible. Similarly, the Iqbal
Court looked to existing jurisprudence regarding unconstitutional
144
discrimination when it held that the complaint had to plead
sufficient facts regarding defendants’—Attorney General John
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller—purposeful mental states

141. For a useful discussion of the relevance of context, see Spencer, supra note 64, at 32–36.
142. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). It has been
argued that “plausibility” was used in Matsushita as an element of antitrust law, and therefore it
was improperly absorbed into pleading doctrine in Twombly. See Edward Brunet, Antitrust
Summary Judgment and the Quick Look Approach, 62 SMU L. REV. 493, 510–11 (2009).
143. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of
“General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 552 (noting that the Court in Twombly interpreted the
plaintiff’s complaint as alleging only parallel conduct); Miller, supra note 32, at 1030 (same);
Spencer, supra note 108, at 487 (same). In Sony, the Second Circuit upheld allegations of an
antitrust conspiracy relying on the difference in factual context between the complaint before it,
which contained allegations that went beyond parallel conduct, and the one in Twombly. Sony
BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d at 324–27.
144. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. The Court effectively altered the law of official immunity. Cf.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (holding
that a city ordinance designed to prohibit a specific religious practice was unconstitutional
discrimination when there was no compelling governmental interest to prohibit the practice);
Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279–81 (1979) (holding that a Massachusetts policy of
giving preference to military veterans when hiring for state jobs was not unconstitutional sex
discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 279 (1976) (holding that the racially
disproportionate impact of a written test used in the process of hiring police officers was not
racial discrimination).
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despite the very modest pleading standard set out in the second
145
sentence of Rule 9(b).
Adherents of the Court’s more demanding pleading direction as
well as those who argue that the two recent cases have changed little
or nothing rely on pre-Twombly Supreme Court decisions to support
their contentions. But, these cases do not justify Iqbal’s extension of
146
Twombly to “all civil actions and proceedings.”
Dura
147
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, for example, was a securities fraud
action governed by the pleading strictures of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act. The Court concluded that the plaintiff had
failed to identify loss causation, a critical substantive requirement of
such actions comparable to issues of consideration or negligence in
breach-of-contract or tort actions. Typically overlooked is the passage
in Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court indicating that pleading loss
causation should not be “burdensome”; it simply calls for indicating
148
the loss and its connection with the fraud the plaintiff “has in mind.”
A second case referred to in support of Twombly and Iqbal,
Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State
149
Council of Carpenters, was a sizable antitrust action that failed to
identify the coercion alleged to be at the heart of a conspiracy. Justice
Stevens, who dissented in both Twombly and Iqbal, did remark in his
opinion for the Court that the district judge could require “some
150
specificity” in pleading. But he was referring to the district court’s
ability to require a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), not a
151
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). In neither of these cases did the
Court go outside the four corners of the pleading or attempt to assess

145. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948–54. See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1301
(discussing the requirement of Rule 9(b) that allegations of malice or intent be made generally).
146. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to
Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 11–12 (statement of
Gregory G. Garre, Partner, Latham & Watkins, LLP) (arguing prior Supreme Court precedent
already established a stricter pleading standard).
147. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347–48 (2005).
148. Id. at 347. Also mentioned by those claiming that little change has occurred is Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1985), a case challenging Mississippi’s distribution of public-school land
funds, which raised a difficult, fact-driven, controversial constitutional question. Nothing in the
Court’s opinion in that case, however, previsions Twombly and Iqbal.
149. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519 (1983).
150. Id. at 528 n.17.
151. Id.
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or weigh the factual allegations, the most significant departures from
prior practice taken in Twombly and Iqbal.
Moreover, antitrust, securities-fraud, and constitutionaldeprivation claims represent an extremely small fraction of federal
court dockets, raising the obvious question: what was the reason—
and the motivation—for the Court’s extension of plausibility to all
cases, the vast majority of which do not raise the concerns articulated
to justify the need for heightened pleading? Perhaps it was out of
respect for the transsubstantivity principle, which requires uniform
152
application of the Federal Rules. As discussed below, that is
unlikely. In any event, it is a slim rationale indeed, because the Court
also made it clear that the plausibility inquiry was context specific.
Philosophically, that is at odds with the prior understanding of the
universal, transsubstantive application of the pleading formulation in
Rule 8(a), although that is not necessarily inconsistent with the actual
practice in some federal courts prior to Twombly and Iqbal.
It remains to be seen, however, whether district courts will
extend the demands of plausibility pleading to require factual
allegations of the elements of relatively uncomplicated civil actions,
as exemplified by Official Form 11—formerly Form 9—the paradigm
153
negligence complaint. Although the Twombly Court was careful to
154
assert the continuing validity of Form 11, it nevertheless stated that
factual allegations—not mere conclusions—would be required to
surmount the plausibility hurdle. However, a word such as
“negligently,” which appears in Form 11, may be viewed as either a
factual allegation or a legal conclusion analogous to the treatment of
“agreement” in Twombly, or a mixture of the two categories. If it is

152. See infra notes 338–58 and accompanying text.
153. FED. R. CIV. P. form 11.
154. Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 565 n.10 (2007). “Negligence” is also implicated
in Forms 12 and 14. The forms are said to “suffice under these rules” in Rule 84. FED. R. CIV. P.
84; see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 2977297, at *3 (7th Cir. July 30,
2010) (“[I]n many straightforward cases, it will not be any more difficult today for a plaintiff to
meet that burden than it was before the Court’s recent decisions.”). Questions also have been
raised about the sufficiency of Form 18 for a patent-infringement complaint. Compare McZeal
v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that “a bare allegation of
literal infringement using the form is inadequate to provide sufficient notice to an accused
infringer under a theory of literal infringement”), with Colida v. Nokia, 347 F. App’x 568, 571
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that the claimant did not argue sufficiency under Form 18 and that
the form is not suited for infringement claims with respect to design patents). If the forms are
held to be outside the ambit of Twombly and Iqbal, there would be significant variance in
practice between words in the forms and words not found in the forms.
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considered a fact, courts should accept an allegation of negligent
conduct as true and thereby confirm that Form 11 remains a sufficient
model for this category of actions. On the other hand, if courts begin
interpreting “negligently” as a legal conclusion, plaintiffs may have to
channel tort law and specify the factual elements to qualify as a
155
plausible claim. For example, plaintiffs may have to recite the
precise actions taken or not taken by a defendant motorist that made
156
his or her driving negligent. In highlighting the benefits of the
liberal ethos of the Federal Rules, Judge Charles E. Clark specifically
pointed to this type of pleading burden as one that happily would be
157
avoided and that probably motivated the way Form 11 was drafted.
In one striking negligence case that relied on Twombly and Iqbal
and involved a simple slip and fall, the complaint was dismissed
because it failed to allege “facts that show how the liquid came to be
on the floor, whether the Defendant knew or should have known of
158
the presence of the liquid, or how the Plaintiff’s accident occurred.”
In addition to the dubious propriety of demanding that level of
particularity in such a common, garden-variety case, it is unrealistic to
expect the plaintiff to know or have access to information about the
facts relating to many of these matters without discovery.
Should Iqbal’s assertion of universality prove accurate, federal
courts will be required to devote much more time to evaluating
factual allegations than in the past—time that might be better spent

155. The same may be said of a number of other critical words—for example, “conspiracy,”
“illicit,” and “motive.” Under a “transactional approach” to pleading, Form 11 would be
sufficient since the challenged event is identified in time and space. See Steinman, supra note 53,
at 1328–31.
156. In Farash v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 337 F. App’x 7 (2d Cir. 2009), the court indicated
that the plaintiff is required to allege in what manner he was injured and how the defendant was
negligent. Id. at 9. In connection with the plaintiff’s assault claim, the court also wanted
allegations of the circumstances that would induce a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm.
Id. at 10; see also Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL 2604447, at *2
(W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2009) (finding that the plaintiff’s allegations of negligence did not meet the
Twombly standard because the plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts as to the circumstances
leading to the accident); Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Butte Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09-245
WBS CMK, 2009 WL 2424608, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009) (noting that the sufficiency of the
Official Forms has “been cast into doubt”).
157. Judge Clark told a story about a negligence lawyer who, under the code-pleading
regime, regularly attached “two and a half pages of type-written allegations of detailed things
that might happen in an automobile accident” to his complaint in order to allege every fact that
possibly could constitute negligence while driving. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 2, at 224; see also
Clark, supra note 1, at 191 (stating that the forms are “the most important part of the rules”).
158. Branham, 2009 WL 2604447, at *2.
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appraising the merits of a well-developed record presented at
summary judgment or trial, especially with regard to uncomplicated
matters. Add to that burden the possibility that defendants might be
obliged to show the plausibility of affirmative defenses like
contributory negligence or assumption of risk—or even a simple
159
denial of negligence—a subject to be explored later. In other words,
the full effect plausibility pleading will have on judicial time and party
160
resource expenditures is very uncertain. This uncertainty raises a
basic question as to what, if anything, has been gained by Twombly
and Iqbal in terms of time, expense, and efficiency, the Court’s
primary justifications for the newly announced pleading
161
requirement.
The federal courts may well face something of a Catch-22 in the
complex litigation environment. Those cases, frequently involving
constitutional and statutory rights implicating national or state
policies and affecting large numbers of people, include actions in
which factual sufficiency is most difficult to achieve at the pleading
stage and in which the pretrial process tends to be highly resource
consumptive. Courts may well apply the plausibility standard more
rigorously, claiming that complex cases require more extensive
162
pleading to address the supposed shortfalls of notice pleading.
Recent decisions suggest that complex cases—such as those involving
claims of discrimination, conspiracy, and antitrust violations—have
163
been particularly vulnerable to the demands of Twombly and Iqbal.

159. See infra notes 386–96 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
161. In DeLotta v. Dezenzo’s Italian Restaurant, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-2033-Orl-22KRS, 2009 WL
4349806 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2009), the court, relying on Twombly-Iqbal, refused to enter an
otherwise-appropriate default judgment because the plaintiff had not pled facts showing he was
a covered employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at *2–4.
162. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Complexity of Modern American Civil Litigation: Curse
or Cure?, 91 JUDICATURE 163, 165 (2008) (discussing the historical and normative causes of the
complexity of litigation in the United States); Epstein, supra note 52, at 66, 98 (noting the
benefits of a stricter pleading requirement in the context of antitrust litigation); see also
Hoffman, supra note 106, at 1224 (discussing when and whether claims should receive greater
scrutiny).
163. See, e.g., In re Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 908–11 (6th Cir.
2009) (dismissing an antitrust collusion claim because the “defendants’ conduct ‘was not only
compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed free market
behavior’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009))); Cooney v. Rossiter, 583
F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (dismissing a conspiracy claim based on lack of “any suggestion,
beyond a bare conclusion, that the remaining defendants were leagued in a conspiracy with the
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Yet, these are the very cases that should be given greater pleading
latitude and necessitate other forms of attention and oversight by
district judges.
It is uncertain how plaintiffs with potentially meritorious claims
are expected to plead with factual sufficiency without the benefit of
some discovery, especially when they are limited in terms of time or
money, or have no access to important information that often is in the
164
possession of the defendant, especially when the defendant denies
165
access. As Professor A. Benjamin Spencer writes, “claims for which
intent or state of mind is an element—such as discrimination or
conspiracy claims—are more difficult to plead in a way that will
166
satisfy the plausibility standard.” Demands for plausibility pleading
167
may shut “the doors of discovery” on the very litigants who most
need the procedural resources the Federal Rules previously made

dismissed defendants”); Dorsey v. Ga. Dep’t of State Road & Tollway Auth., No. 1:09-CV-482TWT, 2009 WL 2477565, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2009) (holding that “numerous” racially
discriminatory remarks were insufficient for a hostile-work-environment claim); Ibrahim v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2009 WL 2246194, at *8–11 (N.D. Cal. July 27,
2009) (dismissing a discrimination complaint because plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to
establish that defendants took action because of, and not merely in spite of, the fact that
plaintiff was a Muslim and a citizen of Malaysia); Vallejo v. City of Tucson, No. CV08-500 TUC
DCB, 2009 WL 1835115, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 26, 2009) (dismissing a Voting Rights Act claim
brought by a disabled Mexican American veteran because the asserted denial of a provisional
ballot was an “isolated incident”); Fletcher v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., No. 3:09CV284-HEH,
2009 WL 2067807, at *5–7 (E.D. Va. July 14, 2009) (dismissing an employment discrimination
claim based on plaintiff’s failure to plead specific factual allegations that similarly situated
employees, who were not members of a protected class, received more favorable treatment than
plaintiff); see also sources cited supra note 67.
164. See Burbank, supra note 143, at 561 (“Perhaps the most troublesome possible
consequence of Twombly and Iqbal is that they will deny access to court to plaintiffs and
prospective plaintiffs with meritorious claims who cannot satisfy their requirements either
because they lack the resources to engage in extensive pre-filing investigation or because of
informational asymmetries.”); Spencer, supra note 64, at 36 (concluding that the pleading
standard now embodies a view toward increased judicial efficiency). The Court took no note of
Rule 11(b)(3), which specifically addresses situations in which a document presented to the
court is signed by someone who lacks but expects to obtain information to support its content
through “investigation or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
165. See Pa. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, No. 09 C 5619, 2010 WL
1979569, at *13–14 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2010) (finding that allegations that defendants withheld
information that made it impossible to identify which plan participants did not receive benefits
and which provisions were violated excused plaintiff’s failure to provide facts to state ERISA
claim).
166. See Spencer, supra note 108, at 459 (arguing that plaintiffs will face a higher pleading
hurdle when evidence supporting an allegation of wrongdoing is more difficult to identify).
167. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
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available. Perhaps it is appropriate to obligate plaintiffs to plead in
greater detail about those matters on which they are informed or on
which they reasonably can inform themselves, even though there may
be understandable tactical reasons why they might not want to do so.
The pleading system should not be reduced to a game of hide the ball
168
nor should it tolerate laziness or sloth. But to demand fact pleading
on pain of dismissal when the facts are unknown or unknowable is a
negation of the pleader’s ability to access the civil justice system.
It is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that a prospective
plaintiff should inform himself prior to instituting litigation. Indeed,
Rule 11(b) requires that every signer of any paper submitted to the
169
court make “an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.” And
in our information-rich society there is no doubt that modern
technology, mandatory disclosure laws, and governmental
investigations make a great deal of data available that is useful to
many potential plaintiffs. Some of it will support and some of it will
undermine their claims. What is available will not be useful—let
alone determinative—on the plausibility issue in many cases,
170
however.
But any presuit-inquiry requirement must itself be a
“reasonable” one. It is much too facile to say that the pleader should
171
be obliged to explore the entire public domain. That is a universe of
incomprehensible vastness today, one that is expanding with every

168. The difference in the pleader’s obligation based on what is known and what is not is
demonstrated by two fact patterns District Judge John G. Koeltl of the Southern District of
New York has presented in conversation and in public. In the first, the plaintiff simply asserts “I
have been subjected to a hostile work environment because I am black and request damages”
but pleads nothing else. In the second the plaintiff simply asserts “I have been fired because I
am white and request damages.” In the first situation, the plaintiff presumably knows the events
that led her to conclude that she has been exposed to a hostile work environment and can plead
enough to enable the court to determine the plausibility of the assertion. Perhaps she should be
obliged to do so. In the second, the plaintiff may not know the facts underlying his
discriminatory firing or have access to them, let alone access to the employer’s records to
determine whether his discharge is part of a pattern of improper conduct. Cf. PETER L.
MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 231 n.211, 595 (2004) (noting that in the
German procedural system, which requires the pleadings to contain developed factual assertions
and identify potential sources of proof for them, less detail is required when the necessary
information is held by the opposing party or nonparty).
169. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
170. See Colin Reardon, Note, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2010) (manuscript at 49–59) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
171. It is true that declining search costs and widespread Internet availability are facilitating
pretrial investigation. See id. at 27–33.
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172

Moreover, speaking autobiographically, not
passing moment.
everyone in our society—including lawyers—has access to the
necessary technological tools or the knowledge of how to use them
effectively, even when they are available. And, of course, the Internet
and social networks are a world of both fact and fiction, it often being
difficult to tell one from the other.
This problem of information asymmetry—which generally is a
173
much more formidable concern for plaintiffs than for defendants —
presents itself in many litigation contexts. It is prevalent in actions
challenging the conduct of large institutions—for example, antitrust
and securities cases—when the necessary information relating to
issues such as fraud, conspiracy, price-fixing, and corporate
governance can be found only in the defendant’s files and
174
computers. The problem is exacerbated in multiple–defendant
situations in which access to information is critical to indicating the
alleged wrongdoing in order to focus on the alleged wrongdoer.
The same is true of questions like intent and malice. A similar
asymmetry exists in other important litigation contexts such as actions
against governmental entities. Particularly affected are civil rights and
employment-discrimination cases, in which issues of motivation, state

172. In Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal
with Reference to Antitrust (Aug. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal), the author argues that a prospective plaintiff should be obliged to plumb public
domain sources prior to pleading. In Spencer, supra note 64, at 26–31, the interesting notion is
advanced that requiring detailed pleading in information-asymmetry situations is inconsistent
with the Constitution’s Petition Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I.
173. Because it is the defendant’s conduct that has been challenged, the defendant generally
will have more access to the information relevant to the litigation. Moreover, unless the
defendant wishes to assert a counterclaim, in many, if not most cases, it will not be called upon
to plead until after a motion to dismiss is resolved—or, if it does plead, it typically can do so in
conclusory fashion. Information asymmetry occasionally is used to describe the imbalance in the
costs of discovery, which are assumed to fall more heavily on defendants than on plaintiffs. See
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 2977297, at *3 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010); id. at
*9 (Posner, J., dissenting in part). Given the current preoccupation with defense costs and the
radical differences in the economic situations of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ lawyers, see infra
Part II.B, that assumption may be questioned, at least in terms of the comparative impact of the
cost burden.
174. See Alison Frankel, Two More ‘Iqbal’ Dismissals Emerge in Product Liability Cases,
LAW.COM (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432738346&
Two_More_Iqbal_Dismissals_Emerge_in_Product_Liability_Cases (arguing that Iqbal, and
implicitly Twombly, are “the best thing to happen to the products liability defense bar since
Daubert” because plaintiffs will not have access to information necessary to support their claims
without discovery).
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of mind, and insidious practices are hidden by agents and employees
175
or are buried deep within an entity’s records. Discrimination in
hiring, promotion, or employee discipline depends on comparative
data drawn from the employer’s records that simply are inaccessible
176
177
absent discovery. Several —but not all —post-Twombly-Iqbal
discrimination cases seem insensitive to the seriousness of this
problem.
As early as 1947, the Supreme Court recognized the central role
access to discovery under the Federal Rules plays in achieving the
objectives of the American civil justice system when it penned the
line: “Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
178
parties is essential to proper litigation.” Fifty years later, Court of
Appeals Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham echoed that philosophical
principle:
Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneysgeneral as an enforcing mechanism for the anti-trust laws, the
securities laws, environmental laws, civil rights and more. In the
main, the plaintiff in these suits must discover his evidence from the
defendant. Calibration of discovery is calibration of the level of
179
enforcement of the social policy set by Congress.

175. See generally Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 256–69 (statement of John Payton,
President, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund) (cautioning about the adverse effect
of the heightened pleading standard on civil rights cases); Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v.
Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 53, at 79–92 (statement of Depo P. Adegbile, Director of
Litigation, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund) (noting the detrimental impact of
Twombly and Iqbal in both civil rights cases and more generally in all cases); Bone, supra note
99, at 876 (noting the potential problems posed by the new pleading standard for civil rights
cases); Schneider, supra note 44 (arguing that the heightened pleading standard will result in an
increase in dismissals for civil rights cases).
176. See, e.g., Adams v. Lafayette Coll., No. 09-3008, 2009 WL 2777312 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31,
2009) (dismissing an employment discrimination claim); Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuno-Burset,
639 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D.P.R. 2009) (dismissing equal-protection and related claims by former
employees of governor’s mansion); Logan v. Sectek, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D. Conn. 2009)
(dismissing the complaint in a case about federal regulations’ level of protection for airline
employees).
177. See, e.g., Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 588 F.3d 585, 597–98 (8th Cir. 2009) (ERISA
claim); Bryant v. Pepco, Civ. No. 09-CV-1063 (GK), 2010 WL 3118705, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 9,
2010) (Title VII claim); Mitchell v. Township of Pemberton, Civil No. 09-810 (NLH)(AMD),
2010 WL 2540466, at *6 (D.N.J. June 17, 2010) (§ 1983 claim).
178. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
179. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1997).
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The federal court system once championed access for potentially
meritorious claims in all cases, but Twombly and Iqbal have swung
the pendulum in the opposite direction, significantly confining a
plaintiff’s ability to reach information needed for a meaningful
adjudication. Inevitably, the challenge facing future policymakers will
be how to construct pleading and motion standards that make sense
given the substantive variety of federal litigation. This may
necessitate exploring the merits of a differential pleading system,
which obviously departs from the long-standing transsubstantivity
180
principle, a possibility discussed below. In effect, the plausibilitypleading standard risks increased difficulty for many prospective
claimants—some with claims that may well have merit and involve
181
important public policies—to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In an
unknowable number of instances, the increased risk of dismissal and
the resources needed to defend against it may deter the institution of
a potentially meritorious case. That result would be a far cry from the
foundational philosophy of the original Rules and the handling of
certain other procedural issues in the not-too-distant past.
In the late 1990s, for instance, the Civil Rules Committee
considered a proposal to amend the Rule 23 procedures for certifying
subdivision (b)(3) classes that, in effect, would vest judges with
discretion to deny certification according to something in the nature
of an “it ain’t worth it” standard. Under this standard, district courts
would balance “whether the probable relief to individual class
182
members justifie[d] the costs and burdens of class litigation.” When
numerous people and groups raised objections, the rulemakers
abandoned the plan. It was inconsistent with the importance of merits
adjudication, and the rulemakers were concerned that what is and is

180. See infra notes 338–59, 401–34 and accompanying text.
181. See Spencer, supra note 108, at 460 (“Such a fluid, form-shifting standard is
troubling . . . . [I]t is likely to impose a more onerous burden in those cases where a liberal
notice pleading standard is needed most: actions asserting claims based on states of mind, secret
agreements, and the like, creating a class of disfavored actions in which plaintiffs will face more
hurdles to obtaining a resolution of their claims on the merits.” (emphasis added)).
182. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., MEETING OF JUNE 19–20, 1997, DRAFT MINUTES 19 (statement of Judge Paul V.
Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ST06-1997-min.pdf. Judge Niemeyer, the then-chair of
the Civil Committee, “pointed out that the debate over the amendment had disclosed
competing economic interests and basic philosophical differences as to the very purposes of
Rule 23 and class actions.” Id.
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not “worth it” often lies solely in the eyes of the beholder. The
Committee’s decision echoed a similar judgment by the Supreme
Court more than twenty years earlier in Eisen v. Carlisle &
184
Jacquelin, in which the Court rejected a “preliminary inquiry into
the merits of a suit” on a class-certification motion as contrary to that
185
procedure’s purpose. These episodes illustrate the dramatic shift in
attitude regarding the federal civil-procedure system that plausibility
pleading reflects. Whereas the Justices and rulemakers once refused
to grant district judges the authority to filter out class actions on the
basis of an evaluation of the merits or a cost-benefit analysis, years
later the Court has done precisely that in the context of pleadings and
motions to dismiss.
No procedural system can entirely avoid discarding some wheat
with the chaff. But how many potentially meritorious claims should

183. For a glimpse of some reactions to the proposed Rule 23(b)(3)(F) amendment, see
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 36–38 (1997), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-1997.pdf.
This proposal drew more comment than any other. The comments ranged from
strong support to vehement opposition. In many ways, the proposal became the focal
point for abiding disputes over the “private attorney-general” function of (b)(3) class
actions. The most fundamental question is whether a procedural rule that emanated
from the Enabling Act process should become the authority that supports private
initiation and control of public law-enforcement values.
Id.; see also COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., MEETING OF OCTOBER 17–18, 1996, DRAFT MINUTES, http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/cv10-1796.htm (“As a group, these changes can be
read either to encourage or to discourage small-claim class actions. A more accurate assessment
is that they increase trial court flexibility, expanding discretion in ways that will further reduce
the scope of effective appellate review.” (statement of Judge Niemeyer)).
184. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
185. Id. at 177. In the past decade, there has been a notable expansion in the procedures for
class-action certification, as a result of which the merits of a suit may be examined—
theoretically only as part of the inquiry into the prerequisites for class certification, such as
predominance of the common questions and superiority. See, e.g., In re New Motor Vehicles
Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 533 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (“A district court must formulate
some prediction as to how the specific issues will play out in order to determine whether
common or individual issues predominate in a given case.”); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
Litig., 522 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2008) (vacating class certification in antitrust claim based on
lack of predominance); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 32 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting Rule 23’s additional requirements of predominance and superiority and rejecting the
argument based on Eisen that a judge cannot consider the prerequisites of Rule 23 that overlap
with the merits of the case); see also Oscar Private Equity Inv. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487
F.3d 261, 271 (5th Cir. 2007) (vacating class certification in a securities fraud claim because
plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants’ misrepresentations were the proximate cause of
plaintiffs’ loss).
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the system be permitted to sacrifice to achieve a reasonable quantum
of filtration? It seems obvious that in many contexts attempting to
distinguish the frivolous from the potentially meritorious on the basis
186
of a single pleading is a dangerously uncertain endeavor. And where
is the evidence that fact-based pleading enhances the extrusion of
meritless, as opposed to potentially meritorious, cases? And what is
the comparative proportion between the two? To my knowledge
there is none. Indeed, some preliminary research suggests the
187
opposite may be true; heightened pleading may not be a better
filter.
There are some critical macro-questions that need to be
addressed as well. How frequently should plaintiffs have their cases
terminated without a meaningful day in court when they lack
sufficient information to plead with factual plausibility because they
cannot effectively access it? Should our judicial system only open its
doors to claimants who have the necessary resources and pre-action
information to satisfy a judge’s judicial experience and common
sense? Have courts abandoned the gold standard—adjudication on
the merits, with a jury trial when applicable—and replaced it with
threshold judicial judgments based on limited information? Will
district courts discard all suits they believe are not plausible—today’s
version of “it ain’t worth it”?
C. Plausibility and the Pressure for Pre-Adjudicatory Disposition
The advent of plausibility pleading suggests obvious parallels to
the rise of the Supreme Court’s plausibility test for summary
188
judgment motions. As a result of the Court’s 1986 summary
189
judgment trilogy, which formally equated that motion with the

186. See Elaine M. Korb & Richard A. Bales, A Permanent Stop Sign: Why Courts Should
Yield to the Temptation to Impose Heightened Pleading Standards in § 1983 Cases, 41 BRANDEIS
L.J. 267, 293–95 (2002).
187. See Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at ii), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1666770
(finding “no correlation between the heft of a pleading and the ultimate success of a case”).
188. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come
forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial).
189. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 312 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574.
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190

directed-verdict motion and introduced a new plausibility standard
in the pretrial context, Rule 56 motions have become a potent
weapon for terminating cases before trial. As I have discussed
191
elsewhere at length,
the 1986 trilogy produced a significant
escalation of summary judgment activity and, in my opinion,
occasionally has taken the procedure beyond its function of
separating the factually trial-worthy from the factually trial192
worthless. As one of the nation’s most accomplished procedure
scholars writes, ultimately, the federal judiciary’s “retreat from the
goal of adjudication on the merits [saw] the trial-termination rate
decline precipitously, to the point that it is a quarter or less of the
193
termination rate by summary judgment.” The same expanded
characterization of allegations as conclusory, rather than factual, and
increased judicial decisionmaking in the fact-application arena now
being seen in post-Twombly-Iqbal pleading decisions has occurred
under Rule 56. But the Court’s summary judgment shift did not
satisfy those demanding that the system be tightened further; the new
pleading regime seems designed to meet the pressures created by
those interests.
Just as the 1986 trilogy was concerned with restraining the socalled—but unproven—litigation explosion through the “powerful
194
tool” of summary judgment, so too the Court in both Twombly and
Iqbal was concerned with developing a stronger judicial gatekeeping
195
role for Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Plausibility pleading may well
become the federal courts’ primary vehicle for achieving pre196
adjudicatory disposition. If so, the Supreme Court has transferred

190. A motion for directed verdict is now called a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
191. Miller, supra note 32, at 1048–56.
192. Id. at 1048–49; see also Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David
Rindskopf, A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 863–69 (2007) (“Overuse of summary judgment is a recent
complaint. . . . [S]ome commentators have become concerned that courts now rely too heavily
on summary judgment and other procedural means of disposing of cases prior to trial.”).
193. Burbank, supra note 143, at 561.
194. Miller, supra note 32, at 1056; see also supra text accompanying notes 30–32.
195. See Hoffman, supra note 106, at 1220, 1224.
196. See Spencer, supra note 108, at 450 (“In effect, then, the Court has moved forward the
burden that plaintiffs must carry at later stages in the litigation up front to the pleading stage.”).
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the primary gatekeeping function performed by summary judgment
197
motions even earlier in the action to motions to dismiss.
This morphing of the directed verdict into summary judgment
and then into the motion to dismiss is unsettling. There are significant
differences among these procedures. A directed-verdict motion under
Rule 50 follows the presentation of evidence subject to crossexamination before the trier of fact in open court and only eliminates
198
cases that are not jury-worthy. A summary judgment motion under
Rule 56 typically is based on a developed record that follows
discovery and only prevents cases lacking genuine issues of material
199
fact from proceeding. In sharp contrast, plausibility pleading
employs a gatekeeping function at a case’s genesis. The decision as to
whether it can proceed will be based solely on one document, without
giving the plaintiff an opportunity to unlock the doors of discovery.
This is particularly true if a district judge stays all proceedings during
the often-lengthy period between the motion to dismiss and its
determination. For many plaintiffs, this effectively denies any hope of
investigating and properly developing their claims, and leads to
200
judicial decisionmaking without a meaningful record. The absence
of the focusing effect of a developed record is likely to magnify the
subjective aspects of the judge’s thinking about the motion.
Plausibility—the Court’s word du jour—now applies both to
summary judgment and to pleadings, although the difference between
these two uses of the word is murky at best. Not surprisingly, some
have argued that the motion to dismiss under Twombly and Iqbal has
become a disguised summary judgment motion, attacking not only the
legal sufficiency of a pleading, but striving for a resolution by

197. See id. at 447 n.93 (“It is my contention that such scrutiny inappropriately moves
forward summary judgment-like screening to the pleading phase.”).
198. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1).
199. Id. 56(c)(2).
200. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). The pleading stage is far too early
for courts to make reasoned decisions on the cost-benefit value of proceeding to discovery in
many cases. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better:
The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 896 (2009)
(“[P]roportionality rules ask the impossible: judges must decide when discovery cost is
proportional to some measure of ‘value’ that includes both evidence value . . . and case
value . . . . This yields a fundamental information-timing problem: discovery disputes occur
before parties marshal all the evidence, so how can courts measure the value of particular
evidence, much less case merits?”).
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201

appraising the facts. The positions of the two motions on opposite
sides of the discovery process means that only plaintiffs who have
survived the first hurdle have an opportunity to find relevant
information to back up their factual allegations in the hope of
surviving the second. As Professor Spencer writes, “[t]he only
distinction is that at the pleading stage, the plaintiff’s factual
allegations simply may be asserted rather than evidenced. But in both
instances, if the facts presented do not present a plausible picture of
202
liability, the claims will not survive.” This approach contradicts—or
at least obscures—the text of the two Rules: whereas Rule 56
demands that claimants “set forth specific facts” that remain in
dispute following the availability of discovery, Rule 8(a)(2) only asks
for a “showing” of the pleader’s entitlement to relief based on
preinstitution investigation. The current confusion suggests that the
time may come when it will be necessary either to return to prior
principles regarding the two motions or to redefine their respective
roles, standards, procedures, and limitations to illuminate the
distinction between them and rationalize pretrial motion practice.
Moreover, why were Twombly and Iqbal necessary? The 1986
summary judgment trilogy had made that motion a powerful pretrial
terminator, especially when coupled with judicial control over the
pretrial process. For a quarter century, successive amendments to the
Federal Rules had impressed limits on the extent of discovery,
established mandatory disclosure, and narrowed the scope of what
matters could be inquired into under the discovery rules. For years

201. See Epstein, supra note 52, at 69; Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment
Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 18
(2010) (“The motion to dismiss is the new summary judgment motion.”); see also Clermont &
Yeazell, supra note 52, at 833 (“This unavoidably probabilistic standard appears equivalent to
the standard of decision for summary judgment.”).
202. See Epstein, supra note 52, at 69; Thomas, supra note 201, at 28–31 (“[T]he Supreme
Court has established standards for summary judgment and for the motion to dismiss that are
substantially the same. . . . [U]nder both standards, a court determines the plausibility of the
claim.”); see also Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 52, at 834 (“To explore this jarring novelty
further, consider the actual complaints that the Twombly and Iqbal courts held insufficient
because the allegations were too conclusory to pass into the promised land of plausibility.”).
Professor Epstein has offered the following clarification of his statements:
[T]he point of the disguised summary judgment motion was not to appraise the facts
in each and every case, but to examine a narrow subset of cases where it makes no
sense to bear the heavy costs of discovery when its massive dislocation and expense is
manifestly unlikely to produce any evidence of value.
Epstein, supra note 172, at 10.
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before Twombly and Iqbal, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal rate had been
203
rising. Judicial gatekeeping seemed to be working. The Supreme
Court’s coup de grace simply was not needed. To be sure, new
challenges are always arising. The expanding e-discovery
phenomenon presents real and troubling cost and logistical problems.
But that subject is being intensely studied, a first generation of
204
Federal Rule changes is in place, and experience is developing.
And, again, why focus on Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)? The Court’s
concerns more appropriately should be viewed as matters of
promoting effective judicial management, especially methods of
controlling discovery and improving lawyer behavior.
II. CASE MANAGEMENT, LITIGATION COSTS,
AND COMPETING SYSTEM VALUES
The advent of plausibility pleading in Twombly and Iqbal was
motivated in significant part by a desire to develop a stronger role for
motions to dismiss to filter out a hypothesized excess of meritless
litigation, to deter allegedly abusive practices, and to contain costs.
Indeed, repeatedly sounded assumptions concerning the frequency
and significance of these phenomena have led to dramatic changes in
pretrial litigation practice—most notably an increase in judicial case
management, a more powerful summary judgment motion, and, since
Twombly and Iqbal, a heightened pleading standard—many of which
have not been sanctified by amendments to the Federal Rules.
Although some criticisms of today’s civil justice system have
205
merit, as discussed below, the picture generally portrayed is
incomplete and is distorted by a lack of definition and empirical data
regarding the alleged negative aspects of federal litigation. This
generates rhetoric that often reflects ideology or economic selfinterest, rather than reality. As a result, reliance on these assertions
threatens to impair the ability of courts, rulemakers, and
commentators to reach dispassionate, reasoned conclusions as to

203. See, e.g., EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1(2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf.
204. See infra note 216 and accompanying text. There was a heavy focus on e-discovery at
the Duke Conference, both in the panel discussions and in the papers.
205. See infra Part II.B.
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what is needed. Moreover, the picture of how our federal procedure
system is functioning generally has been viewed for a number of years
through a lens trained on concerns voiced by defense interests, with
the difficulties faces by the other side of the litigation equation going
206
largely ignored. If assumptions about litigation costs, judicial
management, and abusive use of the system are driving pretrial
process changes, the policymakers must strive to understand these
matters fully and appraise what is real and what is illusion before the
procedure is altered any further.
A. Combating Cost and Delay with Pretrial Management
The increased complexity, magnitude, and number of cases on
federal court dockets in the past few decades have caused many to
lament the “twin scourges” of the federal civil litigation system—
namely, cost and delay—concerns that apparently affect other legal
207
systems and whose existence can be traced back to ancient times.
Reacting to these complaints, increased judicial control over the
pretrial process has been provided in recent decades through
legislation, rulemaking, Supreme Court decisions, and various less
208
formal means, most notably the Manual for Complex Litigation.

206. See, e.g., Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, 35
LITIGATION 3 (2009); Schneider, supra note 44, at 562. The Court’s Twombly and Iqbal
opinions focus on defense costs. In thinking about system costs, it should be remembered that
the period under discussion is one in which federal court caseloads have dramatically increased,
the number of federal judges has remained relatively constant, a significant number of
judgeships have been vacant for significant periods of time, judicial salaries have been frozen,
docket-control mechanisms have become commonplace, and the Supreme Court has reduced
the frequency of granting certiorari petitions—leaving certain issues unresolved.
207. See Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3
LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 87, 88 (1926) (noting that in the third millennium before Christ
people were complaining about the inefficiency of the legal process); Arthur R. Miller, The
Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984) (“The inefficiency with
which the wheels of justice grind is not unique to our time. In ancient China, a peasant who
resorted to the courts was considered ruined, no matter what the eventual outcome of the suit.
Hamlet rued ‘the law’s delay.’ Goethe quit the legal profession in disgust over cases that had
been languishing in the German courts for three hundred years. And in Bleak House Charles
Dickens applied his great talent for social criticism to the ramifications of one of the classic
examples of English legal ineptitude—Jarndyce v. Jarndyce.”). See generally CHARLES
DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (George Ford & Sylvere Monod ed., Modern Library 1985) (1853)
(focusing his social commentary on the long-running litigation in Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, which
concluded only after the lawyers’ fees had consumed all of the money in the estate in question).
208. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004). For a discussion of judicial
control through management, see infra notes 207–43.
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During my tour as Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules beginning in the late 1970s, it became increasingly clear that
rulemaking policy should turn its attention away from the trial and
toward the increasingly important and protracted pretrial process.
The Committee consciously chose to concentrate on the pretrial
phase as the best hope for meaningfully attacking cost and delay,
especially because only a small percentage of cases actually reached
trial even then. The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules,
therefore, were an attempt to reduce cost and delay by giving district
judges the tools to prevent excessive discovery and to take a more
active role in moving cases through pretrial and encouraging
209
settlement. The techniques included formally validating the concept
of judicial management by expanding the role and scope of Rule 16,
giving the district judge the power to impose some constraints on
redundant and disproportionate discovery in Rule 26, and enhancing
the functionality of sanctions under Rule 11 in the hope of improving
210
lawyer behavior. Subsequent amendments to Rule 16 and Rule 26
reflected the Committee’s continued commitment to case
211
management as an effective means to combat cost and delay and to
212
encourage rational, merits-based settlements.

209. See generally ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE
MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY, EDUCATION AND TRAINING SERIES (1984)
(summarizing the objectives of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee in drafting the 1983
Amendments, including an effort to increase pretrial efficiency by establishing the principle of
judicial management).
210. As the Advisory Committee noted at that time,
[e]mpirical studies reveal that when a trial judge intervenes personally at an early
stage to assume judicial control over a case and to schedule dates for completion by
the parties of the principal pretrial steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or trial
more efficiently and with less cost and delay than when the parties are left to their
own devices.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendment, reprinted in 12A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL, at app. C (3d ed. 2010); see also 5A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 3, at 1334 (outlining the purpose and effects of Rule 11); 6A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1521 (3d ed. 2010) (summarizing the history of Rule 16).
211. See Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 893, 913 (2008) (“The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1983, 1993, and 2000 have provided the parties and courts greater resources to control
runaway, excessive discovery. The amendments to the rules include giving greater authority to
district court judges to exercise meaningful managerial control of the scheduling and scope of
discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.”); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly:
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Since the 1983 amendments, case management has been
encouraged as a valuable judicial tool and enjoys widespread use in
various forms. In 1985, the second edition of the Manual for Complex
213
Litigation was released, and like the original Manual, suggested
various case management techniques that had proven successful and
214
deserved further use and development. Most would say that the
Manual, now in its fourth edition, has been highly instructive for the
members of the bar and valuable in helping judges manage complex
215
cases effectively.
Congress participated in the management trend by enacting the
216
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which required all district courts
to develop and implement plans to reduce expense and delay.
“Litigation management,” systematic differential treatment, and early

The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of Milton Handler, and the Uncertain Future of
Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV. LITIG. 1, 25 (2008) (“The judicial role in supervising
discovery was broadened significantly by the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules.”).
212. “For example, there is evidence that pretrial conferences may improve the quality of
justice rendered in the federal courts by sharpening the preparation and presentation of cases,
tending to eliminate trial surprise, and improving, as well as facilitating, the settlement process.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendment, reprinted in 12A
WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 210, at app. C; see also THOMAS E. WILLGING,
LAURA L. HOOPER & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 69 (1996) (concluding that case management practices “limit the
ability of a party to coerce a settlement without regard to the merits of the case” in the class
action context).
213. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) (1985). The original Manual was
published in 1969.
214. See Thomas E. Willging, Beyond Maturity: Mass Tort Case Management in the Manual
for Complex Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2225, 2231 (2000) (“In the introduction, Judge
Pointer wrote that ‘[t]he various techniques suggested . . . either have been used regularly with
success or deserve, in the opinion of the Board of Editors, further use and experimentation in
appropriate cases.’”).
215. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 888 (2008) (“The Manual has been used successfully in
numerous cases to keep down discovery costs and reduce unnecessary delay, proving that a
willing court can exercise meaningful control over claims and defenses asserted by the parties
and discovery.”). In 2006, the Federal Judicial Center published a pocket book for judges that
describes some additional management techniques thought to be useful. See WILLIAM W.
SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE ELEMENTS OF CASE MANAGEMENT:
A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2d ed. 2006).
216. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006). In major part, the 1990 legislation was sunset after seven
years. For a chronicling of the formulation and early developments under the Act, see generally
Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations on Implementation of the
Pilot Program of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1303 (1994).
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ongoing control by a judicial officer were elements to be considered
217
by each district. Although the resultant plans varied, most of them
further developed the core elements of Rule 16 and the Manual,
thereby calling for a considerable amount of district judge
involvement, especially with regard to the discovery process. While
the Rules, the Manual, and the expense and delay plans were making
more tools available for managing pretrial procedure, the Supreme
Court’s strengthening of the summary judgment motion with its 1986
218
trilogy was having an effect in the lower federal courts. Summary
judgment, coupled with the district judge’s power to manage, were
thought to be an effective combination for controlling the pretrial
219
process.
Until Twombly, the Supreme Court consistently sanctioned the
efficacy of these techniques for containing discovery costs and
eliminating meritless cases. In Leatherman v. Tarrant County
220
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote that, without formal amendments to Rule 8 and Rule 9,
“federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and
control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather
221
than later.” The Court reaffirmed these sentiments in Crawford-El
222
223
224
v. Britton in 1998 and in Swierkiewicz in 2002. And both the

217. The quoted words appear in a number of the statute’s sections. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§§ 471, 473. For further discussion of the statute, see infra notes 463, 471–72.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32, 37.
219. Some commentators, myself included, even have argued that the more stringent
summary judgment procedure has provided the bench with too much authority to dispose of
cases before trial and that the motion occasionally has been (and continues to be) used too
hyperactively. See Miller, supra note 32, at 1044–48.
220. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163
(1993).
221. Id. at 168–69.
222. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
223. Id. at 599 (“The trial judge can therefore manage the discovery process to facilitate
prompt and efficient resolution of the lawsuit; as the evidence is gathered, the defendant-official
may move for partial summary judgment on objective issues that are potentially dispositive and
are more amenable to summary disposition than disputes about the official’s intent, which
frequently turn on credibility assessments.”). The preceding pages of the opinion provide an
extended look at the ways a federal judge can manage a case in the context of qualified
immunity.
224. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002) (“The provisions for
discovery are so flexible and the provisions for pretrial procedure and summary judgment so
effective, that attempted surprise in federal practice is aborted very easily, synthetic issues
detected, and the gravamen of the dispute brought frankly into the open for the inspection of
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1983 and 1993 amendments to Rule 16, which dramatically expanded
the scope and delineated the contours of judicial conferences, were
approved by the Court, as was the 2006 group of amendments that
gave the district court extensive control and discretion in the context
225
of e-discovery.
Therefore, the Court’s shift in attitude toward case management
in Twombly was unexpected. Based largely on a somewhat dated and
highly theoretical 1989 journal article by Judge (then Professor)
226
Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice Souter expressed the view that “the
success of judicial supervision in controlling discovery has been on the
227
modest side.” This was the first time the Court had questioned the
ability of district judges to manage pretrial procedures in a way that
228
might limit cost and delay. This conclusion served as an important

the court.” (quoting 5C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL, § 1202 (2d ed. 1990))).
225. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B), 33(d), 34(b)(2)(E), 37(e), 45(d)(1). See generally
SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM: REPORT ON PHASE ONE
(2010); WORKING GRP. ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD.,
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS
AND PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION (2005); Rachel
Hytken, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006 Amendments Satisfy Their
Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875 (2008). The e-discovery field is canvassed in
MILBERG LLP & HAUSFELD LLP, E DISCOVERY TODAY: THE FAULT LIES NOT IN OUR
RULES (2010). The K&L Gates law firm maintains a computerized file of over 1000 e-discovery
matters.
226. “Judges can do little about impositional discovery when parties control the legal claims
to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 559 (2007) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638
(1989)). The Court also cited data that discovery can account for 90 percent of litigation costs
when it is actively employed. Id. (citing Memorandum from Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair,
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of
Practice & Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000)). This data, which is
questionable as to its coverage and is not borne out by more contemporary surveys, does not
necessarily corroborate the failure of case management to control discovery costs. But its
association with the claim that case management has failed seems to imply that Justice Souter
did feel that it supported his conclusion that case management has failed.
227. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. The basis for that statement is unknown. There is no data
indicating how a particular case might fare without management. Not cited was the excellent
essay by Judge Richard A. Posner, later Judge Easterbrook’s Seventh Circuit colleague, on the
use of management techniques to avoid a premature dismissal in American Nurses’ Ass’n v.
Illinois, 786 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986), which appeared almost contemporaneously with the
article. Justice Stevens’s dissent contended that the Court’s majority “vastly underestimates a
district court’s case management arsenal.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 593 n.13 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
228. See Bone, supra note 52, at 898–99 (pointing out that Twombly is the first time the
Supreme Court questioned the effectiveness of case management and that prior to that case, the
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justification for Twombly’s establishing the plausibility-pleading
229
standard, with Justice Souter citing the potential for imposing large
discovery costs on defendants as a reason to weed out cases not
230
deemed plausible at the very beginning of litigation. The Iqbal
231
majority extended this line of thinking to government defendants.
Dissenting in Iqbal, however, Justice Breyer explicitly endorsed
232
“alternative case-management tools”
designed “to prevent
233
unwarranted litigation.” He argued,
The law, after all, provides trial courts with other legal weapons
designed to prevent unwarranted interference. As the Second
Circuit explained, where a Government defendant asserts a
qualified immunity defense, a trial court, responsible for managing a
case and “mindful of the need to vindicate the purpose of the
qualified immunity defense,” can structure discovery in ways that
diminish the risk of imposing unwarranted burdens upon public
officials. A district court, for example, can begin discovery with
lower level government defendants before determining whether a
case can be made to allow discovery related to higher level
234
government officials.

Twombly and Iqbal appear to have set up a somewhat illogical
dichotomy. In deciding a motion to dismiss, judges may consider the
hypothesized cost of discovery to the defendant, but they cannot look
at the potential techniques for cabining those costs with effective
235
judicial management. It is curious that, in the same opinions, the

Advisory Committee had operated on the assumption that the management tools were quite
useful).
229. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. The Iqbal opinion refers to Justice Souter’s conclusion as the
“rejection of the careful-case-management approach.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953
(2009).
230. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (“Thus, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an
antitrust complaint in advance of discovery . . . but quite another to forget that proceeding to
antitrust discovery can be expensive.”). The Court’s opinion pays little attention to the various
developments in case management described in the text.
231. “Our rejection of the careful-case-management approach is especially important in
suits where Government-official defendants are entitled to assert the defense of qualified
immunity.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
232. Id. at 1962 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 1961.
234. Id. at 1961–62 (citations omitted).
235. “We have held, however, that the question presented by a motion to dismiss a
complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls placed upon the discovery
process.” Id. at 1954 (majority opinion) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559).
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Court entrusted district judges with the freedom to use judicial
236
experience and common sense to dismiss a claim at genesis for
noncompliance with a plausibility-pleading requirement, but, at the
same time, denied them the freedom to manage the early phases of
their cases efficiently and economically to test the viability of the
237
challenged claim for relief. Moreover, it has been noted that it is
odd that the Court so easily dismissed case management across the
board when none of the then-sitting Justices had been a federal
district court judge and therefore they collectively lacked federal civil
238
trial experience. The Court’s dismissal is especially dubious because
many district court local rules actively endorse case management,
239
most judges use it, and a number of post-1989 Rule amendments
have established constraints on discovery and broadened the matters
that can be considered at pretrial conferences. Also significant is the
240
empirical data recently collected by the Federal Judicial Center and
241
the American Bar Association Section of Litigation, which reveals a
general consensus among the surveyed practicing attorneys in favor
242
of preserving case management in its current form. At the Duke

236. Id. at 1950.
237. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
238. McMahon, supra note 76, at 869.
239. See id. (“It is unfortunate that the Twombly majority views the efforts of district judges
in this regard to be less than adequate, commenting that ‘the success of judicial supervision in
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.’ But with hundreds of civil cases on their
dockets, district court judges do their best. Moreover, criticism about case management from a
Court that collectively lacks much experience with trial-level civil litigation is difficult to digest.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 1967 (Stevens, J., dissenting))); Paul W.
Grimm & Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The State of Discovery Practice in Civil Cases: Must the Rules
be Changed to Reduce Costs and Burdens or Can Significant Improvements Be Achieved
Within the Existing Rules? 28–32 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/47D6E0CDEF6484DA852
576EA004A9FDA/$File/Judge%20Grimm,%20The%20State%20of%20Discovery%20Practice
%20in%20Civil%20Cases.pdf?OpenElement; Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revised, and Related
Rules: Analysis of Recent Developments for the Benefit of Bench and Bar, 157 F.R.D. 69 (1994).
But see Robert E. Keeton, Commentary, Time Limits as Incentives in an Adversary System, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 2053, 2056–58 (1989) (“I doubt . . . that it is possible to design such a shorter,
better focused trial, without changing the trial judge’s role to one of somewhat more rigorous
control over the process than that implicit in the role of the judge in the traditional adversary
trial.”).
240. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 27–33.
241. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 56, at 3, 6, 11, 123–44.
242. “Taking questions 74 and 75 [of the Center’s survey] together, there appears to be
some consensus that the Rules should not be revised to discourage case management by federal
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Conference, speaker after speaker stressed the importance of
management, with most emphasizing that judicial involvement in the
243
process was critical.
B. The Costs of Litigation
The Supreme Court’s negative view of case management in
Twombly and Iqbal is instructive in that it is a reminder of how much
is not known about litigation cost and delay. Twombly’s emphasis on
the defendant’s costs also reveals how one-sided the discussions about
expense and the expressions of concern have become. Moreover, the
Court’s ready acceptance of the blunt instrument of plausibility
pleading as a barrier to discovery indicates how little information is
available about the potential positives and negatives of any solution
that is advanced to counteract the perceived deficiencies of the
pretrial system. It seems axiomatic that it would be highly desirable to
conduct the needed research and analysis of the entire range of
relevant considerations before the system succumbs further to the
current pressure for more frequent and earlier pretrial dispositions.
If litigation costs are to be considered in applying the pleading
and motion-to-dismiss rules, all costs should be taken into account,
including those borne by plaintiffs, the expenditure of system
resources, and the loss to society from any impairment of important
public policies as a result of non-enforcement. The costs to
defendants—in particular, large corporate and government entities—
244
have been decried frequently.
Twombly justified establishing

judges and that, moreover, the Rules should not be revised to encourage additional case
management by those same judges.” LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 62–64.
243. One of the nation’s most highly regarded district judges and a long-term participant in
the rulemaking process offers two “suggestions” to enhance judicial involvement in cases that
require judicial supervision. Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers
Litigate: ‘Twixt the Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 240–43 (2010). In Epstein, supra
note 172, the author—who is quite sympathetic to the supposed burdens of contemporary
complex litigation on the defense—argues that judicial involvement in managing discovery on
defendants is essential without acknowledging that relevant tools and practices are in place and
being used by many judges. See id. at 26 (“[T]he process of discovery in large cases needs
extensive management . . . .”).
244. E.g., Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 53, at
33, 46–53 (statement of Gregory G. Katsas, former Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice). A number of corporate representatives forcefully argued for the
reduction of litigation costs at the Duke Conference but again, they only focused on their
companies’ costs.
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plausibility pleading on the basis of assumptions about excessive
discovery costs for these organizations and the threat of extortionate
245
settlements. Justice Souter asserted that “the threat of discovery
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic
246
cases,” regardless of the merits. And, of course, a corporate
defendant faces pressures beyond the purely monetary, in terms of
disrupting a company’s operations, diminishing the value of its assets,
decreasing investor confidence and stock prices, impairing its
reputation, and intruding on pending business negotiations.
How much of this is fact? How much is fiction? Large
expenditures do characterize many complex cases that drag on for
years. And it is true that litigants may face significant costs. But the
extent of the costs may be somewhat overstated—or partially selfinflicted—and certainly they are not universally imposed across the
litigation universe. The excessive costs of discovery cited in Twombly
seem to occur in a rather small percentage of cases. Indeed, according
to work done for the Advisory Committee more than a decade ago,
40 percent of federal cases employed no discovery at all, and a
“substantial percentage” of the remaining docket employed very
247
little. According to that same report, however, discovery may have
constituted 90 percent of the costs in cases in which it was actively
248
employed, and discovery still generated 50 percent of litigation costs
249
overall. These figures may be questioned, and more recent surveys
250
suggest significantly lower percentages.

245. As the Court stated in Twombly,
[w]e alluded to the practical significance of the Rule 8 entitlement requirement in
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo when we explained that something beyond the
mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with “a largely
groundless claim” be allowed to “take up the time of a number of other people, with
the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
246. Id. at 559. The Twombly majority’s concerns recently were repeated by Judge Posner in
his dissent in Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 2977297, at *9 (7th Cir. July 30,
2010) (Posner, J., dissenting in part).
247. Memorandum from Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules,
to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, supra note 226.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 38–40 (reporting that lawyers who
primarily represent defendants estimate that discovery accounts for 27 percent of total litigation
costs, whereas lawyers who primarily represent plaintiffs estimate that discovery accounts for 20
percent of total litigation costs).
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It may be true that some of these costs, in an amount that
remains unquantified, may be attributable to meritless suits and
excessive discovery requests, but those costs may be smaller than
claimed given the advent of judicial control through case
management, rule amendments limiting discovery, and the techniques
the system has developed for early termination. And how much of the
overall cost reflects unnecessary or marginal resistance to discovery
requests and motion practice billed at the high hourly rates typically
charged by the major law firms that usually represent defendants in
251
large-scale cases? The truth is that no one really knows. The
empirical research has not investigated that deeply and it may prove
difficult to reach beyond the impressionistic.
Because there is no common definition of what is abusive or
frivolous or excessive or purely tactical—let alone agreement on how
frequently any of those types of discovery and motion activities
occur—greater study is necessary to distinguish unavoidable high
costs from those caused by inappropriate litigation behavior. The data
that does exist—namely recent research by the Federal Judicial
252
Center —does not bear out Justice Souter’s major assertion that
253
discovery costs push defendants to settle. In fact, the majority of the
Center’s survey respondents reported that discovery costs had no
254
effect on the likelihood of settlement,
suggesting that the
assumptions at the heart of Twombly may well wrong. Nor did the
Court acknowledge the myriad factors other than discovery expense
that can lead an economic or governmental entity to settle—for
example, the maintenance of institutional secrets, the existence or
desire to prevent the generation of adverse precedent, the distraction
of employee energy, or the avoidance of reputational injury.
Moreover, no one knows what is meant by excessive discovery cost.
There is no established common ground for this metric; indeed, it

251. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, Who Knew Bankruptcy Paid So Well?,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at B1 (reporting hourly billing by partners of $1,000 or more and
charges of $500 or more an hour for second-year associates in major bankruptcy cases).
252. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203.
253. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
254. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 32, 33 (finding that 49.8 percent of plaintiffs
attorneys and 52.6 percent of defendant attorneys surveyed reported that the cost of discovery
did not affect the likelihood that a case would be settled). But see AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF
LITIG., supra note 56, at 145 (reporting that 97.5 percent of survey respondents answered that
overall discovery costs were somewhat or very important factors when considering whether to
settle a matter).
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must be evaluated contextually. The matter at issue in many cases—
whether it be economic or ideological—may justify a substantial
investment in discovery by the contestants. The resulting
expenditures thus may not be excessive, even though the dollar
amount is large.
Thus, it may be that the concern about costs voiced by the
Twombly Court is somewhat exaggerated. The Federal Judicial
Center’s preliminary study regarding attorneys’ experiences with
discovery and related matters sheds an interesting light on the
question of cost; it indicates that expenditures for discovery, including
attorneys’ fees, in the surveyed matters amounted to between 1.6 and
255
3.3 percent of the total value at stake in the litigation. Although the
significance of these numbers may be debated and the research to
date has not explored the depths of what needs to be analyzed, they
certainly do not seem to be the litigant-crushing figures Twombly
indicated they might be. After all, real estate brokers (and others)
charge a higher percentage for their services.
Although discovery can be enormously expensive in a small
percentage of federal cases, Twombly and Iqbal have stated a
pleading rule that burdens all cases based on what may be happening
in a small fraction of them. For the great body of litigation,
Twombly’s and Iqbal’s cure may be counterproductive and worse
than the supposed disease. As the Judicial Center’s work product
indicates, anecdotal evidence of cost, delay, and abuse can depart
256
widely from the reality experienced by most litigants.
Other aspects of the Center’s study are sobering: overall
satisfaction with the pretrial process is higher and discovery costs
appear more reasonable than the apocalyptic rhetoric has suggested.
A majority of survey respondents disagreed with the idea that
257
“discovery is abused in almost every case in federal court.” By and
large, survey respondents were satisfied with the current levels of case
258
management, and over half reported that the costs and extent of
discovery were the “right amount” in proportion to the economic and

255. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 2. Admittedly these numbers are dependent on
what it meant by the value at stake and on the accuracy of the recollections about expenses of
the surveyed attorneys.
256. Id. at 27, 35–41.
257. Id. at 71.
258. Id. at 67–68.
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259

substantive law values involved in their cases. Some surveys of
lawyer impressions on these matters are somewhat at variance with
260
the Judicial Center’s findings, however, which only emphasizes the
need for further work.
Not only are claims of excessive litigation costs questionable, but
there is also no litmus test to identify extortionate settlements or
measure how frequently they occur. Indeed, the wide range of factors
that motivate settlements make assertions about extortion extremely
261
speculative. It is reasonable to assume that litigation cost is a factor
that may encourage or induce one or more parties to settle in some
cases. Similarly, litigation cost is a factor that may discourage a citizen
from asserting a potentially meritorious claim at all.
Even more elusive are the benefits that accrue to society as a
result of discovery that furthers the private enforcement of important
public policies (some statutorily or constitutionally based), promoting
deterrence, increasing oversight, providing transparency, and
avoiding the expenditures that otherwise might be needed to support
262
government bureaucracies.
The diminution of these benefits

259. Compare id., with AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 56, at 145 (citing
discovery costs as a very important factor when attorneys decide whether to settle a matter).
The Federal Judicial Center also has issued another study identifying the factors associated with
higher litigation costs and confirming that very predictable causes are dominant. LEE &
WILLGING, supra note 203, at 1–6.
260. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG. ET AL., SUMMARY COMPARISON OF BAR
ASSOCIATION SUBMISSIONS TO THE DUKE CONFERENCE REGARDING THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3 (2010), available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/
dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/0F0CC2092ECAAEE2852577130049EBDD/$File/ABA%20Section
%20of%20Litigation%2C%20Comparison%20of%20Duke%20Conference%20Recommendat
ions.pdf (discussing various legal organizations’ proposed changes and additions to rules
governing pre-litigation discovery).
261. Nonetheless, the speculation is repeated. For example, in William O. Gilley Enterprises
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 588 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2009), in the course of affirming the dismissal of
an entity’s claim, the court remarked, “this is the type of ‘in terrorem increment of the
settlement value’ that the Supreme Court mentioned in Twombly.” Id. at 668 (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007)). Ironically, the fact that only a small percentage of
legally cognizable injuries—private or public—are ever the subject of litigation (or any form of
remediation) goes comparatively unnoticed. Perhaps the more significant problem is
underenforcement, not hyperactivity or meritless litigation.
262. It has been suggested that the plausibility standard may encourage manufacturers to
hide evidence, thereby impairing the incentives state tort actions generally provide to improve
product safety. William Funk, Thomas McGarity, Signey Shapiro & James Goodwin,
Plausibility Pleading: Barring the Courthouse Door to Deserving Claimants 1–19 (Ctr. for
Progressive
Reform,
White
Paper
No.
1005,
May
2010),
available
at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Twombly_1005.pdf.
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represents a “cost” to society. Unfortunately, the empirical work
done so far on the expense of litigation, including the submissions to
the Duke Conference, only explores one side of the cost-benefit
equation.
In addition, the costs incurred by plaintiffs are noted
infrequently; indeed, they are not discussed anywhere in Twombly,
263
Iqbal, or the empirical studies presented at the Duke Conference.
But they are no less important from a policy-formation perspective.
As already noted, the defense bar and its clients are not always
innocent victims of frivolous litigation or abusive conduct; indeed,
defense attorneys—who usually are compensated by the hour at
rather handsome levels and paid contemporaneously—frequently
protract pretrial processes for various reasons, including to enhance
their fees, to avoid reaching trial (particularly jury trial), and to
coerce contingent-fee lawyers, who often have cash-flow difficulties
264
and resource limitations, into settlement. The different litigation
economics of the respective parties and the prospect of early
termination encourage resource-consumptive practices by defendants
265
in many situations. Given the present environment, contingent-fee
lawyers usually must expend large amounts of time and money to

263. The closest the Court came in Twombly to discussing the plaintiffs’ costs is when it
found that “it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of
discovery.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. The Court alluded to the potential cost of throwing out a
claim before discovery. After that, it only discussed the burdens of allowing a claim to proceed
to discovery that would be imposed on a defendant. The Court in Iqbal only discussed the costs
imposed on defendants: “The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials
from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
264. The existing studies of federal litigation costs do not break them down sufficiently to
determine what portion is attributable to excessive activity by plaintiffs, particularly with regard
to discovery requests (occasionally referred to as “pushing”), and which portion is attributable
to defendants’ motion practice and resistance to plaintiffs’ attempted discovery (occasionally
referred to as “tripping”). Although the effects of hourly billing are adverted to in general
terms, no attempt has been made to calibrate them.
265. In Twombly, the plaintiff sought to limit the scope of the initial discovery and proposed
a phasing approach—a proposal that ultimately was rejected by the Court. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
593 (Stevens, J., dissenting). At oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff made it clear that the
first phase of discovery would be limited to the conspiracy claim, which would be followed by a
summary judgment motion that would establish the claim’s plausibility or terminate the case.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (No. 05-1126) (statement of Mr.
Richards), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
05-1126.pdf.
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develop a case of any complexity before instituting litigation. This
often requires the retention of experts and investigators. Expenses
mount as plaintiffs must fend off sequential complicated pretrial
motions, including some that could terminate the case or necessitate
266
an interlocutory appeal. These financial realities, which relatively
few plaintiffs’ firms can surmount, plus judicial scrutiny and the
deterrent effect of possible sanctions, strongly discourage them from
undertaking a sizable matter lacking a significant factual or legal
267
underpinning.
The efforts of contingent-fee lawyers are not free goods; they
have value and must be husbanded. For the reasons just noted,
rational plaintiffs’ attorneys are very cost- and time-conscious. To
avoid expenditures that may never be reimbursed and to prevent the
loss of potentially more attractive alternative professional
opportunities, they generally avoid marginal motions and screen
potential cases using their own version of plausibility before taking on
matters. Nor do contingent-fee lawyers want to conduct unnecessary
depositions or be inundated with documents or e-discovery to hunt
for the proverbial “smoking gun.” These restraints have become
increasingly important as summary judgment has been invoked and
granted more freely; they will become even more pronounced with
the added burdens of Twombly and Iqbal and a growing awareness of
the high dismissal rate in many substantive contexts. As a result, it
will be harder for plaintiffs to find representation, even for potentially
meritorious claims. Additionally, prospective plaintiffs and their
attorneys will have to expend greater resources investigating claims
prior to filing in the hope of being able to plead enough to survive

266. See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure,
24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1422 (1992) (discussing the difficulties for “attorneys and litigants who
possess less money, time, and information”).
267. Two academic writers have argued that the unavailability of effective legal services,
which they believe has been magnified by Twombly and Iqbal, falls most heavily on what one
calls “social out-groups,” see A. Benjamin Spencer, Essay, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil
Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 361–62, 366–70 (2010), and the other refers to as “the
vanishing plaintiff,” by which she means those who have been marginalized by various social
and economic factors, see Brooke D. Coleman, Vanishing Plaintiff 1 (2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring
Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and
Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1312–
22 (2005) (“The more likely explanation rests in . . . symbolic differences in the nature and
organization of the legal representation of individual and organizational litigants.”).
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under the higher standard. This again means that some meritorious
claims never will be brought, leaving certain injured plaintiffs
uncompensated, because prospective litigants or their counsel may
not have—or be willing to risk—the resources needed to investigate
sufficiently prior to institution to survive a motion to dismiss.
Consequently, they will never gain access to critical information held
268
by possible defendants or third persons.
In some instances, what this means is that contingent-fee lawyers
may bear a larger burden of unreimbursed costs as they investigate
more grievances but then decide that the risks appear too great to
institute cases that they fear will then be dismissed on the complaint.
All of this must be viewed against the palpable disparity in the legal
services available to individual plaintiffs and institutional defendants.
As a practical matter the Supreme Court simply has transferred some
of the expenses typically borne on the right side of the “v.” to the left
side in the form of imposing higher costs for entering and surviving in
the system. And the question remains unanswered: to what extent
does this inhibit individuals from asserting their rights and cause
collateral damage to various other system values?
Whereas the Twombly Court refers to the possibility that
plaintiffs can extort settlements from defendants through threats of
269
expensive discovery, there is no recognition in the opinion that the
combination of economic costs of a more demanding pleading regime,
increased grants of motions to dismiss, and summary judgment
barriers may skew downward plaintiffs’ valuations of their claims. A
plaintiff’s pretrial bargaining position is related directly to the
probability of gaining access to merit discovery and making the threat
of trial realistic. Both are diminished by the post-Twombly and Iqbal
270
magnification of pretrial disposition opportunities for defendants,

268. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence in Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465,
1472–73, 1499 (2003) (discussing the chilling effect of discovery reforms on meritorious
litigation). Finding “confidential witnesses” and “whistleblowers” is now part of a plaintiff
attorney’s preinstitution job description.
269. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59. This and related theses are debunked in Charles Silver,
“We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003).
270. “Similarly, the denial of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment may give the
defendant an incentive to make a reasonable settlement offer, rather than face the risk and
expense of going to trial.” EDWARD J. BRUNET, MARTIN H. REDISH & MICHAEL A. REITER,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 325–26 (2d ed. 2000); see also Samuel R.
Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of
Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (“More important, the nature of our civil
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potentially obliging plaintiffs to settle earlier and for less than the
merits of their cases otherwise might dictate. If settlements are
procured because the system can be employed to wear one side down,
that is its own form of extortion.
If research and analysis is to address litigation cost and delay
intelligently, the totality of party expenses, consumption of system
resources, and diminution of societal benefits must be understood.
Again questions abound. Realistically, which private and public costs
can be ameliorated? By what procedural approach—heightened
pleading, dispositive Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 motions, effective
judicial case management, or some combination of them—might
these costs be reduced? And which techniques better serve the “just,
speedy, and inexpensive” triad of objectives set out in Federal
Rule 1?
Appraising the system overall, it is unclear that aggressive Rule
12(b)(6) and Rule 56 filtration will reduce costs in the segment of
cases that use discovery extensively. The savings achieved by early
termination may not offset the increased costs likely to be incurred as
a result of more extensive preinstitution activities and fact-based
pleading, the increased number of dismissal and summary judgment
motions, and, potentially, the increased number of appeals from
judgments following early terminations. Increased pretrial
dispositions generate their own time and resource expenditures that
have not been measured. One can assume that not only will the two
motions be made with greater frequency but that adversarial combat
over them will intensify, ultimately consuming more litigant and court
time than in the past. Expanding on that theme, when a Rule 12(b)(6)
271
motion is granted, the plaintiff is likely to seek leave to replead, and
the resulting skirmishes about that and collateral Rule 15 amendment
matters will generate their own expenditures. Should judgment be
entered following a denial of leave to replead or following a final
dismissal of the amended pleading when leave has been granted,

process drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of trial, and, in
many cases, to agree upon terms that are beyond the power or competence of courts to
dictate.”).
271. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1357 (“Rule 12(b)(6) generally is not
immediately final or on the merits because the district court normally will give the plaintiff leave
to file an amended complaint to see if the shortcomings of the original document can be
corrected.”).
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appeals also will generate expenses. Similar questions have been
raised about the supposed savings from the Supreme Court’s three
273
1986 decisions enhancing the summary judgment motion.
Calculating party, systemic, and societal costs is not an easy task,
but a thoughtful analysis that takes account of all the litigation
players and expense elements—as well as the consumption and
allocation of judicial and other public resources—is necessary to
reach a reasoned conclusion about the heft of the cost and delay
problems. The research efforts undertaken by the Federal Judicial
Center are to be applauded, and one hopes they will be continued
with a much more embracive field of vision so that even more
sophisticated data is generated and other inquiries undertaken to
understand these matters. Without these efforts, dramatic changes in
federal practice will continue to be made in an information vacuum
that obscures the true costs of litigation and the net gain—or loss—
produced by elevated-pleading and pretrial-motion practice.
Beyond the difficulty of capturing the necessary data, it is even
harder to monetize the soft, qualitative values of citizen access to the
federal courts, merits adjudication, and the multifarious benefits of
private enforcement of public policies. Again, for example, no one
knows how to put a dollar figure on the societal loss when a
meritorious discrimination, consumer-fraud, or antitrust case is
terminated prematurely or never is instituted because of the deterrent
effect of today’s more stringent pleading and motion regime. And, of
course, no one knows how many cases fitting those descriptions exist.

272. Some commentators have suggested that the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard will
consume more time and expense and lead to more appeals. See McMahon, supra note 76, at 868
(“The Supreme Court may have thought it was providing relief to the federal docket by making
it easier to dismiss complaints, but that will not be the result. Instead, district courts will have to
entertain more motions to dismiss from defendants emboldened by Twombly, and they will
spend more time deciding those motions.”); see also Jason Bartlet, Into the Wild: The Uneven
and Self-Defeating Effects of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73,
109 (2009) (discussing how dismissals with prejudice under the Twombly pleading standard may
increase cost and delay in contravention of its intended purpose).
273. For a discussion of the need to investigate the claims of cost savings resulting from a
more powerful summary judgment motion, see Miller, supra note 32, and see also Samuel
Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J.
73 (1990); D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875 (2006). See generally Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed?
The Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39
(2008) (applying an economic framework to the choice between pleading and summary
judgment as points at which a claim can be dismissed).
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What is known is that these matters have not been accorded
meaningful attention. Given the current state of procedural flux and
its direction, a wide-angle evaluation of the pretrial process must
replace today’s telescopic focus on the burdens on defendants. That
seems a necessary precursor for developing balanced and workable
solutions. In light of the faulty premises of Twombly and Iqbal,
perhaps the implementation of those cases and further procedural
change should wait until far more knowledge is acquired and
274
analyzed.
C. The Importance of Access to the Courts, Deterrence, and the
Private Enforcement of Public Policies
The Court’s establishment of plausibility pleading, with its
emphasis on the need for factual allegations, has a direct impact on
the accessibility of the federal courts to the citizenry in all categories
of cases. To a degree not yet determined, it will chill a potential
plaintiff’s or lawyer’s willingness to institute an action. And even if
one is started, it will result in some possibly meritorious cases being
terminated under Rule 12(b)(6), thereby reducing citizens’ ability to
employ the nation’s courts in a meaningful fashion. Even though
some federal judges may have deviated from notice pleading in the
years preceding Twombly, those cases do not reflect the design of the
pleading-and-motion structure promulgated in 1938, or the one
described by the Supreme Court in Conley and the several other
Supreme Court cases that followed it, or the one applied by most
federal courts for decades after the Conley decision. And insisting on
more pleading detail—on pain of dismissal—is not consistent with the
view of American courts as democratic institutions committed to the
resolution of civil disputes on their merits in an egalitarian,
transparent fashion. Nor are pleading barriers consistent with the
view that the federal courts are instruments for the private
enforcement of public law and policy, an objective that appears to
275
have been in eclipse—or at least in the shadows—in recent years.
What seems to be increasingly overlooked is that the modes of civil

274. At this juncture a moratorium of this type probably requires congressional
intervention. See discussion infra Part III.C.
275. See Robert J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1531–32 (2008).
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procedure are the mechanisms for operating an important societal
regulatory system.
Many of the cases on federal court dockets involve purely private
matters that do not affect anyone other than the actual parties—the
simple automobile fender-bender or breach of contract dispute being
paradigms. But many of these cases have stare decisis value. Very
significantly, many also have important deterrent implications, as in
the product-defect and pharmaceutical fields. An excellent
illustration of this therapeutic effect is provided by a report based on
responses from the risk managers of 232 major American
corporations regarding their litigation and legal cost experience:
As a management function, product liability remains a part-time
responsibility in most of the responding firms. Where product
liability has had a notable impact—where it has most significantly
affected management decisionmaking—has been in the quality of
the products themselves. Managers say products have become safer,
manufacturing procedures have been improved, and labels and use
276
instructions have become more explicit.

In this category of purely private litigation, Twombly and Iqbal
probably have had a negative impact on citizen access and the
deterrent value of enforcing the substantive law effectively. These
effects of the two decisions in private cases were not acknowledged
by the Court; indeed, the expressions of concern in the majority
opinions about costs, extortionate settlements, and burdens placed on
governmental officials suggest these matters did not weigh heavily in
the thinking of those Justices who joined in them. The Court’s
preoccupation with the supposed deleterious effects of litigation on
defendants may well reflect or be a by-product of the earlytermination mentality of significant segments of the federal judiciary
that has developed in the last quarter century.
Standing on a different footing are the myriad federal cases that
have wider application because of either the range of persons directly
or indirectly affected, or the nature of the underlying conduct at issue.
These include a significant array of matters—such as actions involving
constitutional, federalism, and other core systemic principles; federal

276. Nathan Weber, Product Liability: The Corporate Response (Conf. Bd., Rep. No. 893,
1987), as reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. 20,169 (1986). See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in
the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994)
(reviewing empirical studies of tort law efficacy).
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statutes; governmental conduct; and judicially created private rights
of action—that can have significant public consequences. Many class
and mass actions fall into this category. Indeed, in some respects
these cases represent a very significant aspect of the contemporary
civil workload of the federal courts. This category is not limited to
disputes arising under federal law. On the diversity-of-citizenship side
277
of federal court dockets, or sometimes as a result of the availability
278
of supplemental subject matter jurisdiction, there are numerous
state law claims—often substantively parallel to federal claims—
raising important public policy issues of state law that are heard in the
federal courts.
If Twombly and Iqbal inhibit the assertion or prematurely
dispose of claims of this character, then the new pleading-and-motion
regime operates at cross-purposes with the enforcement of policies
the federal court system is intended to support. To be sure, in the
context of judicially created public and private rights and remedies,
federal courts have considerable latitude in defining and redefining
their contours and the conditions for their assertion. But even in these
categories, it seems inappropriate for the Court to have restricted the
effective assertion of those rights by altering the pleading burden and
the motion to dismiss in the name of protecting defendants from
hypothesized litigation costs and possible settlement pressures
without any acknowledgement of the impact that restriction might
279
have on the policy objectives at issue in the litigation.
The cases that warrant the greatest concern and consideration
after Twombly and Iqbal are those that advance a statutorily
authorized, private compensatory regime and those that are designed
to have a regulatory effect by rectifying or stopping activity
280
proscribed by a federal statute or federal common law. These

277. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). The scope of these actions was enhanced by the
federalization of the bulk of class actions by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Id.
§§ 1332(d), 1453.
278. Id. § 1367.
279. The policy objectives were antitrust enforcement in Twombly and remediation of
possible constitutional violations by high-ranking government officials in Iqbal.
280. The private enforcement of public policy seems to have its roots in the legislative
recognition of qui tam actions. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006). The development of a
public-interest bar seeking social change through litigation was traced to the Supreme Court’s
seminal desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Education, 247 U.S. 483 (1954), in Stephen
C. Yeazell, Brown, The Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 1975, 1977–84 (2004). The author goes on to argue that Brown also motivated the
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provisions often represent a constitutional or congressional
determination that private civil actions are necessary for one or more
well-understood reasons—for example, securing deterrence;
providing compensation for injured citizens; and addressing concerns
that the relevant regulators lack sufficient resources, or may have
come under the influence of those they are supposed to regulate, or
281
have fallen into a period of inattention, desuetude, or worse. The
private enforcers—appropriately dubbed private attorneys
282
general —are effectuating public policy. In a sense, it is a form of
privatized regulation of commercial and governmental conduct.
Congress intended that these plaintiffs and the issues they raise be
given a meaningful day in federal court.
The private enforcement model is not without its critics.
Encouraging self-interested clients and their lawyers to pursue the
public interest risks promoting bounty hunting. And the propriety of
leaving the formation of public policy to private litigants and episodic
judicial decisionmaking, rather than to public regulatory agencies,

deregulation of the bar, for example, by recognizing a lawyer’s constitutional right to advertise,
which then led to what he sees as the “reconstitution of the plaintiffs’ bar” and the growth of a
cadre of lawyers seeking a more profitable practice by “combin[ing] strands of self- and public
interest.” Id. at 1988; see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (arguing that adjudication and civil procedure can usefully be
analyzed as elements of a larger system of public regulation); Funk, McGarity, Shapiro &
Goodwin, supra note 262, at 8–9 (describing Twombly’s impact on plaintiffs harmed by
unregulated products and activities).
281. Consider the report that a number of SEC officials spent hours watching and
downloading pornography on government computers before and during the financial system’s
recent crisis. See, e.g., Nico Hines, Wall St Regulators Spent Hours Watching Porn Instead of
Monitoring Crisis, TIMES ONLINE (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/us_and_americas/article7106889.ece. Even more recently there has been a strong
suggestion that the ecological disaster caused by an oil release in the Gulf of Mexico can be
traced to various forms of inattention and misconduct by personnel of the federal Minerals
Management Service of the Department of the Interior. Thus, there are proposals to reorganize
that agency “to end a decades-old relationship between industry and government that has
proved highly profitable—and some say too cozy—for both.” John M. Broder, U.S. to Split Up
Agency Policing the Oil Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A1.
282. The designation appears to have its origin in Associated Industries of New York v.
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). See generally Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from
Private Attorneys General in Mega Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511 (2001)
(highlighting the predictive effect of private attorneys general); Richard B. Stewart & Cass A.
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982) (discussing the
role of private citizens to hold government entities accountable).
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283

may be questionable. But for several reasons, heightened pleading
rules applicable to all cases are not an appropriate solution to
possible private-enforcement hyperactivity. First, the points raised by
the critics have limited or no relevance to the public interest bar.
Second, in many, if not most, instances the plaintiff and his or her
lawyer are acting out of a complex mixture of public and private
motivations that are hard to quantify or separate, but their efforts
284
have a social value.
Third, federal judges, through case
management, control of attorneys’ fees, and their obligation to
evaluate settlements in many situations can sand off the rough edges
of the practice. And, fourth, in many contexts the loss of private
enforcement will result in little or no enforcement of important public
policies.
The characteristics of many of these private enforcement regimes
are prescribed by Congress or state legislatures, often in terms of the
perceived importance of the policies to be protected and often to
incentivize private actors and their lawyers to invest in the litigation
process. Thus, special rules of standing, evidence, burdens of proof,
and limitations periods may be formulated and defenses eliminated to
285
facilitate an enforcement action. For example, to make utilization of
certain statutory rights of action economically feasible, Congress
often provides fee awards for—and occasionally offers multiple
damages to—a successful plaintiff, in order to encourage contingent286
fee attorneys and the public interest bar to take up the cudgels.

283. See generally John C. Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983) (discussing incentive
problems within the private–attorney general system); Bryant Garth, Ilene N. Nagel & S. Jay
Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of
Class Action Litigation, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 353 (1988) (reviewing empirical data concerning
private attorneys general); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First
Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589 (2005) (analyzing constitutional questions associated with
suits by private attorneys general).
284. See generally William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and
Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004) (recognizing a spectrum of private attorneys
general, each of which mixes public and private functions in particular ways).
285. See generally Sean Farhang, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American
Separation of Powers System, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 828 (2008) (providing examples of structural
accommodation of policy attempts to address larger problems through citizen suits).
286. See id. See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global
Age: Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 219, 223
(2001) (noting that the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act authorized treble damages to plaintiffs
and included a fee-shifting provision); Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the
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Conversely, Congress occasionally imposes restraints on private
actions to prevent excessive activity by the private bar, as it did in
enacting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995.
Although several of these private rights of action are long
287
standing, such as the qui tam aspects of the False Claims Act of
288
1863, they blossomed and multiplied in the second half of the
twentieth century in response to the civil rights movement and a
number of the other pressures of that period, many of which were
designed to further social and economic equality and fairness. Each of
them is an expression by Congress of its intent to promote the private
289
enforcement of national policies. A great number of these statutes
were enacted against the backdrop of the liberal ethos of the Federal
Rules—especially their simplified notice pleading as prescribed by
Rule 8(a)(2) and the Supreme Court’s construction of it in Conley,
limited grants of motions to dismiss, relatively uninhibited discovery,
and highly restrained summary judgment practice. The willingness of
citizens to mobilize to enforce their legal rights obviously depends
upon the receptivity of the process available for doing so. Congress
presumably well understood that. But the last quarter century has
radically changed the landscape. As Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham
has observed,
Recent events have laid bare the consequences of underenforcement of federal regulatory schemes. It seems odd to now
impede their efficacy. Rather, control of access to discovery as a step
back from the underpinnings of the 1938 rules must be balanced to
serve the role of private attorneys general litigation. That is, a gate
must be able to screen by merit. Perhaps we could move toward an

Implementation of Public Policy, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 195–96 (Winter 1984)
(noting that fee shifting is mandatory under the Interstate Commerce Act and the Clayton Act,
and that courts have regularly exercised their discretion to implement fee shifting under Title II
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
287. See, e.g., Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006); Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
288. False Claims Act (Lincoln Law), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006), amended by Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.
289. An excellent illustration is the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fee Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)). The Act was Congress’s reaction
to the decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), which
reaffirmed the American rule, leaving litigation costs where they fall absent a congressional
authorization to shift fees in a private attorney general context. See S. REP. No. 94–1011, at 1, 4–
6 (1979), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5911–13.
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initial opening to limited discovery followed by a look at likely merit
290
for greater or full access.

The inhibiting effect of Twombly and Iqbal, combined with the
economic realities discussed in the preceding Section, significantly
reduce the pool of potential enforcers of federal public policies
291
through civil litigation seeking personal compensation.
Although it must be recognized that the federal procedural
system is, as it must be, constantly evolving and that the federal
judiciary, including the Justices of the Supreme Court, are entrusted
with the interpretation and application of the Federal Rules, the
shortfall of Twombly and Iqbal is the Court’s failure to acknowledge
the potential those decisions have to impair meaningful access to the
federal courts. This is especially worrisome in cases involving
important issues—such as constitutional values and the private
enforcement of federally and state-created rights—and the
concomitant shift in the allocation of the litigation-resource burden
from defendants to plaintiffs these two decisions produce. The result
is likely to operate in derogation of effectuating rights and policy
292
norms established by Congress and state legislatures. As Judge
Higginbotham intimates, the problem today may well be underenforcement not over-enforcement.
D. The Need for Further Research and Definition
Given the various competing values at stake, and accepting the
need for some form of continuing judicial gatekeeping or filtration, a
question remains: what is the best mechanism for achieving that
objective—pleadings, motion practice, summary judgment, or case

290. Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2010) (manuscript at 6–7) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
291. One author argues persuasively that these inhibiting factors fall most heavily on various
groups of marginalized Americans, whose claims—if they could be addressed—would be most
suited to perform the regulatory function of civil litigation. She believes that the new restrictive
procedural ethos, particularly with regard to pleading, deprives society of the social utility of
those claims. Coleman, supra note 267, at 1.
292. The significant drop in employment discrimination cases and the high rate of dismissal
of civil rights cases noted by some must, to some degree, reflect the chilling effect of the
procedural restrictions in recent years. See, e.g., Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 53; Schneider, supra note 44, at 531 (pointing out that the
Court changed the pleading standards without any action from Congress); Mary Pat Gallagher,
Where Have all the Employment Cases Gone?, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 6, 2008, at S19.
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management? No one knows, and the question cannot be answered
rationally—let alone with confidence—without a great deal of study.
And even after that is done, reactions to the subject and any resultant
changes may be the product of intuition, philosophy, or self-interest
as much as they may be the result of research. But the latter is
essential.
The Court’s dramatic shift in attitude regarding judicial
management in Twombly reflects the current divergence in
philosophy on how district courts can best handle the pretrial process.
With Twombly, the Court wiped the slate clean, starting anew with
plausibility pleading as the system’s initial gatekeeper, rather than
building on the existing tools of case management and the more
vigorous post-1986 summary judgment motion. But change of that
magnitude should have been based on a much greater understanding
of the implications of the tectonic shift that has occurred in the
character of federal civil litigation and procedural practices in recent
decades, and on much more clarity about the utility of pleading
practice and the actual quality of pretrial management. Data of a
highly sophisticated character need to be gathered and analyzed to
determine what the deficiencies of these techniques are, and what
293
they are not. Who was closer to the mark, Justice Souter in
Twombly or Justice Breyer dissenting in Iqbal?
Despite the Rules Committee’s, the Supreme Court’s, and
Congress’s pre-Twombly endorsement of case management as an
appropriate method to contain cost and delay, a few commentators
have argued that case management is doomed to fail on both
294
theoretical and practical grounds. Practical objections reflect the

293. Asking for impressions about whether litigation is “too expensive” or “takes too long”
is of little value, because few, if any, attorneys would say the process is “inexpensive” or “not
long enough.” See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 56; AM. COLL. OF TRIAL
LAWYERS, supra note 54, at 17. For sharp criticism of the conclusions and principles drawn from
the second of the cited surveys, calling them not supported by the survey results, see J. Douglas
Richards & John Vail, A Misguided Mission to Revamp the Rules, TRIAL, Nov. 2009, at 52.
294. See Bone, supra note 52, at 900–01 (suggesting that Twombly’s skepticism about case
management might be justified). See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 376 (1982) (arguing that case management was not proven to be effective and that it may
harm the standards of impartial adjudication and hinder constitutional rights such as dueprocess safeguards). In JAMES S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, DANIEL
MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, RAND INST. FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996), the authors reported little effect on time and cost but did
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view that judicial resources are limited and assert that some district
judges spend little time managing cases or are insufficiently energetic
295
Indeed,
in maintaining the district court’s involvement.
management is said to be left largely in the hands of magistrate judges
296
in many instances. Philosophical objections range from a view that
the function of judges is to adjudicate, not manage, to a concern
about a loss of judicial impartiality and the possible deleterious
effects judicial management may have on aspects of the adversarial
297
system. Despite these criticisms, the managerial role of federal
judges has been reaffirmed and expanded over the years and judicial
involvement is deemed useful—if not essential—by practicing
298
litigators.
Judge Easterbrook’s 1989 article—the basis for Justice Souter’s
rejection of judicial management in favor of plausibility pleading in
Twombly—contended that it would be impossible for judges to
299
separate abusive discovery from extensive and “impositional”

conclude that certain management procedures could reduce time to disposition by 30 percent
with no adverse effects.
295. See Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 96–97 (2009)
(“The Rules permit, but do not require[,] that judges take an active role in case management,
and judges and litigants have economic and social incentives to minimize judicial participation.
As a result, courts tend to involve themselves only infrequently in the day-to-day administration
of cases.”).
296. See Richard A. Posner, Coping with the Caseload: A Comment on Magistrates and
Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2216 (1989) (“Abuse there is, but it is more likely to occur in a
case supervised by a district judge, whose primary responsibilities lie in trying cases and
managing—somehow—a huge docket, than in a case supervised by a magistrate, whose most
challenging and responsible task is, precisely, to manage discovery in big civil cases.”).
297. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 294, at 376–78 (“[T]he restraints that formally
circumscribed judicial authority are conspicuously absent. Managerial judges frequently work
beyond the public view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written, reasoned opinions,
and out of reach of appellate review.”); see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010
WL 2977297, at *10 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting in part) (discussing the
difficulty of managing discovery when much of the process is delegated to magistrate judges
who “can have only an imperfect sense of how widely the district judge would want the factual
inquiry . . . to roam”). See generally Michael E. Tigar, Pretrial Case Management Under the
Amended Rules: Too Many Words for a Good Idea, 14 REV. LITIG. 137 (1994) (arguing that
unwise case management harms the adversarial process).
298. See supra notes 205–43 and accompanying text.
299. See Easterbrook, supra note 226, at 637–38 (“Stated differently, an impositional request
is one justified by the costs it imposes on one’s adversary rather than by the gains to the
requester derived from the contribution the information will make to the accuracy of the
judicial process.”).
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discovery requests made by attorneys practicing in good faith. He
concluded that “[j]udges can do little about impositional discovery
when parties control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the
301
discovery themselves.”
Although some contemporary critics of case management
302
continue to cite Judge Easterbrook’s theoretical assumptions, there
has been little research conducted that confirms his conclusions, let
alone research that systematically measures the amount or
303
consequences of any management shortfall. Even less effort has
been devoted to exploring and explaining how today’s judicial
management practices might be enhanced. Moreover, the article is
now more than twenty years old. Its publication preceded the effects
of the revolution in summary judgment practice, the narrowing
amendments to the discovery rules, the district court expense-anddelay plans, the local management rules that have emerged following
the Civil Justice Reform Act, the great growth in consciousness about
case management throughout the profession, the extensive control
over discovery now commonly exercised by district judges, and the
traction and sophistication the art of management has achieved under
the 1983 and 1993 amendments of Rule 16 and the sequential editions
304
of the Manual. It also preceded the growth in extremely complex
litigation involving numerous new technologies and scientific
developments, as well as electronic discovery. These phenomena
seem to call for more—and better—judicial management, not less.
Justice Souter’s reliance on that article simply is not persuasive,

300. Id. at 641 (“Lawyers practicing in good faith, therefore, engage in extensive discovery;
anything less is foolish. . . . Indeed, many lawyers do not know whether their own discovery
requests are proper or impositional; it is almost impossible to tell one from the other, and both
are in the interests of the lawyer’s client.”).
301. Id. at 638. Note that this is the same passage cited in Twombly to justify the
disparagement of case management.
302. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE
L.J. 561, 602 (2001) (“Even were it feasible to prevent all abusive discovery costs—an all-butimpossible task—the costs inherent in discovery would be inescapable.” (citing Easterbrook,
supra note 226, at 642)); Stancil, supra note 295, at 97–100.
303. The articles cited in the preceding notes do not refer to any empirical data that
validates Judge Easterbrook’s conclusion. Moreover, the only evidence cited in his article
concludes that discovery abuse may be a problem. This data do not seem relevant to a
discussion that already has concluded that assumption is true.
304. For some indication of the widespread use of case management, see LEE & WILLGING,
supra note 203, at 11–12.
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especially since the new pleading standard established in Twombly
305
and Iqbal is not limited to discovery-rich cases.
Absent any real evidence, both the supporters and critics of case
management rely heavily on ideology, which colors their views about
how to improve the civil justice system’s pretrial process. Little has
been done to research the efficacy of judicial management through
sophisticated studies of what district courts actually do, what works,
306
and what does not. Anecdotal evidence, assumptions, and theory
are not enough to validate the drastic changes that have been made to
the process of determining the sufficiency of a complaint and related
motions; they do not make credible what the Court wrote in Twombly
and Iqbal. This subject should be evaluated in light of comprehensive,
intelligent, and dispassionate information regarding the costs and
challenges of civil litigation. This exploration must go well beyond
simply surveying the impressions and attitudes of participants if the
rulemakers are to achieve a satisfactory balance of efficiency, access,
and quality. Fortunately, considerable progress on the research front
307
is being made.
In addition to analyzing discovery and management, which
clearly are inseparable from pleading and motion practice, it would
be desirable, if possible, to reach a common understanding of what is
meant by “abusive” or “excessive” discovery and “frivolous”
308
litigation. These words are uttered in a mantra-like fashion in
litigation cost and delay discussions. Yet despite their abundant
recitation, it is unclear what they embrace. Does abusive discovery
refer to almost all discovery, as the Easterbrook article may have

305. See discussion supra notes 115–17.
306. One commentator has asserted that there is no “reliable” empirical data about the
ability of trial judges to curb discovery problems. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical
Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1989 (2007).
307. In addition to the studies by the Federal Judicial Center, the American Bar Association
Section of Litigation, the New York State Bar Association, and the American College of Trial
Lawyers referred to in the notes in this article, numerous other studies by the Center, state
organizations, other bar association groups, and academics are underway. For examples of these
studies, see supra note 67.
308. These and related words were used repeatedly by speakers at the Duke Conference
with no attempt to articulate a frame of reference or define their meaning. See generally Suja A.
Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 633 (2010) (concluding that references to
“frivolous cases” distract from effective discussion of costs and rights).
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suggested? If so, then the term basically is meaningless. Or is it
abusive only when the plaintiff uses the discovery procedures as a
“fishing expedition” or requests irrelevant information merely to
pressure the defendant and extort a settlement? Are frivolous cases
those “with no ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process
310
will reveal relevant evidence?’” Or is the category broader than
that? And what about the infrequently mentioned frivolous or
abusive behavior on the defense side—dilatory motions, harassing
discovery demands, or noncompliance with legitimate discovery
requests—designed to delay progress toward trial and to consume the
typically limited resources of contingent-fee plaintiffs’ lawyers?
311
Attrition is all too often a strategy of choice. And why isn’t all of
this a matter for the sanction structure, the discovery regime, or more
effective judicial oversight rather than a burden on the pleading and
related motion rules? The answer proffered by Twombly and Iqbal
seems to reflect a policy of early termination über alles.
I spent a great deal of time during the first six months of my
tenure as Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
participating in bar association meetings and judicial conferences,
asking attendees what they thought constituted abusive discovery and
frivolous litigation—phenomena I had been informed were at the
heart of the litigation cost and delay problem that the Committee was
trying to counteract. At times I felt like Diogenes with a lamp looking
for an honest opinion. Although no single, generally agreed-upon
standard emerged from these discussions, there were two nearly
universal themes in the various explanations and examples I heard.
First, frivolous litigation is the lawsuit the other side brings against
one’s client; second, abuse is whatever the opposing counsel does.

309. See supra notes 299–01 and accompanying text. It is interesting to look at the sentence
Justice Souter wrote in Twombly to reject the case-management approach. His opinion seems to
imply that costly discovery and discovery abuse are one and the same:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of plausible entitlement to relief can, if
groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through “careful case
management,” given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). They are not.
310. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Dura
Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 337 (2005)). Experienced litigators usually have had the
epiphany of being in cases that initially appeared to be sows’ ears but that proved to be silk
purses.
311. The tobacco litigation is but one example of a campaign of attrition by an industry and
its lawyers, as is well described in Cabraser, supra note 127, at 18–33.
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My research methods admittedly were unscientific and the
foregoing summary of my “findings” somewhat glib. But despite the
passage of more than thirty years and personal involvement in
countless federal cases, I have yet to find a more specific or
illuminating definition of these terms. Although in some instances
one knows inappropriate litigation behavior when one sees it, wideangle consensus on what these terms mean and when they apply may
312
well be unobtainable. The line between zealous advocacy and
litigation misbehavior is obscure at best, and we really have no idea as
to the frequency—or infrequency—of abuse and excessive motion
313
and discovery activity. Yet cosmic anecdotes flood the Rialto, and
urban legends constantly are being generated. This is troublesome;
the alleged phenomena that have driven pretrial policy decisions over
the past few decades remain largely subjective, unquantified, and
anecdotal.
By leaving the notions of abusive discovery and meritless
litigation undefined in Twombly and Iqbal while simultaneously
encouraging judges to factor concerns about them into their Rule
12(b)(6) decisions, the Court has authorized judges to let their own
views and attitudes regarding these phenomena influence their
decisionmaking. This virtually unbridled discretion is inappropriate.
It compounds the subjectivity inherent in the plausibility inquiry. And
when exercised at the threshold of a case, it may undermine historic
norms and debilitate the private enforcement of important
substantive policies, as well as constitutional due process and jury314
trial rights. Moreover, it may lead to greater inconsistencies in the
application of federal law, diminish the predictability of outcomes
that is critical to an effective civil-dispute-resolution system and the
confidence people have in it, and increase forum and judge shopping.

312. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 520 (1997)
(“We know remarkably little about frivolous litigation. Reliable empirical data is extremely
limited, and casual anecdotal evidence highly unreliable.”).
313. See AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 227 (2009) (characterizing the notion that there is
“widespread frivolous antitrust litigation” as a “myth”).
314. See Resnik, supra note 294, at 427–28 (“Therefore, management becomes a fertile field
for the growth of personal bias. . . . Nevertheless, neither the Supreme Court, the lower federal
courts, nor Congress has considered the effect of judicial management on impartiality.”). Since
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion now acts as a gatekeeper, the greater discretion afforded the district
judge gives him increased influence over the availability of a meaningful day in court.
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These are potential consequences—and system costs—that must be
considered in evaluating the present and future utility of case
management and its relation to the current state of pleading and
pretrial motion practice. In short, there is much to be examined.
III. THE FUTURE OF RULEMAKING AND THE FEDERAL RULES
The Supreme Court’s legislative-like decisions in Twombly and
Iqbal and the 1986 trilogy have caused many to question the
continuing role of the rulemaking process and its current statutory
structure. Congress’ delegation to the Court of authority to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the nation’s courts
315
through the Rules Enabling Act long has been understood to have
established two principles: first, as the Supreme Court frequently has
noted, only the rulemaking machinery or an act of Congress can
316
change a properly promulgated Federal Rule; second, the Federal
Rules must be general and transsubstantive—they must apply in the
same way to all types of federal court actions. Twombly and Iqbal
cast doubt on both of these foundational assumptions. These
principles, their future, and the role of Congress require some
exploration.
A. The Value of the Rulemaking Process
The Supreme Court repeatedly has expressed its faith in the
317
rulemaking process for the better part of a century. Forty years ago,
the Court said, “We have no power to rewrite the Rules by Judicial

315. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
316. See Burbank, supra note 143, at 536.
317. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A, 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (refusing to establish a
heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination suits by judicial interpretation);
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (emphasizing that the Court has consistently
declined to revise established pleading rules); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1993) (“Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were
rewritten today, claims against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added
specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must be obtained by the process
of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation. In the absence of such an
amendment, federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of
discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.”); see also Miller, supra
note 32, at 1010–11 (summarizing the Court’s refusal to establish heightened pleading standards
in Leatherman, Crawford-El, and Swierkiewicz).
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318

interpretations.” Less than a decade prior to Twombly, the Court
noted that “our cases demonstrate that questions regarding pleading,
discovery, and summary judgment are resolved most frequently and
most effectively either by the rulemaking process or the legislative
319
process.”
These sentiments were repeated five years before
320
Twombly. Then, just five months before Twombly, the Court in its
321
unanimous opinion in Jones v. Bock stated,
We are not insensitive to the challenges faced by the lower federal
courts in managing their dockets and attempting to separate, when it
comes to prisoner suits, not so much wheat from chaff as needles
from hay stacks. We once again reiterate, however—as we did
unanimously in Leatherman, Swierkiewicz, and Hill—that adopting
different and more onerous pleading rules to deal with particular
categories of cases should be done through established rulemaking
322
procedures, and not on a case-by-case basis by the courts.

Critics argue that, with Twombly and Iqbal, the Court may have
forsaken its long-held commitment to the rulemaking process by
reformulating the Rules’ pleading and motion-to-dismiss standards by
323
judicial fiat. These assertions echo much of the criticism directed at
the Court following its 1986 summary judgment trilogy, when scholars
complained that the Justices had amended Rule 56 without
324
employing the Enabling Act’s procedure. Today, even those who
defend the Court’s “pragmatic” shift away from notice pleading

318. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969) (noting that the discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules do not apply to habeas proceedings); see also Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“Courts are not free to amend a rule outside of the process Congress
ordered . . . .”).
319. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 595.
320. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
321. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
322. Id. at 224.
323. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 52, at 110, 113–14; Schneider, supra note 44, at 531.
324. See Miller, supra note 32, at 1029; Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The
Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the
Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 99, 181–87 (1988) (arguing that changes wrought by
the trilogy should have been instituted by the Advisory Committee through the amendment
process, because that process is more public and results in better and more substantial
information for the profession than unilateral Supreme Court action); see also Nancy Levit, The
Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 321, 329–30, 360–62 (1989) (discussing changes in the standards for summary
judgment as one example of courts inserting caseload concerns into the formulation of
jurisdictional doctrines and, by doing so, treading on the legislature’s territory).
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acknowledge that Twombly and Iqbal have redefined Rule 8(a)(2)
and Rule 12(b)(6). The contesting viewpoints are hard to evaluate
because the boundary between judicially changing a Federal Rule and
325
simply interpreting and applying it is one of degree.
A significant drawback of amendment by judicial dictate is the
Supreme Court’s lack of democratic accountability. Whereas the
326
rulemakers generally conduct open meetings
and follow an
extensive notice-and-comment procedure that allows anyone
327
interested some (albeit limited) form of participation, the Court’s
Twombly-Iqbal methodology grants five Justices the power to bypass
the statutorily established process and “legislate” on important
procedural matters, often in ways that determine whether litigants
ultimately will be able to have a meaningful day in court and whether
important constitutional and congressional mandates and public
policies are enforced. In addition to its comparatively democratic
pedigree, the existing rulemaking process provides other advantages,
such as the Advisory Committee’s superior access to academic studies
and statistical research. As Professor Stephen B. Burbank points out,
the Supreme Court is “ill-equipped to gather the range of empirical
data, and lacks the practical experience, that should be brought to
bear on the questions of policy, procedural and substantive, that are
328
implicated in considering standards for the adequacy of pleadings.”
The Justices do not have the time, trial-court experience, or on-the-

325. Although the cases can be distinguished, it might be argued, for example, that the
Court “amended” the Rules in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (Rule
23), and Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986) (Rule 15).
326. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1) (2006). Meetings were closed during my tenure as Reporter;
they became open while I was a member of the Committee. The history of that transition has
been described by my successor as Reporter. See Carrington, supra note 43, at 22–25.
327. See Bone, supra note 99, at 884. The rulemaking machinery is in the hands of people
appointed by the Chief Justice. It has been suggested that opening the Advisory Committee’s
deliberations has allowed lobbying for various interests to infiltrate and perhaps influence the
process, raising questions about the extent to which rulemaking is truly democratic. See supra
note 43.
328. Burbank, supra note 143, at 537; see also Bone, supra note 99, at 883–85 (describing the
comparative advantages of rulemaking by the Advisory Committee); A. Leo Levin & Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1958) (proposing a balance of power in rulemaking between
courts and legislatures); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1133–36 (2002) (describing the
comparative advantages of rulemaking by the Advisory Committee); Jack B. Weinstein, Reform
of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L REV. 905, 908 (1976) (same).
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ground information to evaluate the consequences that procedural
changes may have on private enforcement of substantive law or what
alternative enforcement mechanisms should be established if
litigation pathways are impaired.
Considering the Court’s current ideological makeup and the
continuing trend toward increasingly early case disposition,
rulemaking by judicial mandate does not bode well for many of those
policies that are furthered by private enforcement and the access
principle. The members of the Advisory Committee therefore must
determine whether they will reassert their role as independent
architects of the Federal Rules, accept that an aspect of their
responsibility now may be to codify the Court’s Federal Rule
decisions, or simply remain silent and defer to case development.
This question becomes especially important in light of the
difficulties that arise when the Court announces piecemeal procedural
revisions in the context of a case’s particular facts, rather than on the
basis of a holistic appraisal of the effects that changes in a Rule’s
interpretation might have on the application of other Rules and on
the tremendous array of variegated matters that appear on federal
court dockets. One commentator, for example, has described how
plausibility pleading conflicts with several other Rules, most notably
329
Rules 8(f), 9(b), 11(b), and 12(e). And perhaps other parts of Rule
8, Rule 15(a), and the Forms should have been added to the list.
This is an important point: at least in certain respects, the Court’s
Twombly and Iqbal holdings may have eclipsed the established
operation of one or more of these Rules, some of which have
provided safeguards for ensuring that plaintiffs are given an
opportunity to plead or replead potentially meritorious claims. The
two decisions raise concerns that, instead of enabling plaintiffs to
correct their pleadings when deemed factually insufficient—for
example, by amendment under Rule 15, by pleading alternatively or
330
inconsistently as permitted by Rule 8(d), or by pleading on
information and belief within the boundaries of Rule 11(b)—the

329. See Spencer, supra note 108, at 469–72.
330. See Btesh v. City of Maitland, Fla., No. 6:10-cv-71-Orl-19DAB, 2010 WL 2639562, at *5
n.4 (M.D. Fla. June 29, 2010) (holding that for pleading in the alternative, only one alleged
theory need be plausible to survive a motion to dismiss).
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motion to dismiss may be employed to dispose of claims the court
331
believes should be disfavored.
Under the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard, the role that other
pretrial Rules will play in future cases is uncertain. For instance,
although the Court denied creating a heightened pleading standard
for substantive areas not mentioned in the first sentence of Rule
332
9(b), it is difficult to understand how that proposition will operate in
practice; the distinction between the demand for “particularity” in
Rule 9(b)—an express heightened pleading provision—and the
Court’s insistence on a “showing” of “factual sufficiency” under
333
Twombly seems imperceptible. Moreover, even though the second
sentence of Rule 9(b) allows conditions of mind, including knowledge
and intent, to be alleged “generally,” Twombly and Iqbal required
specific factual allegations on issues of precisely this character—
334
335
namely, conspiracy and purposeful discrimination.
And it is unclear how the forgiving and “justice”-seeking
amendment policy of Rules 15(a) and 15(b) will function in a
plausibility-pleading environment. It seems unlikely that the Court
intended to diminish the force of Rule 15; the Supreme Court’s
decisions do not speak to the subject. There is reason to believe that
most district courts will continue to give the Rule 15(a)(2) words “the
court should freely give leave when justice so requires” the liberal

331. See Miller, supra note 32, at 1016 (“Surveys confirm that judges view prompt rulings on
summary judgment and Rule 12(b)(6) motions as the most effective procedural devices for
filtering out frivolous litigation.” (citing Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Thomas E. Willging & Donna
Stienstra, The Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Rule 11, FJC DIRECTIONS, Nov. 1991, at 3, 20
tbl.11)).
332. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007).
333. See SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010) (clarifying that Rule 9(b)
requires, beyond Rule 8, the pleading of “time, place, and content . . . with specificity”). It is
unclear how this interpretation of Rule 9 differs from the requirements for Rule 8 set forth in
Twombly. The Twombly majority, in addition to affirming the validity of what is now Form 11’s
specification of places, dates, and times, suggested the antitrust conspiracy complaint in that
case did not provide adequate notice because it “mentioned no specific time, place or person
involved in the alleged conspiracies.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10; see also 5 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 3, § 1216. However, in Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 592 F.3d
314 (2d Cir. 2010), the court suggested that facts related to time, place, or the specific
individuals involved are necessary to satisfy Rule 8 only if the other factual allegations do not
provide notice. Id. at 325; see also Hollander v. Etymotic Research, Inc., No. 10-526, 2010 WL
2813015, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2010) (finding allegations might meet Rule 8 standards, but not
Rule 9(b)).
334. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56.
335. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947–54 (2009).
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application those courts have accorded that language in the past and
not interpret Twombly and Iqbal as requiring a tightened application
336
of that passage. Once again, sounding a pragmatic note, there are
potential litigation cost and delay consequences to these amendment
questions. If Rule 15 does survive unscathed, the growing number of
dismissal-motion grants will generate additional amendment requests
and grants of leave to replead, and in many instances a second motion
to dismiss following that repleading. On the other hand, if the
application of Rule 15 is narrowed, more judgments following Rule
12(b)(6) dismissals will be entered and additional appeals from
denials of dismissals and leave to replead are likely to result.
In sum, if the principles articulated in Twombly and Iqbal are to
be retained, either with or without formal Rule amendment, the
remaining Rules will have to be canvassed—including Rule 84, as well
337
as the supposedly sufficient practice Forms that Rule authorizes —to
determine whether corrective textual steps are necessary to restore
the overall coherence of the pleading and pretrial motion rules. But
before either engaging in that process or codifying the Court’s two
decisions, which might not prove to be a simple task, one should step
back and seriously assess the Rules’ fundamental principles and
objectives. The subject’s importance warrants that.

336. Preliminary research has shown that several courts have continued to grant leave to
replead liberally after Twombly-Iqbal. E.g., Lewis-Burke Assocs. LLC v. Widder, No. 09-302
(JMF), 2010 WL 2926161, at *6–7 (D.D.C. July 28, 2010); Dupris v. McDonald, Nos. 08-8132PCT-PGR, 08-8133-PCT-PGR, 2010 WL 231548, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 13, 2010); see also Krainski
v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents, No. 08-17523, 2010 WL 2991397, at *8 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2010)
(Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority’s finding
that the plaintiff could not produce any new facts to save the complaint and, therefore, the
district court’s denial of leave to amend was an abuse of discretion). This does not contradict—
and if anything, it supports—the potential cost consequences referred to previously. See supra
notes 121–22 and accompanying text. Cases have appeared, however, in which the court has
denied leave to replead on the ground that doing so would be “futile.” See, e.g., Cieniawa v.
White, No.1:09-CV-2130, 2010 WL 2766170, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 13, 2010); In re Young, 428
B.R. 804, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 2010). Similar questions arise as to the future of Rule
11(b)(3), which allows court papers to be signed on the basis that “factual contentions” will have
support “after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” See generally 5A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1335 (noting the elements and application of the standard
of certification under Rule 11).
337. See Elan Microelecs. Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. C 09-01531 RS, 2009 WL 2972374, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009) (noting the difficulty of “reconcil[ing]” Form 18 with Twombly and
Iqbal); see also supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
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B. The End of Transsubstantivity?
In addition to establishing the rulemaking process, the Rules
Enabling Act’s provision for “prescrib[ing] general rules of practice
338
and procedure” means that the Federal Rules should be “uniformly
applicable in all federal district courts [and] uniformly applicable in
339
all types of cases.” The concept is based on the principle that the
Federal Rules should operate evenhandedly across the substantive
universe, be framed in uncomplicated, general terms, and be applied
in the same fashion for all litigants. This philosophy was consistent
with the desire to keep the original Federal Rules textually simple
340
and value neutral as much as possible. Because the mission of
procedural rulemaking has been thought to be to help execute the
policy choices made by others, the theory is that substance-specific
rules should be generated by those other institutions and processes.
Under the tenets of transsubstantivity, the general application of
Rule 8’s pleading principles and the motion rules should not vary with
341
the substantive law controlling a particular claim. Thus, Rule 9
governs the only contexts in which pleading principles different from
342
those prescribed by Rule 8 can be applied; it stands as a formal
exception to the transsubstantivity rule. Accordingly, in Swierkiewicz,
the Supreme Court rejected heightened pleading standards in

338. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
339. Burbank, supra note 143, at 536. For a discussion of the 1935 Advisory Committee’s
commitment to the transsubstantive quality of the Federal Rules, see id. at 541–42. See generally
Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedural Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV.
319, 324 (2008) (discussing transsubstantivity as underlying the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure’s “distinctive features”); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections
on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 719 (1975) (describing the early English-law
principle of transsubstantive rules); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Transsubstantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244–47
(1989) (describing the social benefit of transsubstantivity); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and
Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 375 (2010)
(arguing that only legislatures should engage in substance-specific rulemaking).
340. See generally 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1029 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the
purpose and construction of the Federal Rules).
341. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2067, 2067–69 (1989); Spencer, supra note 108, at 457.
342. See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1291–1315 (describing the details
and application of Rule 9). Aside from Rule 9, the notion of heightened pleading for actions
thought to be “disfavored” presumably would have been anathema to the drafters of the
original Rules.

MILLER IN FINAL

2010]

9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM

A DOUBLE PLAY ON THE FEDERAL RULES

91

employment discrimination cases and reaffirmed the status of the
343
And the same standards
Federal Rules as general rules.
theoretically apply to all motions to dismiss and to all motions for
344
summary judgment.
With Twombly and Iqbal, it is quite possible that the Court
implicitly abandoned or compromised its devotion to the
345
transsubstantive character of the Rules. True, the Court did state
that the enhanced pleading standard will govern all civil actions, and
the cases therefore can be thought of as establishing a “general” rule.
But the Court also indicated that the principle is to be applied
contextually. Thus far, it has applied plausibility pleading only to two
atypical actions in substantive contexts in which several lower courts
previously had advanced heightened pleading—antitrust and
346
governmental discrimination claims. By way of counterpoint, as
noted earlier, the Court insisted in Twombly that Form 9—now Form
347
11—would continue to suffice for negligence pleading. If that holds
true, plausibility may be transsubstantive in name only. In practice,
some form of the preexisting notice pleading may survive for simpler,
run-of-the-mine actions. But a universe of different applications of
plausibility pleading may emerge in other substantive and complexity
environments. This distinction in the standard’s application based on
348
context, a note sounded by Justice Kennedy in the Iqbal opinion,
would mean that although the transsubstantivity concept would be
349
preserved as a generic or overarching principle,
divergent

343. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). As previously discussed, at least
one panel of the Third Circuit has concluded that Swierkiewicz is a victim of Twombly and
Iqbal, although other courts have expressed a different view. See supra notes 113–17 and
accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 30–31, 59–60 and accompanying text.
345. See Burbank, supra note 143, at 555–56.
346. It appears that the Court may have sanctioned the establishment of a hierarchy of
actions, with a bias toward fairly stringent gatekeeping in three types of cases: disfavored
actions, like libel or slander; actions that threaten to disrupt government functioning; and “mega
cases” that impose large financial burdens on defendants. See supra note 52.
347. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 565 n.10 (2007); see also Xpoint Techs., Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 09-628-SLR, 2010 WL 3187025, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 12, 2010)
(finding the complaint for patent infringement was sufficient because it mimicked Form 18).
348. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953–54 (2009).
349. See Bone, supra note 52, at 890–91 (arguing that Twombly’s plausibility standard is in
line with the rule drafters’ “pragmatic commitment to making procedure an efficient means to
enforce the substantive law accurately”); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. See generally Epstein,
supra note 52, at 62 (defending Twombly as a mini-summary judgment).
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applications would be tolerated in different situations. But that is a
curious form of preservation and ultimately might lead to the
development of special pleading rules for various substantive areas.
Viewed realistically, the substance behind the catechism of
transsubstantivity actually may have been discarded in all but name
long before Twombly and Iqbal; its continued existence certainly has
351
been a subject of academic debate. In practice, many lower courts
applied heightened factual pleading requirements in a variety of
substantive areas—such as antitrust, discrimination, securities law,
and suits against governmental officials—despite the Court’s repeated
352
references to Conley and notice pleading. A system that accepts a
three-page complaint for a negligence claim and effectively requires a
one-hundred-page complaint for an antitrust suit hardly can be
described as applying a uniform pleading standard, even if the
articulated formula is the same. Moreover, the vast reservoir of
judicial discretion in the application of the Federal Rules, coupled
with the restraints on appellate review imposed by the final-judgment
353
rule, probably undermines the transsubstantivity principle.

350. See Apps Commc'ns, Inc. v. S2000, Corp., No. 10 C 1618, 2010 WL 3034189, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 3, 2010) (stating that courts should “take into consideration the complexity of the case
when addressing whether a complaint alleges sufficient facts”). Compare Limestone Dev. Corp.
v. Village of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008) (“In a complex antitrust or RICO case a
fuller set of factual allegations than found in the sample complaints in the civil rules’ Appendix
of Forms may be necessary . . . .”), with Wiek v. Keane, No. 09 CV 920, 2010 WL 1976870, at *4
(N.D. Ill. May 12, 2010) (holding that because the Fourth Amendment case was not as factually
complex as Twombly or Iqbal, the pleading standard was not as high).
351. Mullenix, supra note 43, at 829 n.176 (citing Carrington, supra note 341, at 2067–69
nn.1–7; Cover, supra note 339, at 732–40); Gene R. Shreve, Eighteen Feet of Clay: Thoughts on
Phantom Rule 4(m), 67 IND. L.J. 85, 92 (1991). See generally Marcus, supra note 339 (discussing
the history and current adherence to transsubstantivity); Schneider, supra note 44 (describing
the disparate application of plausibility pleading to employment discrimination and civil rights
cases); Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1501
(1992) (recounting several statutory exceptions to transsubstantivity).
352. See, e.g., E. Food Servs., Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2004) (antitrust); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) (suit against the INS);
see also Fairman, supra note 37, at 1110–58 (observing heightened pleading standards for
several other types of cases); Fairman, supra note 1, at 617–19 (same); Marcus, supra note 37, at
482 (criticizing trial judges who would decide dismissals on instinct); Tobias, supra note 351, at
1502 (citing environmental suits as a statutory exception to transsubstantivity).
353. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). See generally 15A–B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND
RELATED MATTERS §§ 3905–3919.10 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the history and application of the
final-judgment rule).
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There is additional evidence that the bloom is off the
transsubstantivity rose. Rule 6(b), for example, authorizes the
extension of time for doing an act in most situations but not in certain
others, and Rule 16 provides judges with extensive discretion to
manage cases on a differential basis depending on, among other
354
factors, the complexity of the issues involved. In the discovery
arena, Rule 26(a)(1)(B) exempts certain classes of cases from the
355
mandatory disclosure requirements. And there are the two special
356
pleading provisions in Rule 9(b) as well as elsewhere in Rule 9. In a
related—although legislative—vein, the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 produced a plethora of different district court expense and delay
plans that are inconsistent in many respects and depart from the
357
Federal Rules and with each other in various ways. Similarly, local
rules and many individual judges’ standing orders magnify the
procedural differences from case to case, judge to judge, and district
to district. Thus it seems obvious that not all cases are treated alike by
the federal courts, despite any ongoing aspirational devotion to
transsubstantivity. At this point, therefore, it may be necessary to
decide whether to reaffirm the principle, transmogrify it, or expressly
abandon it. If the time has come to retire transsubstantivity, the

354. For example, Rule 16(c)(2)(L) encourages courts to consider “adopting special
procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex
issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems.” FED. R. CIV. P.
16(c)(2)(L). Some local rules call for “systematic differential case management” tailored to each
individual case based on “complexity, time required to prepare a case for trial, and availability
of judicial and other resources.” N.D.N.Y. R. 16.1. Congress clearly disregarded the notion of
transsubstantivity in creating super-heightened pleading and sanction rules under the PSLRA
for private securities fraud litigation; that legislation, of course, is not governed by the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006).
355. For a number of years, Rule 26(a)(1)(B) empowered each district to decide whether to
apply the provision. Many opted out of mandatory disclosure, creating a substantial
inconsistency of application. For a discussion of the history of the mandatory disclosure
requirement, see infra note 433.
356. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(c), (g). Several of the Court’s pre-Twombly decisions intimate
that differential pleading standards could be established through the rulemaking process, a
notion that is inconsistent with the assumed meaning of the Enabling Act’s reference to
“general rules.” See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 224 (2007); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1993).
357. See generally Tobias, supra note 266 (noting the divergent district court procedures
following the Civil Justice Reform Act); supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
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possibilities for doing so are obvious—it can be done judicially,
358
359
legislatively, or by benign neglect. More of that below.
C. Dealing With Twombly and Iqbal: A Return to the Rulemaking
Process or Resort to Legislation?
The Supreme Court’s bypass of the rulemaking process in
Twombly raises the question: what is the purpose of today’s elaborate
statutory process, given the Court’s willingness to revise important
aspects of the Rules on its own rather than follow its existing
precedents? If Twombly and Iqbal take us toward an era in which the
role of formal rulemaking is reduced in part to deciding whether to
codify the Court’s Rule-related decisions, it would be an unfortunate
turn of events. Given the Justices’ dependence on the small number
of procedural issues that reach the Court, they necessarily function
reactively and their rulemaking inevitably is interstitial. Moreover,
Court intervention would deprive the rulemaking process of the
special competencies and experience bases typically found on the
360
Advisory Committee and at other stages of Rule revision. The
membership of these groups has been distinguished and dedicated
over the years. The better approach, I think, would be for the
Advisory Committee to take a “business-as-usual” approach.
Although atypical pleading contexts were before the Court in both
Twombly and Iqbal, the latter said plausibility applied to all cases.
Thus, perhaps the two opinions should be read as an informal signal
to the rulemaking bodies that a reexamination of pleading and
pretrial-motion practice is in order. That would enable the
rulemaking committees to proceed pursuant to their usual
procedures, paying heed, of course, to the concerns the Court
expressed.

358. See generally Cover, supra note 339, at 738–40 (arguing that allowing courts to have the
ability to modify existing rules would not “destroy the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor
violate some notion of separation of powers”). Given the significant deviations from
transsubstantivity noted in text, that principle offers no justification for Iqbal’s extension of
Twombly to all civil actions. There was no consensus at the Duke Conference on the question of
whether transsubstantivity should be preserved.
359. See infra notes 448–78 and accompanying text.
360. The Committee is composed of federal trial and appellate judges; experienced federal
practitioners; and an occasional academic, state court judge, or Department of Justice
representative. A law professor who specializes in federal procedure serves as the Reporter.
When effectively composed, the members have a wide range of viewpoints and professional
backgrounds and might be thought of as an all-star team of seasoned proceduralists.
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The Advisory Committee understandably has difficulty secondguessing the Court’s decisions, let alone turning away from them,
361
especially when they reflect a particular judicial mindset. Yet it is
important to remember that Committee members are expected to
exercise independent judgment, that they have the power to depart
from existing Rule-related precedents in making proposals, and that
the Court ultimately may accept the rulemakers’ decisions. Further
study and inquiry into the validity of the assumptions underlying
Twombly and Iqbal, as well as a full exploration of all the relevant but
potentially countervailing policies, may arm the Committee and the
Judicial Conference with a perspective and knowledge base that were
unavailable to the Court. Given the importance of the issues under
discussion, a lesser effort would be unfortunate.
There are several avenues that can be taken. The Advisory
Committee may codify Twombly and Iqbal and rewrite Rule 8(a)(2),
in which event corresponding amendments to the other pretrial rules
362
affected by the decisions might be necessary. Or the rulemakers
may wish to await judicial developments and the emergence of a

361. An attempt to revise Rule 56 to take account of the Supreme Court’s 1986 summary
judgment trilogy eventually went nowhere. According to the then-Reporter,
the argument that seemed to prevail in the Standing Committee against the revision
of Rule 56 was that it would be inappropriate for our committees to be trespassing on
a lawmaking role that the high Court had appropriated for itself. I was not the only
person present who was resistant to a notion that seemed to be misplaced modesty
and deference by those to whom Congress had assigned the role of disinterested
drafting of procedural law for its non-partisan approval.
Carrington, supra note 43, at 62. This reluctance to depart from Supreme Court decisions is
understandable since sitting federal judges comprise a significant portion of the membership of
the relevant committees and the entirety of the Judicial Conference. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). See
generally Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 292–96 (2009) (discussing the structure and composition of
the civil-rulemaking process and proposing changes).
362. In a white paper submitted to the Duke Conference, a group of organizations
representing defense interests purport to “codify” Twombly and Iqbal by proposing that Rule
8(a)(2) require “a short and plain statement, made with particularity, of all material facts known
to the pleading party that support the claim, creating a reasonable inference that the pleader is
plausibly entitled to relief.” Lawyers for Civil Justice, DRI—The Voice of the Def. Bar, Fed’n
of Def. & Corporate Counsel & Int’l Ass’n of Def. Counsel, Reshaping the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the 21st Century: The Need for Clear, Concise, and Meaningful Amendments to
Key Rules of Civil Procedure, at x (May 2, 2010) (unpublished white paper) (emphasis omitted),
available
at
http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/
888E977DFE7B173A8525771B007B6EB5/$File/Reshaping%20the%20Rules%20for%20the%2
021st%20Century.pdf?OpenElement. In reality, that language is far more demanding than the
Supreme Court’s decisions and the language advanced in other proposals. Indeed, the proposal
amounts to a reversion to code, if not common law, pleading.
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corpus of experience at the trial and appellate levels while
363
commissioning the several empirical analyses that are needed. The
latter approach might be criticized by some as an abdication of the
Committee’s responsibility or creating a risk that events will overtake
revision efforts that should be undertaken now. Finally, the
rulemakers can bring Conley’s pure-notice-pleading philosophy out of
“retirement,” with—but probably without—the hyperbolic “no-set364
of-facts” formulation. There is support for that approach in several
365
quarters.
An imponderable in appraising these possibilities is the extent to
which Congress will participate in the formation of policy on this
subject. The legislative pot has been stirred. Shortly after Iqbal was
decided, various interest groups—including civil rights and consumer
366
advocates—began pressing for congressional action. Amidst these
367
efforts came the proposed Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009,
introduced in the Senate by Senator Arlen Specter. The bill seeks to
accomplish exactly what its title suggests. Formal hearings were held
368
by the Committee on the Judiciary on December 2, 2009, and
369
various constituencies provided input in the following months. In
March 2010, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse circulated for discussion a
potential substitute bill that enumerates a number of congressional
findings, emphasizes that the proposed substitute legislation presumes

363. The Duke Conference focused on many of the problems under discussion. That
conference, plus several studies undertaken by the Federal Judicial Center, were designed to
expand the Advisory Committee’s knowledge base and identify areas of possible consensus.
None was reached at the Conference regarding Twombly and Iqbal
364. For further discussion of Conley, see supra notes 3–5, 59–62 and accompanying text.
365. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 143, at 547–53 (“In such garden-variety cases, I suggest, a
pleading that provides sufficient notice to survive a Federal Rule 12(e) motion should also
survive a motion under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) if its nonconclusory allegations, taken as true, and
any inferences reasonably drawn from them, tell a plausible . . . story of liability.”); Clermont &
Yeazell, supra note 52, at 856–59 (discussing methods of bringing back notice pleading through
either an amendment to the Federal Rules or through congressional action).
366. See Tony Mauro, Groups Unite to Keep Cases on Docket: Plaintiff’s Lawyers Seek to
Stop Dismissals After Iqbal Decision, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 1 (noting that civil rights
groups, consumer groups, and trial lawyers attempted to fight the Iqbal decision).
367. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). Several law professors have been providing assistance to
the Senate staff.
368. Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41.
369. From conversations with congressional staff, my understanding is that a third bill is
being drafted as well. A New York State Bar Association committee calls for the pleading of all
“nonconclusory” matters. See infra note 375. For the defense bar’s proposal, see supra note 362.
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subsequent action by the Advisory Committee, and ties restoration to
370
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as it existed before Twombly.
As of this writing, therefore, the Senate bill is still a work in progress.
The House of Representatives has been active as well. On
October 27, 2009, a hearing entitled Access to Justice Denied:
Ashcroft v. Iqbal was held by the Subcommittee on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Committee on the Judiciary,
371
although no formal bill was before it. Following that hearing, the
subcommittee’s chairman, Congressman Jerrold Nadler, introduced
372
the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, which would preserve
373
Conley’s “no set of facts” language. Both the House and the Senate
proposals—as well as others advanced by bar associations, circulated
374
on the Internet, or emanating from other sources —purport to be
respectful of the rulemaking process and assume the Advisory
Committee would either approach the subject from a pre-Twombly
375
base point or formulate a new Rule 8(a)(2) standard.
Not surprisingly, there is substantial opposition to any legislation
that might undermine the Supreme Court decisions. Defense interests
opposed to any legislation on this subject have been mobilized, led by
376
the Chamber of Commerce. Twombly and Iqbal serve them quite
well. Legislation also is disfavored by those who are philosophically

370. The draft is still not public. With Senator Specter’s departure from the Senate, Senator
Whitehouse appears to have assumed a leadership position on this subject.
371. Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 53.
372. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
373. Id. § 2.
374. Many law professors have chimed in with proposals. E.g., Michael C. Dorf, An
Alternative to Senator Specter’s Notice Pleading Bill (July 29, 2009, 3:13 AM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/07/alternative-to-senator-specters-notice_28.html.
Professors
have circulated other proposals on FINDLAW, http://writ.news.findlaw.com (last visited Aug. 27,
2010), and on the University of Notre Dame Law School’s Civil Procedure listserv,
civ.pro@listserv.nd.edu.
375. In a report of the New York State Bar Association, it is suggested that Rule 8(a)(2)
require “a short and plain non-conclusory statement of grounds sufficient to provide notice of
the claim and the relief sought,” which demands less than Iqbal but will lead to litigation over
the meaning of “non-conclusory.” N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION’S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS FOR PLEADING IN FEDERAL
LITIGATION 1 (2004).
376. See, for example, the multi-industry letter presented on the Chamber’s stationery
opposing Senate Bill 1504. Letter from Multiple Industries to Senator Leahy, Chairman, Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com/issues/
letters/2009/091201s1504.htm.
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committed to the rulemaking process as it has developed for more
than seventy years and do not wish to see any reallocation of
authority over the Federal Rules. Nor is legislation favored by those
who fear that the subject will be ill-handled if it is subjected to the
377
political forces at work in Congress. The fate of the proposals is
unclear as of this writing. Any action before the November 2010
election is extremely unlikely.
Legislation simply purporting to roll back the clock to restore the
pleading standard to its pre-Twombly position has the virtue of
minimal intrusion on the rulemaking process in contrast to Congress’
enactment of a specific pleading standard to replace Rule 8(a)(2), but
it might not be politically feasible to achieve. Moreover, a rollback
might not achieve the intended result because it would not necessarily
resurrect the type of notice pleading that the original rulemakers and
378
Conley sought to establish. As already noted, in the two decades
prior to Twombly and Iqbal, many lower-court decisions had
departed from Conley’s directive and established variegated versions
of notice pleading, or fact pleading, or some combination of the two.
What existed was a bit of a crazy quilt, which unfortunately could well
be resurrected if the legislation simply returned things to what they
were the day before Twombly was decided. The proposal circulated
by Senator Whitehouse might obviate this problem by tying the
rollback to adherence to the pre-Twombly Supreme Court
379
jurisprudence, namely cases such as Leatherman and Swierkiewicz.
Another approach would be to define a pleader’s obligations in terms
of the requirements of legal sufficiency and notice-giving, the
380
functions intended in 1938.
So, if there is to be legislation, should it reestablish the pre-2007
Supreme Court precedents, the mixture of notice and fact pleading
that characterized federal court practice in the years preceding the
two cases, or the purer notice pleading that dominated the decades

377. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 99, at 883–85; see also Charles E. Clark, The Challenge of a
New Federal Civil Procedure, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 443, 457 (1935). A somewhat curious argument
against any legislation, clearly designed to appeal to certain members of Congress, is that any
relaxation of Twombly and Iqbal would facilitate lawsuits by people claiming injury as a result
of governmental conduct in the War Against Terrorism.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 37, 61–62.
379. See supra notes 220–21, 224 and accompanying text.
380. See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 375, at 42–43. This approach might be viewed
as too great an incursion on the rulemaking process.
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following the promulgation of the Federal Rules? A return to
Conley’s “no-set-of-facts” formulation is quite unlikely and probably
undesirable. Its literal application seems unworkable. Whatever the
shortcomings of a particular legislative draft might be, congressional
intervention to restore pleading to its status prior to Twombly and
Iqbal might be an attractive way to establish a cooling-off or stopand-think period, allowing the rulemaking process to study the
situation on a wide-angle basis and to propose a solution for what
seems to be an imbalance in the post-Twombly-Iqbal operation of the
381
pretrial Rules. Under any of the proposed legislative scenarios,
Congress’ intercession would reduce premature dismissals in the
interim and encourage federal courts to alleviate the current
information-asymmetry problem, as well as provide the Advisory
Committee with considerable motivation to come to grips with the
subject. Corrective action seems especially desirable in light of the
382
dubious assumptions underlying Twombly and Iqbal.
Establishing a pre-Twombly point of reference for the Advisory
Committee is quite important, because it provides an appropriate
backdrop against which its members can work. The rulemaking

381. At the same time, congressional intervention raises the concern that the cure may be
worse than the disease. In 1938, when speaking of the rulemaking power under the Enabling
Act, Judge Oscar R. Luhring remarked, “[t]he courts have been given the power to make their
own rules without interference by Congress. It is up to us to justify that confidence, and if we
don’t make good the Congressional goblin will get us!” AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 6, at 216.
Professor Fairman also noted concerns among the judiciary that congressional interference in
procedural rules “avoids the scrutiny of comment by the bench, bar, and public inherent in the
formal rulemaking process.” Fairman, supra note 1, at 615 (citing Year 2000 Readiness and
Responsibility Act: Hearing on H.R. 775 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 126–
28 (1999) (statement of Walter K. Stapleton, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on
behalf of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.)). Congressional intervention has proven
unfortunate from a drafting perspective on occasion. That was true of the 1983 legislation
amending Rule 4, which required remedial rule amendments in 1993. See 4A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 3, § 1092.1 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the request for waiver of formal service
of summons under Rule 4); Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The
Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 733 (1988) (noting that Congress materially departed
from the recommendation of the Supreme Court).
382. Those opposed to any legislation argue that Congress would be invading the
rulemaking process. A wag might respond that it was the Court that initially invaded the
rulemaking process, so turnabout is fair play. My successor as Reporter recently has written,
“[g]iven the role of the Court in the rulemaking legislative process as established by the 1934
Act, there is simply not much that the Advisory Committee or the Judicial Conference can
reasonably be expected to do.” Carrington, supra note 43, at 87. Then, seemingly frustrated by
the Supreme Court’s intervention and sounding a note of caution, he expressed support for
congressional action on Twombly and Iqbal. Id. at 59–60.
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process is appropriately deliberate and can take at least two to three
383
years, even when time is thought to be of the essence. Moreover, if
the discussions and papers presented at the Duke Conference are
384
indicative, there is little support for rule revision now within the
rulemaking establishment or among the many corporate and defense
lawyers in attendance. A number of speakers urged “waiting and
seeing” how the lower federal courts actually apply the two cases.
That pathway means there would not be any effort at rule revision in
the near future; even if there is, an actual change is not likely to
materialize for four or five years. Because cases currently are being
dismissed with significant frequency as a result of the Supreme Court
decisions, congressional action would be desirable to avoid further
hyperactivity under Rule 12(b)(6) until the rulemaking process has
385
run its course. In an analogous vein, putting rule revision on hold
and waiting for Congress’s reaction to a procedural phenomenon has
its antecedents. For many years, including those that embraced my
tour of duty as Reporter, the Civil Rules Committee maintained a
moratorium on amending Rule 23, expecting that the political process
would yield legislation on controversial aspects of class-action
practice.
Even if the Advisory Committee chooses to wait and see, or to
codify plausibility pleading or some variant thereof, it will have to
386
ensure that other pretrial rules are made consistent with it and
consider other changes to Rule 8 in particular, so as to reestablish a
balance in the parties’ pleading obligations. For instance, given the
387
Court’s focus in Twombly on the precise language of Rule 8(a) and
the Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs must provide a “showing” of

383. A proposed amendment typically goes through several drafts—which are considered at
multiple Committee meetings—and a public comment period. It then must pass through the
Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference, and then the
Judicial Conference itself, before it proceeds to the Supreme Court. After Court approval, the
amendment must await congressional inaction for seven months before it is effective. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2074 (2006).
384. For a sampling of the pieces presented, see Symposium, 2010 Civil Procedure
Conference, 60 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2010).
385. The Committee apparently will engage in “continual study” and pursue a “deliberate,
thorough approach.” Memorandum from Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Civil Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 3, 4
(Dec. 8, 2009).
386. See supra notes 329–37 and accompanying text.
387. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546, 556 (2007).
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388

factual sufficiency to support their claims, it follows that the
plausibility standard similarly should apply to counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-party claims. And the text of the relevant rules
389
amply supports that conclusion.
Somewhat uncertain, however, are Twombly’s and Iqbal’s
applicability to denials and affirmative defenses. Neither Rule 8(b)
nor Rule 8(c) contains the magic word “showing,” and both modes of
defensive pleading typically are alleged in a formulary, conclusory,
390
and uninformative fashion along the style illustrated in Form 30.
391
Thus far, the cases are divided on the point. Equally uncertain is the
applicability of Twombly and Iqbal to pleading the “grounds” for a
district court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 8(a)(1) or a
demand for relief under Rule 8(a)(3). Neither provision calls for a
392
“showing,” but that is not conclusive. Thus, for example, does the
simple diversity jurisdiction allegation, “Defendant Jones is a citizen

388. Id. at 563, 580.
389. See, e.g., Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. v. Kia Enters., No. 09-116, 2009
WL 2152276, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2009) (holding that defendant’s counterclaim failed to
meet the Twombly standard); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Versata Enters., 630 F. Supp. 2d 395,
404 (D. Del. 2009) (reviewing defendant’s counterclaim using the Twombly standard);
Nesselrotte v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. 06-01390, 2007 WL 3147038, at *2, *6 (W.D. Pa. Oct.
25, 2007) (same).
390. Often, one suspects, these defenses are alleged without any prior significant
investigation into the facts.
391. The main factor in determining whether a particular district court judge applies the
plausibility standard to affirmative defenses appears to be his or her interpretation of Twombly
and Iqbal. Courts that read the decisions as a clarification of what information is necessary to
provide fair notice to the other party extend the plausibility standard to the pleading of
affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Barnes v. AT&T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, No.
C 08-04058, 2010 WL 2507769, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2010); Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc.,
263 F.R.D. 647, 649–51 (D. Kan. 2009) (Rushfelt, Mag.); Shinew v. Wszola, No. 08-14256, 2009
WL 1076279, at *2–5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009); Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 0780551, 2008 WL 2225668, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2008); United States v. Quadrini, No. 2:07CV-13227, 2007 WL 4303213, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2007). Courts that interpret Twombly
and Iqbal as a strict reading of Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement of “showing” the grounds on which
the claim rests do not extend the new standard beyond that domain. See, e.g., Charleswell v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 01-119, 2009 WL 4981730, at *6 (D.V.I. Dec. 8, 2009);
Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. 09-973, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23,
2009); First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Servs., LLC, No. 08-cv-12805, 2009 WL 22861, at *2
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009). Ironically, some courts have excused defendants from compliance
with Twombly and Iqbal because of the need for discovery. See Stoffels v. SBC Commc’ns., Inc.,
No. 05-CV-0233-WWJ, 2008 WL 4391396, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008); Voeks v. WalMart Stores, Inc., No. 07-C-0030, 2008 WL 89434, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 7, 2008).
392. Rule 8(a)(1) requires “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction”; Rule 8(a)(3) only calls for “a demand for the relief sought.”
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of New York and Plaintiff Smith is a citizen of North Carolina,”
which is the style of Form 7, suffice under Rule 8(a)(1)? Perhaps that
will be viewed as a conclusion that need not be accepted as true. Does
it satisfy plausibility on its face or is more factual detail necessary?
393
One hopes the former is the case. Should the pleading burden be
made more demanding when the jurisdiction issue is one of corporate
citizenship or party standing, on the ground that the naked assertion
394
of either is more easily seen as a legal conclusion? Even more
complex, some standing questions present difficult issues of causation,
395
effectively merging questions of jurisdiction and substance.
If, in fact, plausibility pleading is retained and held to turn
strictly on the language of Rule 8(a)(2), federal courts might not
extend it to Rules 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b), and 8(c). If that proves to be
true, the Advisory Committee would have to consider whether to
revise Rule 8 in order to correct this pleading burden imbalance in
deference to the quest for the metaphorical level litigation playing
field. What’s good for the goose should be good for the gander.
Conversely, if the new pleading structure is applied to all pleading
elements by judicial decision or Rule revision, then in theory
defensive allegations could be challenged by a Rule 12(f) motion to
strike for insufficiency as a corollary to Rule 12(b)(6), although the
former now speaks of an “insufficient defense” and the latter of a
“failure to state a claim.” In reality, any increase in the burden of
pleading jurisdiction the demand for relief, or the plausibility of

393. Some courts have required plaintiffs to plead facts to show that there is a claim arising
under a statute that warrants subject matter jurisdiction. See Riser v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl.
212, 216–17 (2010) (applying the plausibility standard to the pleading of facts supporting subject
matter jurisdiction under the Tucker Act); Stanislaus Custodial Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v.
Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n, No. CVF09-1988 LJO SMS, 2010 WL 2218813, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 1,
2010) (holding Lanham Act jurisdiction requires plaintiff to allege facts that plausibly assert the
use of a trademark in interstate commerce). Courts have demonstrated confusion over the
application of plausibility pleading under provisions other than Rule 8(a)(2). See Tripoli Mgmt.,
LLC v. Waste Connections of Kan., Inc., No. 09-CV-0167-CMA-KLM, 2010 WL 845927 (D.
Colo. Mar. 9, 2010) (considering, but ultimately rejecting, the application of Twombly and Iqbal
to a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, which is proper since plaintiffs are not required to plead personal
jurisdiction).
394. See Laufen Int’l, Inc. v. Larry J. Lint Floor & Wall Covering, Co., No. 2:10-cv-199, 2010
WL 1444869, at *3 (W.D. Pa. April 9, 2010) (holding that Rule 8 does not require the plaintiff to
plead facts to describe the ways in which a corporation conducts its activities at the location
allegedly constituting its principal place of business).
395. See, e.g., Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Md. 2010)
(analyzing a complaint alleging the housing foreclosure crisis caused economic harm to
Baltimore).
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denials and affirmative defenses, also would cause cost and delay
consequences that would have to be considered in determining
whether efficiency and cost savings actually were being realized from
396
the shift to plausibility pleading.
Even if the newly announced plausibility requirement governed
all facets of every pleading, its application would not be fair or
evenhanded. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent in Twombly, the
defendants in that case never were required to answer the plaintiffs’
397
claims despite years of litigation. That typically will be the case.
Even if the plausibility standard includes—and applies uniformly to—
all types of defensive pleadings, plaintiffs still will bear a disparate
pleading burden as a practical matter because defendants only need
to move to dismiss following the complaint rather than interpose an
398
answer. In a sense, the defendants have been given a free pleading
pass by the Supreme Court. As the preceding discussion suggests,
there are a number of textual and policy issues confronting the
rulemakers even if they decide to leave Twombly and Iqbal
untouched or simply to codify them.
IV. REBALANCING THE FEDERAL RULES: A FEW THOUGHTS
ABOUT POSSIBILITIES
My thinking about the future begins with the observations about
Twombly and Iqbal made earlier, none of them particularly positive.
Some of the Court’s justifications are little more than unverified
assumptions about the litigation world that are not based on reliable
399
evidence but simply repeat well-trodden clichés. Most prominently,
judicial management is more than a “modest” control technique, the
claims of excessive costs, abuse, and frivolousness in litigation may
have much less substance than many think, and extortionate
settlements may be but another urban legend. Although I do not

396. Although affirmative defenses could be the subject of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike,
plaintiffs rarely challenge them at the pleading stage. That could change, however.
397. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 571 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Plaintiffs have alleged such an agreement and, because the complaint was dismissed in
advance of answer, the allegation has not even been denied. Why, then, does the case not
proceed? Does a judicial opinion that the charge is not ‘plausible’ provide a legally acceptable
reason for dismissing the complaint? I think not.”).
398. One wonders how “admitted” or “denied” can be subjected to the plausibility standard,
however.
399. See supra Part II.
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claim special knowledge on these matters, my judgment is that
whatever deficiencies some of the Justices may have seen in the
current pretrial system, the chosen solution seems inappropriate.
If federal pleading and motion-to-dismiss practice are not
returned to their pre-Twombly-Iqbal state or something
approximating it—and one assumes a continuation of the current
approach—there is work to be done on the Rules. Therefore, a few
400
suggestions seem appropriate at this point. The rulemaking process
has been a dynamic and creative one; now is the time for that spirit of
innovation to come to the fore. Ultimately, the Advisory Committee
will have to reconcile the continuing viability of the values of 1938
with the realities of 2010, and find a way to uphold the principle of
access and the other policy objectives underlying the original Rules
while adjusting to contemporary litigation conditions. It is unclear
whether this will—or should—take the form of several textual
modifications of the existing Rules or a wholesale revision of pretrial
401
procedure.
I do not pretend that any of the offerings described below are the
best way forward, or imply that they encompass all the approaches
that are potentially useful; at a minimum, however, I believe each
deserves study and evaluation. The thoughts that follow are just that,
and require considerable further elaboration. Some of them also
overlap. Moreover, as a past Advisory Committee Reporter and
member, I have no illusions about the difficulties of working out the
402
details. Every Reporter knows that is where the devil resides. Nor
do I harbor any illusion about the ease of navigating through the
political and ideological thickets that are likely to confront the
members of the rulemaking process.
In considering these thoughts, the following questions seem
basic—at least in my mind. Has litigation changed so much that the

400. Proposals similar to some of those I offer below have been suggested by others. See,
e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 54 (proposing ways to better the litigation
system); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN
THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (2009) (analyzing discrepancies in case disposition times).
401. There was no support for the latter at the Duke Conference.
402. This popular saying, employed by many, from architect Mies van der Rohe to Admiral
Hyman Rickover, apparently is, in fact, an ironic variation of “God is in the details.” Alden
Whitman, Expressed Industrial Spirit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1969, at 1 (discussing the life of Mies
van der Rohe); see GREGORY Y. TITELMAN, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF POPULAR
PROVERBS AND SAYINGS 116 (2d ed. 2000).
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ethos of access, private enforcement of public policies, merits
adjudication, and equality of procedural treatment no longer can be
403
served? Must the rulemakers and the federal courts abandon the
foundational principles of the Federal Rules to meet the pressures of
the complexity and density of modern litigation? What quality of civil
dispute resolution system do we want? Can it be designed to be
neutral among the contending interests? And how much will it cost?
A. Providing Access to Information Needed to Satisfy the Plausibility
Standard
Since the combined effect of Twombly, Iqbal, and the summary
judgment trilogy is to require a plaintiff to have greater knowledge
concerning his claim either before instituting an action or
immediately thereafter, inequality of information access during those
critical time frames poses a significant—if not the most significant—
problem for many people seeking affirmative relief. This difficulty
404
thus demands the most attention. But realistically any solution is
likely to add to the burdens and protraction of the pretrial process in
405
some cases. Perhaps that is a price that must be paid to achieve
some of the citizen-access, private-enforcement, and fairness
objectives of the American civil-justice system.
Consideration might be given, for example, to some form of
limited preinstitution discovery to provide access to critical
406
information. The language of Rule 27 is much too restrictive to

403. See Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case,” 21 F.R.D. 45, 46 (1957) (“I
fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading cannot be made to do the service
of trial and that live issues between active litigants are not to be disposed of or evaded on the
paper pleadings . . . .”).
404. The problem was widely recognized at the Duke Conference and no opposition was
voiced to the need for solving the information-asymmetry problem.
405. For employment discrimination cases—which require plaintiffs to bring their
grievances to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to assess whether
there is probable cause to institute an action—changes to the regulatory process might help
reduce information asymmetry without burdening the court. When presented with a complaint,
the EEOC could conduct a more robust investigation directed at uncovering information that
demonstrates the claim’s plausibility. This change would require additional federal funding for
the Commission. EEOC investigations would, however, limit judicial involvement at the pretrial
stage, reduce the financial burden on individual plaintiffs, and restrict some of the back-andforth motion practice between the parties regarding access to discovery.
406. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 43 (2010) (exploring the role that state presuit discovery could play in rectifying
the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal); Lonny S. Hoffman, Using Presuit
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perform that function and would require amendment. There are
provisions authorizing preinstitution discovery currently in force in
some states that could provide a model. One approach found in some
states allows the pretrial preservation of evidence and the
408
identification of witnesses. But that technique is not sufficient,
either. However, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202.1(b) is somewhat
broader and empowers the court to order a deposition on the basis of
409
a verified petition “to investigate a potential claim or suit.” Only a
provision of the Texas character would be a meaningful response to
the information-asymmetry problem. But such provisions would be
opposed by defense interests and those who believe they would
410
engender meritless litigation, abuse, and extortion. These concerns
could be ameliorated by requiring judicial authorization for presuit
discovery on a demonstration of good faith and the applicant’s need,
which would include a showing that relevant information was solely in
the possession or control of a potentially adverse party or third

Discovery to Overcome Barriers to the Courthouse, 34 LITIGATION 31 (2008) (examining the
legal bases for presuit discovery).
407. Rule 27 is expressly limited to the perpetuation of testimony by deposition and requires
a verified petition showing that the action presently cannot be brought, and listing the subject
matter of the anticipated action, the facts the petitioner wishes to establish, details about the
expected adverse parties, and the expected substance of the deponent’s testimony. See Martin v.
Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 55 (9th Cir. 1961) (discussing Rule 27); In re Ford, 170
F.R.D. 504, 508 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (finding that Rule 27 does not allow pre-complaint discovery
under Rule 11). See generally Nicholas A. Kronfeld, Note, The Preservation and Discovery of
Evidence Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27, 78 GEO. L.J. 593, 594 (1990)
(recommending courts interpret Rule 27 to help litigants preserve evidence and frame their
complaints).
408. New York offers one example. N.Y. C.P.L.R § 3102(c) (McKinney 2010).
409. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1(b). For an analysis of the experience under the Texas rule, see
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The Role of Presuit
Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 247–69 (2007). Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 220(b) (1953) (allowing investor inspection of books and records for possible corporate
fraud); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0023 (West 2001) (authorizing “informal discovery” for unsworn
statements and documents); PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.8 (sanctioning pre-complaint discovery); Ex
parte Anderson, 644 So. 2d 961, 965 (Ala. 1994) (permitting presuit inspection of written records
without explicit state civil procedure rule authorization). Connecticut has an independent action
for discovery in aid of an action that is about to be brought. See Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333,
338 (Conn. 1994) (granting a bill of discovery).
410. Indeed, some of the post-Twombly surveys show a modicum of support for
preinstitution discovery, but it is unclear what significance should be accorded to this because
the issue has not been focused on. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 260, at 8
(summarizing Federal Rules amendment proposals).
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411

person. There also could be provision for notice to potentially
adverse parties, and narrow inquiry parameters as necessary
ingredients of any expansion of Rule 27 or the development of a new
provision. Other constraints on the procedure’s availability might be
considered.
Would it work, or would district judges require a showing by the
applicant as demanding as that required for the complaint itself?
Would an order for presuit discovery be enforced, especially with
regard to documents and emails that company and governmental
agency defendants typically are reluctant to produce in litigation?
Would the permitted scope of inquiry be so limited, perhaps by
justiciability or case and controversy requirements rooted in the
412
Constitution, that the prospective plaintiff might not gain access to
the critical information needed to frame a complaint? Even if federal
presuit discovery is not expanded, perhaps use might be made of state
413
presuit discovery procedures in aid of potential federal litigation.
A related possibility might be authorizing early, limited, and
carefully sequenced discovery following the interposition of a motion
414
to dismiss—so-called pinpoint or flashlight discovery. Contained
discovery before the motion’s resolution could provide a fruitful
middle ground for evaluating challenges to cases that lie between the
traditional Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on the complaint’s legal or
notice-giving insufficiency and a motion based on the complaint’s
failure to meet the factual plausibility precepts of Twombly and Iqbal.

411. See Jones v. AIG Risk Mgmt., Inc., No. C-10-1374 EMC, 2010 WL 2867334, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. July 20, 2010) (noting that a court has the ability to grant limited discovery under Twombly
and Iqbal when relevant evidence is solely within the province of defendants); see also Santiago
v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 759 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[Plaintiff] cannot know for certain what [defendant]
knew without discovery. Consequently, the district court should not have dismissed this count of
the complaint.”). “Need” also might include the absence of any alternative information source
that was in the public domain.
412. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Supreme Court has permitted the resolution of certain
nonmerit matters without a prior determination that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists.
See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578, 87–88 (1999) (holding that in certain
situations a “court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction”).
413. For some of the possible limitations on presuit discovery, see Dodson, supra note 406,
at 60–64. Most of the limitations that are discussed refer to the use of state presuit discovery. Id.
414. There is considerable support for this. See, e.g., SPECIAL COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N
SECTION OF LITIG., CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY—SOME PROPOSALS 8 (2010),
available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/docs/civil-procedure-proposals.pdf. Indeed, it is
simply a form of staggered discovery, which frequently is employed as part of judicial case
management.
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It would not permit full-fledged discovery with its accompanying costs
and delays before the action’s legal viability and notice-giving
functions were established. Indeed, in some instances the discovery
might be achieved with little or no burden on the defendant. That
would be true, for example, when the discovery involves documents
already produced to the government, particularly in a related judicial
415
or regulatory proceeding.
The suggested procedure, by which the district court authorizes a
modicum of factual exploration before taking definitive action on the
request for dismissal, is philosophically analogous to the principles
embedded in Rule 11(b)(3) and Rule 56(f). Those provisions allow a
416
party to try to secure needed information not yet available to it. The
suggested procedure would provide the needed peek at the merits to
avoid undesirable restraints on the institution of an action, reduce the
premature termination of cases, and limit the impairment of the
417
Like preinstitution
private enforcement of public policies.
discovery, however, the proposed approach would require the
attention of a district or magistrate judge to oversee the procedure’s
operation in an appropriately constrained fashion. But again, would it
be effective?
Perhaps a formula could be crafted to permit this type of
circumscribed post-institution and pre-motion-to-dismiss discovery
under careful management protocols. Discovery would focus solely
on what is necessary to meet the plausibility requirement, assuming it
is retained, especially in contexts involving a defendant’s mental state

415. See, e.g., In re Delphi Corp. Sec., Derivative & “Erisa” Litig., No. 05-md-1725, 2007 WL
518626, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2007); In re Plastics Additives Antitrust Litig., No. 03-2038,
2004 WL 2743591, at *10–12 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2004); In re LaBranche Sec. Litig., 333 F. Supp.
2d 178, 183–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Firstenergy Corp. Sec. Litig., 220 F.R.D. 541, 544–45
(N.D. Ohio 2004).
416. In Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage Complaint Pleading as a Solution
to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 51, 55 (2010) (Pa. State Univ. Dickinson Sch. of Law, Legal Stud.
Research Paper No. 30-2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1653962, the author proposes “bifurcating complaint pleading” to permit a “limited
discovery phase . . . to allow knowledgeable pleading.” Whether that goal, comparable to the
one I am advocating in the text, requires further elaboration of the pleading stage is
questionable.
417. It has been suggested that if the plaintiff alleges under Rule 11(b)(3) that certain
matters are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the
court may so order if convinced that the allegations are sound. See Edward A. Hartnett,
Responding to Twombly and Iqbal: Where Do We Go from Here?, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 24,
33 (2010), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_95_Hartnett.pdf.
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or motivation, and situations involving a private or government
418
defendant or third party in sole possession of critical information.
This procedure would have to be constructed carefully to assuage
those who would be concerned about anything that smacks of
allowing the discovery camel’s nose under the pleading tent. But it
might bring some equilibrium to the burdens on the parties at the
pleading and motion-to-dismiss phases of litigation.
The Iqbal Court indicated that the current structure of Rule 8
forbids any access to discovery if the plausibility standard has not
419
been met. That point is neither irrefutable nor immune from rule
revision, and I understand that some district courts have since winked
at it, although the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have repeated
420
the Court’s statement. Nor is there any mandatory or automatic stay
421
of discovery while a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is pending, except in
cases under the Private Securities Legislation Reform Act. The
district court judge therefore could permit discovery—presumably,
but not necessarily, limited to matters relating to the issue of
plausibility—prior to or during the pendency of the motion to dismiss
422
and could then consider anything relevant that emerged. At least

418. When the district judge believes a complaint falls short of plausibility but additional
information not reflected in the pleading is accessible to the plaintiffs, the district judge
presumably will dismiss with leave to replead or simply hold the motion in abeyance and grant
the plaintiff leave to provide an amended pleading.
419. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (“Because respondent’s complaint is
deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.”).
420. See, e.g., Mann v. Brenner, No. 09-2461, 2010 WL 1220963, at *5 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2010)
(staying discovery pending resolution of the motions to dismiss); Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602–03 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that a claim must have facial plausibility to
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss); S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d
98, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing defendant’s claim as mere speculation); see also 520 S.
Michigan Ave. Ass’n. v. Unite Here, Local 1, No. 10 C1422, 2010 WL 2836666, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
July 15, 2010) (noting that factual allegations must raise a right to relief above the speculation
level); Ghaster v. City of Rocky River, No. 1:09CV02080, 2010 WL 2802682, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
July 13, 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court applied the plausibility standard to all civil
actions in Iqbal).
421. See, e.g., City of Aurora v. P.S. Sys., Inc., No. 07-cv-02371-WYD-BNB, 2008 WL
4377505, at *8 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2008); see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010
WL 2977297, at *10 (7th Cir. July 30, 2010) (noting that a judge can allow discovery while
deferring a ruling on a motion to dismiss); Coss v. Playtex Prods., LLC, No. 08 C 50222, 2009
WL 1455358, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2009) (noting that limited discovery may be appropriate
prior to a court ruling on a motion to dismiss).
422. This recommendation has support from at least two other members of the academic
community. See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 41, at 230 (statement of Suzette M. Malveaux,
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one court has allowed limited discovery after dismissal of a claim
when relevant information needed to meet the plausibility standard
423
was in the sole province of the defendant. A matter of this
magnitude should not be left to the inclinations of individual judges,
however. Whether or not the Supreme Court’s proscription is taken
literally, a significant revision of the pleading and motion rules
appears to be necessary to create a more textured and balanced
solution to the information-access problem.
In line with the foregoing, a rational approach would be to relax
the pleading structure if a plaintiff alleges the inaccessibility of critical
information and articulates a reasonable basis for the information’s
existence and the defendant’s control over it. When that is
demonstrated, it might be reasonable to reverse the pleading burden
and require the defendant to make the needed material available to
the plaintiff along with whatever explanation it thinks appropriate. If
the plaintiff felt the defendant’s production still did not make it
possible to defend against the motion to dismiss, the court could
424
authorize more discovery on a showing of good cause. The
defendant’s discovery, however, should be stayed pending resolution
of the motion to dismiss.
B. A New Procedure Relating to Ascertaining Plausibility
As an alternative to the suggestions in the preceding Section,
consideration might be given to creating a new motion that would lie

Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law)
(suggesting that courts should “be open, upon receipt of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, to allowing
plaintiffs some initial discovery focused on those discrete facts necessary to show a plausible
claim” and that such limited discovery has been used in determining whether the requirements
for class actions, qualified immunity, and jurisdiction have been met); see also Edward A.
Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 507–14 (2010) (noting
that, except in cases of qualified immunity, district courts have broad discretion to allow
discovery prior to a Rule 12(b)(6) decision); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy
Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil
Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 69 (2010) (noting that courts should permit limited
“plausibility discovery” in civil rights cases upon receipt of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
423. See Jones v. AIG Risk Mgmt., Inc., No. C-10-1374 EMC, 2010 WL 2867334, *5 (N.D.
Cal. July 20, 2010) (allowing limited discovery after dismissal of a breach of contract claim to
determine whether amendment is possible).
424. In addition to ameliorating the problem of information inaccessibility, limited
preliminary discovery also might be useful for providing information so that both parties might
be better able to appraise their claims for purposes of possible settlement. See generally
Nagareda, supra note 126, at 8–9, 43–44.
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between those now provided in Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56, one that
would provide a new management tool for district judges. As
425
the plausibility-pleading standard has
previously discussed,
destabilized the long-held assumption that the motion to dismiss only
is addressed to a pleading’s legal sufficiency and notice-pleading
426
quality. Rule 12(b)(6) motions under Conley served the legal
filtering and notice functions well, but the plausibility requirement
now authorizes additional factual assessments and judgmental
evaluations. A new procedure might be useful to address the type of
decisionmaking created by this shift.
One approach might be to enhance the Rule 12(e) motion for a
427
more definite statement. That Rule long has been considered a
relatively weak procedure limited to assuring notice giving because of
its restrictive language that, as a practical matter, only applies to the
428
complaint and affirmative claims in other pleadings; but this need
not continue to be the case. By expanding the scope of Rule 12(e),
the rulemakers may be able to custom-tailor a more effective
procedure. It would be one that would be invoked by a defendant
when the statement of the claim is legally sufficient and provides

425. See supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
426. The summary judgment motion historically also has been thought to present a legal
issue because it can be granted only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Even after
the Supreme Court’s Celotex and Liberty Lobby decisions, which equated summary judgment
with the directed verdict motion (now the motion for judgment as a matter of law), the Rule 56
motion remains—at least in theory—a matter-of-law motion. See supra notes 189–92 and
accompanying text.
The moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’ because the
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of
her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. ‘[The] standard [for
granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict.’
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (alteration in original). “In essence, though,
the inquiry under each [summary judgment and directed verdict] is the same: whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986).
427. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (“A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading
to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party
cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive
pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired.”).
428. The motion is available only when “a pleading . . . is so vague or ambiguous that the . . .
[movant] cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Id. See generally 5C WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 3, §§ 1374–1379 (discussing the elements of a motion for a more definite statement
under Rule 12).
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adequate notice to enable a response, but the absence of facts makes
the right to relief appear less than plausible. Whether responding
parties would see any advantage to employing such a motion rather
than one under Rule 12(b)(6), however, is questionable. Either one
probably would be granted with leave to replead. Indeed, the net
result simply might be the creation of yet another pretrial friction
point.
Perhaps more promising, although not strikingly different from
429
the post-institution discovery technique just discussed, would be a
new procedure that a plaintiff could invoke in response to a motion to
dismiss, which would enable the district court to permit a modicum of
discovery when plausibility, rather than pure legal or notice-giving
430
sufficiency, was challenged. It might be the subject of a separate
Rule or a new Rule 12 subdivision, possibly denominated “Motion to
431
Particularize a Claim for Relief.” It could be raised as a freestanding motion in anticipation of the defendant’s motion to dismiss

429. See supra text accompanying notes 414–20.
430. Such a proposal seems to have some judicial support assuming the continued ability to
plead on information and belief post-Twombly-Iqbal. In Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202 (2d
Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff, alleging disparate treatment, did not need
to allege examples of preferential treatment by defendant employees toward non-minority or
male customers because the “names and records, if any, of persons who were not members of
the protected classes and were more favorably treated . . . is information particularly within
KeyBank’s knowledge and control.” Id. at 215. Without these facts, the plaintiff merely recited
an element of the claim—that members outside the protected class were treated differently. In
essence, the motion proposed in text, much like what happened in Boykin and Arista Records
LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010), would allow plaintiffs to plead on information and
belief that facts needed to establish plausibility are within the defendant’s possession and
warrant a slight opening of the discovery door.
431. See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 54, at 6 (“A new summary
procedure should be developed by which parties can submit applications for determination of
enumerated matters (such as rights that are dependent on the interpretation of a contract) on
pleadings and affidavits or other evidentiary materials without triggering an automatic right to
discovery or trial or any of the other provisions of the current procedural rules.”). A proposal in
FED. COURTS COMM., ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., PROPOSALS FOR THE 2010
DUKE CONFERENCE REGARDING THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4–7 (2010),
available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071920-NYCBarProposalsforDuke
Conference.pdf, suggests a summary adjudication motion primarily directed at determining
issues rather than claims and calls for the exchange of enhanced initial disclosures following an
answer and before summary judgment. The Association’s proposal was rejected as inefficient
and potentially productive of “unfair outcomes” by the Federal Courts Committee of the New
York County Lawyers’ Association. FED. COURTS COMM., N.Y. CNTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N,
COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSALS FOR THE 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REGARDING THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE BY THE FEDERAL COURTS COMMITTEE OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1–3 (2010).
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or interposed as a cross-motion to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, or both,
and operate as something analogous to the pre–Federal Rule
432
discovery device known as the bill of particulars. Alternatively, the
procedure might take the form of a request that the defendant
provide something—perhaps a critical document or sworn
statement—that bears on the viability of the plaintiff’s claim.
Once the judicially authorized discovery is secured or the request
responded to, a plaintiff could stand on the complaint or, when
appropriate, seek to amend it. When and how the procedure might be
employed; the extent of the discretion the district judge might have to
grant, deny, or modify the request; how much limited discovery might
be permitted; and what form that discovery would take pose difficult
policy questions. To be sure, the complaint’s possible deficiencies
probably would have to be exposed by the motion or the request, but
that is a reasonable trade-off for the plaintiff gaining access to
important information that might stave off dismissal. Defendants, of
course, might feel abused by having to come forward with potentially
damaging material at this embryonic point in the case. Nonetheless,
giving access to the inaccessible seems fair and the particularization
would be limited to those matters. The effectiveness of this procedure
would depend on the judicial officer’s involvement in the process,
which admittedly makes it a potentially resource-consumptive tool.
Another procedural route that might give the pleader access to
information needed to meet a challenge to his complaint is to expand
the concept of automatic disclosure. This could be accomplished by
increasing the number of categories in the mandatory disclosure
433
provision in Rule 26(a)(1), or by empowering district judges to
order specified disclosure on a case-by-case basis as part of the initial
or an early Rule 16 conference. The former approach would require a
consensus concerning what categories of information should be added
to the Rule to solve information-asymmetry problems—a matter that
is not self-evident. The latter approach is far more flexible and would

432. See CLARK, supra note 74, § 54 (describing bills of particulars).
433. Mandatory disclosure was adopted despite the objection of virtually the entire bar. See
generally 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2053 (3d ed. 2010). A history of the process
that led to the adoption of mandatory disclosure has been published by the Advisory
Committee’s then-Reporter. See Carrington, supra note 43, at 31–45. Although the present Rule
26(a)(1) had some supporters, the overwhelming commentary on its utility at the Duke
Conference was indifferent to negative.
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be very similar to the notion of authorizing factual plausibility
discovery discussed in the preceding Section. But it imposes more of a
work burden on the court. Whatever form an expanded Rule 26(a)(1)
might take, one of its benefits is that it would provide the district
court judge with the particularization needed for making a more
informed judgment as to the sufficiency of a claim for relief. A
procedure of this type would be effective only if it could be utilized
before resolution of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion—or even before one is
made—whether the motion is based on plausibility or legalsufficiency grounds, or a combination of the two.
As was true of those in the preceding Section, the ideas offered
in this Section would generate more pretrial-motion practice and
434
inevitably cause some cost and delay, consequences I have seen all
too often over the years and deplore. Nonetheless, the emergence of
a new procedural tool may be an inevitable byproduct of any attempt
to ameliorate the deleterious consequences of an information
imbalance. This approach still may be effective if it reduces the costs
imposed by Twombly and Iqbal: more motions to dismiss, repleading,
renewed motions to dismiss, and appeals, as well as impairing the
value of private enforcement of important public policies. Perhaps
this suggests a quest for pleading and motion formulae that lie
between the “no set of facts” language of Conley and that of
Twombly-Iqbal, abandoning the latter, or looking elsewhere in the
pretrial process for solutions to the perceived systemic ills.
C. Improving Case Management
Evaluating the quality and utility of case management is
inextricably interwoven with any consideration of pleading and
motion practice. Is it completely defunct, in need of serious
modification, or just awaiting some experience-based tweaking? I
cannot see simply accepting as determinative Justice Souter’s lightly
supported dismissal in Twombly of judicial management’s “modest”
ability to shape and filter litigation efficiently. Even assuming that
present-day case management does not offer an optimal set of tools
for addressing the exigencies of contemporary litigation, it is
extremely unlikely that it is—and has been for all these years—

434. Indeed, cost and delay may be an inevitable byproduct of any attempt to ameliorate the
information-imbalance consequences of demanding fact-based pleading.
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incapable of meeting at least some of the practical concerns expressed
435
by the Court and others.
Abandoning what has been developed over the years is not a
rational option, and nothing in the Federal Judicial Center’s empirical
436
work referred to earlier suggests it should be. A district or
magistrate judge, through his or her control over scheduling and the
discovery process, represents the best—if not the only—hope in the
procedural arsenal for containing excessive litigation behavior and
the type of attrition activity that breeds cost and delay, especially in
large-scale cases. Indeed, this reality promotes strengthening the
management process and being more insistent about judicial
involvement in it. The complexities of contemporary litigation suggest
we need that more than ever before.
Perhaps judges should be firmer in requiring compliance with
scheduling and other management orders, particularly discovery
orders, and make it clear that a case’s movement toward trial is
437
inexorable. Some judges already are, but a widespread acceptance
of this approach will entail more hands-on activity by them and a
willingness to make the threat of sanctions, including preclusion
438
orders, a more realistic deterrent. One magistrate judge and his
distinguished practicing-attorney coauthor firmly believe that neither
the bench nor the bar is taking enough advantage of the existing

435. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). The Court’s statement stands
in sharp contrast to the position voiced by numerous Duke Conference speakers that more
management and direct judicial involvement was needed. For related discussion, see Epstein,
supra note 172, at 18–19.
436. See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text.
437. I fondly remember that when I was working as an informal reporter for the committee
of district judges charged with developing the original Manual, the late Chief Judge of the
Western District of Missouri, William H. Becker, who served as the group’s chair, repeatedly
declared that the best management tool he knew was the establishment of an immutable
schedule for a case with trial on a day certain. He forcefully (and colorfully) expressed the view
that if the district judge never let the case deviate from the schedule, it “would settle if it were
capable of being settled.” Some obviously believe this approach is too inflexible.
438. See, e.g., In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1252–53
(9th Cir. 2007) (upholding the district court’s dismissal of the case for failure to comply with
case management orders); Nick v. Morgan’s Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 597 (8th Cir. 2001)
(imposing monetary sanctions against a party for lack of good-faith participation in alternative
dispute resolution); In re FLSA Cases, No. 6:08-mc-49-Orl-31GJK, 2009 WL 129599 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 20, 2009) (imposing sanctions for noncompliance with show cause orders).
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extensive procedural toolkit and that “the problem is an absence of
439
will.”
With the benefit of further empirical research that takes account
of all pretrial costs, the Advisory Committee, the Board of Editors of
the Manual, and individual judges may be able to make more refined,
dispassionate decisions about the utility and proper role of case
440
management as it relates to the pleading and motion structure.
There may be procedural mechanisms and techniques, for example,
that would compensate for the alleged defects in case management
and meet legitimate concerns about cost, abuse, and delay, yet allow
for the resurrection of some or all aspects of the pre-Twombly-Iqbal
notice pleading and Rule 12(b)(6)-motion practice. Perhaps more
emphasis should be placed on phasing or logically sequencing
discovery, so that possible silver-bullet issues can be identified to
441
promote the acceleration of a resolution on the merits. In a related
vein, differential case management, in the form of either individual
442
case custom tailoring or “tracking” according to case characteristics,
443
has not been fully explored or developed, let alone exploited. It
should be. The highly circumscribed discovery suggested by plaintiffs’
counsel in Twombly to determine the viability of the class’s claims

439. Grimm & Cabraser, supra note 239, at 11. There was no dissent from this proposition at
the Duke Conference. References occasionally are made to the relatively light use of the wide
authority given district judges to limit the frequency and extent of discovery provided by a 1983
amendment now found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C). As the Reporter at that time, I regret that the
“proportionality” concept embedded in the provision has not been seen as a more useful
element of the “toolkit.” See generally 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 433, § 2008.1.
440. See supra notes 269–74 and accompanying text.
441. See Epstein, supra note 172, at 18 (recommending staggered discovery with periodic
reassessments as to whether the case should continue).
442. For a description of “tracking,” see infra notes 451–56 and accompanying text.
443. Both techniques showed up in various expense-and-delay plans formulated under the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. See supra text accompanying notes 216–19. Compare FINAL
REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS: DIFFERENTIATED CASE MGMT. PLAN WITH SUGGESTED
RULES & COMMENTARY, 1991 WL 525120, R. 8:2.1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 27, 1991) (Civil Justice
Reform Act Plan) (establishing a five-track system), with EXPENSE & DELAY REDUCTION
PLAN, 1991 WL 525091, Art. 1 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 1991) (Civil Justice Reform Act Plan)
(delineating an individualized and case specific monitoring system). The RAND Institute’s
evaluation of experience under the Civil Justice Reform Act was rather lukewarm about the
implementation of management policies under the district court plans but was quite positive
about the utility of certain methodologies. See KAKALIK, DUNWORTH, HILL, MCCAFFREY,
OSHIRO, PACE & VAIANA, supra note 294, at 47–50 (stating that even though cases at the ends
of the spectrum of complexity would be easy to place into tracks, most of the cases would fall in
the middle and be placed into a “standard” track, which might lead to the loss of many of the
predicted benefits of tracking).
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444

should not have been rejected by the Supreme Court. The Justices
should have had more faith in the ability of district judges to manage
their cases. Indeed, similar procedures have been used in many other
445
cases. Framing this type of special-purpose discovery will require
careful crafting by counsel and the court, depending on the needs in
particular cases. It also will require more experimentation and
evaluation.
Furthermore, other disciplines, such as information science,
efficiency analysis, and business management, could help identify the
best—or, at least, more-effective—practices for reducing litigation
costs. Importing relevant skills and experiences from other fields,
which might involve new forms of education for both district and
magistrate judges, may illuminate ways to restructure the pretrial
process to produce more flexibility, better management, and less
446
Rambo-like lawyer conduct, as well as to reduce disparities in the
utilization of procedures to prevent under- or overuse. New ideas
even might include reformulating the roles of magistrate judges and
para-judicials in civil cases, or adjusting the pretrial workload
distribution among courthouse personnel or the modes of skilltraining that should be made available through the Federal Judicial
447
Center. Who is in the best position to do which pretrial tasks is not
self-evident. Nor is what should be included in a catalogue of the best
procedural practices. Educational programs also might be developed
for the practicing bar regarding the effective use of and participation
in meet-and-confer and pretrial conferences, cooperative discovery,
and techniques for expense and time containment. It may be that
recent thinking about management matters has been too static and
that Rule 16 and the Manual are not yet sufficiently delineated and

444. The proposal by plaintiffs’ counsel was noted in Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion,
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 593–95 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Respondents’ brief), and has been confirmed in private conversation with the class’s counsel. It
was rejected by the Court’s dismissal of “phased” discovery. Id. at 560 n.6 (majority opinion).
445. See, e.g., Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming the
district court’s order to limit discovery and dismiss the case).
446. This became the generic referent in the 1990’s for litigation tactics that were hyperactive and overly aggressive, invoking the Sylvester Stallone character in three popular action
movies: FIRST BLOOD (Orion Pictures 1982), RAMBO FIRST BLOOD: PART II (TriStar Pictures
1985), and RAMBO III (TriStar Pictures 1988).
447. The Center is the training and education arm of the federal judiciary as well as its
research resource. See 28 U.S.C. § 620 (2006).
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textured to meet the challenges of the more difficult aspects of
contemporary litigation.
Whatever management pathways prove promising, variations in
judicial practice born of habit, temperament, philosophy, and context
inevitably will continue to exist. One must be mindful, however, that
although judicial discretion is a necessity in the implementation of
management techniques, it must be exercised in a realistic and evenhanded manner that does not weaken substantive policies, reflect
personal philosophical preferences, or counter-productively burden
the pretrial process.
All of this raises the satellite questions of how much detail is
appropriate for inclusion in Rule 16—which was lengthened
considerably in 1983 and 1993 to elaborate and expand the pretrial
conference process—and what the future status and content of the
Manual should be. Many of the thoughts expressed in the preceding
paragraphs are inappropriate for inclusion in the Rules; they really
call upon the assistance of the Judicial Center, bar associations, and
even law schools to assist the bench and bar in achieving what
amounts to a cultural shift in the handling of pretrial matters in
federal civil cases. All participants in federal litigation must be
incentivized to make case management—to paraphrase the former
army recruitment slogan—“be all it can be.”
D. A Tracking System
Professor Lonny S. Hoffman has criticized some legal writers as
“traditionalists”—those who are so wedded to the principles the
original drafters championed that they overlook the practical
deficiencies of notice pleading in light of contemporary litigation
448
realities. According to him, this relentless focus on the past leads
many traditionalists to argue—unconvincingly, he believes—for the
449
reinstatement of notions from a bygone era. So, a personal mea
culpa may be in order; in many respects I am a “traditionalist.” I was
brought up, educated, and trained in the heyday of the original
conception of the Rules by people who believed in their liberal ethos
of access, transsubstantivity, equality of treatment, private
enforcement of public policies, and quality merit adjudication. But, as

448. See Hoffman, supra note 106, at 1236–37.
449. See id.
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noted at the outset of this Article, the earth has moved. Procedure
does not exist in a vacuum. It must reflect and effectuate the
substantive law and serve the needs of the judicial system and those
who participate in it. It may be, therefore, that the transsubstantivity
450
principle may be nothing but a cherished relic.
So, at the risk of being branded a heretic by certain fellow “old
fogies,” I find somewhat attractive the fact that several “modern”
thinkers have proposed adopting a tracking system that has different
procedural rules depending on a case’s substantive underpinnings or
451
dimensions. This is a more radical notion than simply grouping
cases according to certain characteristics for case- or discoverymanagement purposes and then applying the same procedural rules
to all cases with those characteristics within the individual tracks.
Although this and similar proposals have elicited strong resistance in
the past, the concept bears scrutiny.
The aspirations of Federal Rules 1 and 2, which once seemed to
be in harmony, have become irreconcilable in some respects. A recent
survey conducted for the Federal Judicial Center, for example,
bolsters this conclusion by showing sizable discontinuities in litigation
452
costs. A second document produced by the Center concluded that
litigation cost variations resonate to such predictable factors as higher
monetary stakes, longer processing times, electronic discovery, and
453
greater case complexity. Consequently, the general applicability of
454
the Federal Rules to “one form of action” may have come into

450. See supra Part III.B.
451. See Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Reform Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 213 (1990) (statement of Stuart Gerson, Assistant
Att’y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice); John Burritt McArthur, Inter-Branch
Politics and the Judicial Resistance to Federal Civil Justice Reform, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 551, 560–62
(1999); see also Tobias, supra note 266, at 1398–99, 1418–19. But see Burbank, supra note 143, at
545 (noting the judiciary’s consistent objections to statutory proposals to “fashion a particular
procedural rule for a particular substantive context”). A number of speakers at the Duke
Conference expressed support for tracking—at least in terms of differentiating between simple
and complex cases.
452. The survey found that the median costs reported by defense attorneys was $20,000 in
cases that employed at least one type of discovery. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 203, at 37. Yet
the top-fifth-percentile group of cases reported $300,000 in costs. Id. Obviously, it is only in a
relatively small percentage of cases that these substantial litigation expenditures are
experienced.
453. Id. at 2.
454. FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
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conflict with the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
455
every action and proceeding,” especially for contemporary cases at
456
either end of the complexity spectrum. Tracking—at least in some
form—is an idea whose time may have come.
I do not believe that the transsubstantivity philosophy of the
Rules should be abandoned based on unproven assumptions about
abusive practices, meritless lawsuits, and excessive costs and delays.
Instead, movement toward differential procedural treatment must be
based on an extensive exploration of the present situation to
determine how best to approach different types of cases, ranging from
the mundane to the burdensome, and how much discretion to give the
judicial officer to individualize the treatment of cases. The task
undoubtedly will be arduous and possibly contentious. In part it will
be difficult to create a workable differential system based on
substantive law or litigation dimensions because it is unclear how best
to define groups of cases with common characteristics and then draft
customized rules for each category. I remember when working with
the judicial authors of the original Manual for Complex and
Multidistrict Litigation—as it was then titled—that they thought long
and hard about a possible definition for “complexity” to clarify the
ambit of the document. In the end, those attempts proved frustrating
and fruitless, and the authors decided to include only a highly
457
generalized statement about the Manual’s coverage.
Perhaps tracking by case dimension would be more promising
and easier to administer than segmenting by case complexity or
substantive context. The British have constructed such a system. It
consists of three tracks: the small-disputes track, for claims up to
£5,000; the fast track, for claims between £5,000 and £15,000; and the
multi-track, which applies to cases of larger value, complexity, and

455. Id. 1.
456. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1217 (“These rules fully reflect the basic
philosophy of the federal rules expressed in Rule 1 that simplicity, flexibility, and the absence of
legalistic technicality are the touchstones of a good procedural system.”).
457. The original Manual defined complex litigation as follows:
“Complex litigation,” as used in this Manual, includes one case or two or more
related cases which present unusual problems and which require extraordinary
treatment, including but not limited to the cases designated as “protracted” and
“big.”
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FIRST) § 0.10 (rev. ed. 1973).
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458

importance. Claims not based on monetary value are assigned to the
most appropriate track. Because each track provides standardized
procedural instructions meant to apply to all cases within its scope,
most require little specialized judicial attention. Although there
actually are multiple opportunities for judicial involvement under
each track, small claims cases generally are handled with minimal
supervision and technicality. The fast track provides litigants with an
efficient means of bringing relatively simple cases to trial, with a focus
on one-day hearings within thirty weeks of their assignment to that
track. The multi-track offers the greatest variety in management, with
procedures that can vary from simple standardized directions similar
to the fast track, to regular, hands-on judicial involvement in complex
matters.
Because British civil procedure does not have an elaborate
discovery regime comparable to that found in Federal Rules 26
through 37, or the prospect of trial by jury with its attendant
procedures, a tracking model of that type would have to undergo
major revision to work in the federal courts, and any assignment by
dollar amount would have to be different. The British small-claims
track, with its modest cap on case value, for example, does not align
with the federal courts’ requirement of more than $75,000 in
diversity-of-citizenship cases and the absence of any such requirement
459
in federal question cases. Also, the rules delimiting the tracks might
be adjusted based on complexity level or each case’s substantive
context. Nonetheless, the British system’s focus on standardized rules
for each track and different levels of judicial involvement may
provide a useful concept and experience base for a federal tracking
experiment.

458. See generally ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES
PRACTICE 482–500 (2d ed. 2006). A number of countries employ special procedures for
different types of actions. E.g., ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE]
§§ 592, 689 (Ger.), reprinted in ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (C.H. Beck ed., 57th ed. 1999)
(delineating the German system of summary proceedings for actions seeking payment on a sum
of money or the delivery of goods); see also PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN
CIVIL JUSTICE 425–28 (2004) (describing the German Code provision). Many civilian systems
have specialized commercial courts or panels. See, e.g., CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] arts.
L.721-1 to 724-7 (Fr.); GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ [GVG] [Constitution of the Courts Act]
§ 105 (Ger.), reprinted in ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (Richard Zöller ed., 23rd rev. ed. 2002).
459. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
OF
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Tracking is not alien to the existing federal system. Rule
26(a)(1)(B) creates a modest track by allowing eight categories of
461
cases to bypass the mandatory disclosure requirement. The Manual
for Complex Litigation provides something in the nature of ad hoc
462
tracking for managing an important portion of the federal docket.
Interestingly, the promulgation of the mandatory disclosure rule
followed an intramural debate within the rulemaking community in
the early 1990s; some favored a provision for differential case
management customized to the needs of particular cases based on
463
both Congress’ directive in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and
a rule then in force in the Eastern District of Texas that established
different discovery tracks ranging from no discovery to “[s]pecialized
464
treatment.” Indeed, the subject was dealt with at length in a model
civil-justice expense-and-delay-reduction plan developed by the
465
Judicial Conference pursuant to its reporting obligations under the
466
1990 Act. In the end, the transsubstantive mandatory disclosure
rule—with its exceptions—prevailed over the case-by-case standard
467
and the tracking techniques.

460. For an early tracking suggestion, see Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After
Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243, 244 (1984).
461. Similarly, some local rules enumerate certain categories of actions that are exempted
from the scheduling and planning provisions of Rule 16(b). E.g., LR, D. Mass. 16.2.
462. Early editions of the Manual recommended the use of “waves” of discovery as needed.
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) supra note 213, § 21.421. The current
Manual speaks of “[p]hased, sequenced, or targeted discovery.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 208, § 11.422.
463. The Act directed the consideration of “systematic, differential treatment” of civil cases.
28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1). The response was said to be limited, see KAKALIK, DUNWORTH, HILL,
MCCAFFREY, OSHIRO, PACE & VAIANA, supra note 294, at 25–27, although some districts had
modest tracking systems before the Act and a number of the plans offered a multi-track model.
See generally AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT 6–7 (1992); Dunworth & Kakalik, supra note 216 (evaluating the RAND
Corporation’s review of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990).
464. Civil Justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan Pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, 1991 WL 525100 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 1991).
465. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MODEL PLAN FOR REDUCTION OF EXPENSE
AND DELAY IN CIVIL CASES, 7–15 (1992) (discussing differentiated case management disclosure
requirements).
466. 28 U.S.C. § 477(a)(1) (2006).
467. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of
Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753, 782–85 (1995); Edward F. Sherman, A Process
Model and Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in the States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1553, 1567 n.63
(1994).
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In contrast to the mandatory disclosure provision, Rules
16(a)(1), 16(c)(2)(1), and 26(f)(2), as well as the Manual’s
management guidelines for complex cases, naturally encourage
greater judicial involvement and permit more case-by-case judicial
tailoring for discovery than typically is seen in simpler cases, in order
468
to minimize discovery costs and to reduce delay. Similarly, the
469
multidistrict litigation statute and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
470
Litigation facilitate combining factually and legally related cases to
coordinate the pretrial process and to avoid resource-consuming
redundancy, effectively forming a track. The Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990 authorized the district courts to consider “differential
treatment of civil cases” in formulating their expense-and-delay
471
472
plans. Local rules in some district courts have the same effect. At
473
474
the state level, New York and California, among many others, use
various forms of tracking: they assign cases to courts or divisions
thereof based on the amount in controversy, or they assign them to
specialized tribunals by type of action, such as commercial matters or
475
disputes with governmental entities, as deemed appropriate.
Tracking may be a workable solution, particularly if a costbenefit analysis shows that the Federal Rules’ procedural gold
standard has become too resource consumptive to be employed in all
cases, but the judgment is that as a society we are not willing to give

468. See Cavanagh, supra note 211, at 23–25.
469. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
470. Created by Congress in 1968, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is composed
of seven federal circuit and district court judges who determine whether similar cases instituted
in separate districts should be combined in one district for coordinated pretrial proceedings. See
generally 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 353, §§ 3861–3868 (3d ed. 2007).
471. 28 U.S.C. § 473.
472. Local Rule 16.1(a)(3)(G) of the Western District of New York calls for a “meaningful”
discussion of “the need for adopting special procedures for managing difficult actions involving
complex issues, multiple parties or difficult legal questions.”
473. New York has established a Commercial Division of its Supreme Court with monetary
thresholds, designated categories of actions that can be heard in the Division, and a number of
rules of practice. Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Cts [22 NYCRR] § 202.70.
474. California calls for the coordination of complex actions, defined as any action “that
requires exceptional judicial management” and lists a number of factors to be considered by the
court in deciding whether to make that designation. Cal. Rules of Courts, rules 3.501–3.550. A
number of procedural rules are provided that govern the coordination of complex cases. Id.
475. See generally Holly Bakke & Maureen Solomon, Case Differentiation: An Approach to
Individualized Case Management, 73 JUDICATURE 17 (1990) (describing differential case
management and local variations).
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up our high-quality system entirely. If there is resistance to
abandoning the transsubstantivity principle because of its
longstanding character or the current language of the Rules Enabling
Act, it may be necessary for Congress to recast the statute to modify
the “general-rules” requirement to fit contemporary circumstances
476
and to afford the rulemakers more flexibility. Or it may be
appropriate to reassess the existing understanding of the existing
statutory words. For example, rules general to each track, similar to
those in the British system, may be thought sufficiently “general”
without requiring a legislative change in the Rules Enabling Act.
Perhaps what is needed is a more open recognition that the “onesize-fits-all” philosophy that prevailed in the 1930s no longer may be
the most apt litigation model; there is considerable recognition of
477
that. Indeed, that was Congress’ judgment in enacting the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990. Similarly, the same realization that some
variations in the Rules’ application were necessary led the drafters of
the original Rules to establish the heightened pleading requirement
for fraud and mistake in the first sentence of Rule 9(b) and the
lightened pleading requirement for “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and
other conditions of a person’s mind” in the second sentence of that
478
provision. These deviations from the transsubstantivity principle
might lead present and future rulemakers to draw corresponding
distinctions for other litigation categories. It must be recognized,
however, that opposition to abandoning transsubstantivity continues
in some quarters.
Moreover, tracking is a pathway fraught with danger, involving
the drawing of lines that are difficult—perhaps impossible—to see.
Inevitably, attempting to establish distinctions will bring to the fore
vast differences in philosophy, ideology, and self-interest that merge
substantive predilections with procedure. Indeed, that may be the
reality underlying Twombly, Iqbal, and the PSLRA, which in a sense
are the contemporary analogues to the forces that led to the special
pleading provisions found in Rule 9(b). Fashioning different pleading,
motion, and discovery procedures to protect the ability of

476. See supra text accompanying note 358.
477. The Federal Judicial Center Preliminary Report shows support for conducting an
experiment with a simplified procedure system in several districts by party consent. See LEE &
WILLGING, supra note 203, at 52–54.
478. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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government officials to function effectively or economic entities to
compete not only requires the drafting skills of a Leonardo da Vinci
but depends on what those who write the rules believe is needed
either to protect governmental functionality and corporate America
or to hold them accountable. Those who formulate court rules also
must be mindful of the often competing interests of minority group
members, consumers, investors, and any of us who breathe the air or
drink the water or enjoy the environment—in short, all the people.
Thus, the intellectual honesty and integrity of those who draft,
approve, and apply tomorrow’s procedures become central to the
enterprise.
It may be that attempting to create a tracking system is a fool’s
errand: today’s pressures and philosophical divisions may not allow
the policymakers, rulemakers, and interest groups to leave their
clients at the meeting-room door. Any sophisticated sea change from
transsubstantivity to tracking will require multiple rule sets; involve
arduous, difficult, and politically charged processes; and demand a
considerable amount of time to formulate and execute. And who
knows what the law of unanticipated consequences will bring? But
the effort may be worth undertaking. Some lines might prove to be
visible and may well command consensus. The initial effort might be
relatively primitive—perhaps simply using the type of objective
criteria exemplified by the British model or constructing an
experiment in one or more districts. A potential downside is that even
a simple approach would breed, at least at the outset, litigation over
determinations of which track was appropriate for which cases.
E. Sanctions
I mention this subject with some trepidation given my prior
involvement with the 1983 amendment of Rule 11 as an Advisory
479
Committee Reporter and then Committee member. But it seems
worth observing that more-effective enforcement of the certification
480
required by Rule 11 of each paper presented to a federal court
might be desirable, keeping in mind that since 1993 the Rule does
have a “safe-harbor” provision and that subdivision (b)(3) contains

479. I am bemused by the fact that several participants at the Duke Conference bemoaned
the fact that sanctions were few and far between.
480. See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1335 (describing the elements and
application of Rule 11).
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another safety valve permitting the signer to assert that the accuracy
of the document’s contents will likely be borne out by “further
481
investigation or discovery.”
Consideration might be given to restoring some of the elements
of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 that were eliminated by the 1993
482
amendment.
This might include a partial reinstatement of
compensation and punishment as legitimate objectives of the sanction
process to promote efficiency and compliance, principles that
483
continue to be applicable under Rule 16(f) and parts of Rule 37. If it
can be achieved, meaningful judicial deterrence seems desirable to
curtail inappropriate pleading, motion, and discovery conduct and to
maximize the effectiveness of judicial management. In addition,
perhaps the sanction rules should be revisited to see if standards of
lawyer behavior can be further articulated to produce a sophisticated
and nuanced regime that will minimize litigation misconduct,
whatever its form, but at the same time recognize the need to protect
484
adversarial-system values.
Opposition can be expected from various civil rights and publicinterest
groups
who
fear—with
some
justification—the
disproportionate application of sanctions against them and the
485
concomitant chilling effect. Any changes in the sanction structure

481. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
482. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1331–1332. For example, the district
court’s discretion to deny sanctions might be limited and the range of sanctions restored.
483. Rule 16(f) authorizes the imposition of compensatory sanctions for certain types of
noncompliance with pretrial management matters. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f). The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act preserves the mandatory sanction character of the 1983 version of Rule
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c) (2006).
484. Various legislative proposals to strengthen Rule 11 have been put forward in recent
years. See, e.g., Frivolous Lawsuit Prevention Act of 2009, S. 603, 111th Cong. § 2. Care must be
taken to avoid the possible use of Rule 11 to undermine access through over-deterrence or to
promote attrition tactics.
485. That concern was strenuously voiced about practice under the 1983 amendment. See
generally Melissa L. Nelkin, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11—Some “Chilling”
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986)
(discussing the potential chilling effects of Rule 11 sanctions and suggesting nonmandatory
sanctions as a remedy for the problem); Georgene M. Vairo, Commentary, Rule 11: Where We
Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (1991) (asserting that Rule 11 is being
used to limit advocacy in federal courts). The issue has been relatively quiet under the 1993
amendment. But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality?
Boon or Bane?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 994 (1998) (“[B]oth the 1983 Amendment and the 1993
Amendment represent increased procedural hurdles and risk for litigants, resulting in a net
shrinkage of access to courts.” (footnote omitted)).

MILLER IN FINAL

2010]

9/15/2010 11:50:51 AM

A DOUBLE PLAY ON THE FEDERAL RULES

127

would have to be handled with considerable delicacy and applied
evenhandedly, and in a way that avoided the motion cottage industry
486
that arose under Rule 11 between 1983 and 1993.
CONCLUSION: DIOGUARDI REDUX
Admittedly, contemporary litigation realities are strikingly
different from the world that generated the original Federal Rules.
Strong forces have moved case disposition earlier and earlier in an
attempt to solve the perceived problems of discovery abuse, meritless
lawsuits, and litigation expense and delay. Although rulemakers and
courts must live in the present and plan for the future, it is important
not to forget the important citizen-access and private-enforcement
values and objectives at the heart of the 1938 Rules. The pendulum
appears to have swung too far away from those values. In that vein,
487
one wonders how Dioguardi would be decided today.
John Dioguardi’s complaint actually alleged a number of facts,
but would those facts be sufficient today to support a plausible
inference of wrongdoing? The allegations consisted of a series of
disjointed statements, left holes in many key elements, and did not
provide any articulated legal theory. Judge Clark’s opinion identified
a conversion claim, even though Dioguardi never stated that the
Collector of Customs took his tonic, but merely alleged: “[I]t isn’t so
easy to do away with two cases of 37 bottles of one quart. Being
488
protected, they can take this chance.” And any first-year law
student can extrapolate—or intuit—a trespass claim and a number of
other possible theories. Would the Second Circuit be as tolerant
489
today?
Now, unlike then, a federal judge is instructed to determine
whether an inference of wrongdoing by the Collector was plausible.
Judicial experience and common sense—matters beyond the

486. See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1332; Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing
Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 631–32 (1987).
487. See Am. Compl., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (No. 157), reprinted
in JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN HERSHKOFF,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 561 (10th ed. 2009).
488. Id. ¶ 5.
489. It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit upheld the complaint’s sufficiency in
both Twombly and Iqbal and has interpreted the Supreme Court’s decisions in those cases in a
reasonably moderate fashion. E.g., Starr v. Sony BMG Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 323–27 (2d Cir.
2010).
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complaint—might counsel a judge that property conversion or
negligent damage to goods at a major customs facility was a realistic
concern and thus plausible, depending, perhaps, on the reputation of
the federal agency’s workings. Is there a more likely alternative
explanation? Perhaps it is just as plausible that Dioguardi did not
follow the applicable procedures to receive his goods, leading to their
sale at auction, or that they were improperly packaged when shipped,
as it is that customs personnel were dishonest or careless. In light of
Iqbal’s assumption that high-ranking government officials could not
plausibly act toward Muslim Pakistanis with a discriminatory motive
following 9/11, a claim of conversion or trespass against a government
official might be regarded as implausible. Yet, ruminations about
Dioguardi’s and anyone else’s conduct are sheer speculation. In truth,
how is a district court judge, regardless of his judicial experience and
common sense, supposed to know what is or is not plausible in these
490
circumstances based solely on a complaint like Dioguardi’s?
The judge then might weigh the burdens of subjecting the
Collector of Customs to discovery and trial. Perhaps Dioguardi’s is
one of the relatively modest, simple cases in which these rigors would
be seen as limited. If a case-tracking system replaced
transsubstantivity, his complaint might slide by under an easier
pleading standard for small cases and be expedited. However, the
Collector of Customs runs a large, complex operation that generates
countless transactions and records each day. Discovery—especially ediscovery—to track the goods and identify the personnel who came in
contact with them could be quite costly and might disrupt an
important government agency’s functioning. A federal court today
might conclude that allowing Dioguardi to go beyond the complaint
491
“just ain’t worth it.”
Perhaps most striking is the difference in attitude between Judge
Clark and the thrust of the Supreme Court’s latest pleading decisions.
Within the muddled complaint, Judge Clark found two claims and
492
intimated there were more. He even evinced a desire to see

490. Obviously, some would argue that this is the type of issue that should be determined by
a jury, although in the legal context of Dioguardi—a suit against the government—one would
not be available.
491. It is even conceivable that the judge might consider the litigation as intrusive on
matters of national security or an interference with monitoring imports to deter terrorist
activities.
492. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
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Dioguardi’s claim adjudicated on its merits rather than on a
493
formalistic assessment of his statements’ linguistic quality. Judge
Clark apparently valued Dioguardi’s right to a day in court and a
judgment on the merits more highly than minimizing the potential
cost to the governmental defendant and the burden on the court
system. After Twombly and Iqbal, a complaint whose sufficiency was
as problematic as Dioguardi’s might be dismissed based on concerns
about judicial resources, potentially frivolous lawsuits, and the costs
494
of discovery. That seems myopic. It fails to recognize the democratic
significance of litigation as a form of governance or oversight on
bureaucratic activity, an enforcement mechanism, and a channel for
citizens to express their grievances against their government or fellow
citizens. And it fails to recognize the economic restraints on most
plaintiffs and contingent-fee lawyers.
Of course, Dioguardi does not reflect the types of cases that
probably motivated the procedural changes that have occurred in the
last quarter century and that are jeopardized by today’s quest for
early disposition. Consider a contemporary version. Suppose that
Dioguardi were the representative plaintiff in a class action on behalf
of all importers who were of certain racial, ethnic, or religious
backgrounds claiming systematic discriminatory behavior in the
handling of their goods by the Collector of Customs in the Port of
New York. What factual presentation would Twombly and Iqbal
require for his complaint to meet the plausibility threshold and
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion? Would the calculus have shifted
because of the change in context? Would judicial discretion be so
broad as to empower a district judge to brand the claim implausible
and to dismiss on the basis of his judicial experience and common
sense, even though the critical information about the government’s

493. Id. (“In view of the plaintiff’s limited ability to write and speak English, it will be
difficult for the District Court to arrive at justice unless he consents to receive legal
assistance . . . .”).
494. Perhaps Dioguardi could survive under a plausibility standard on the ground that
pleadings by pro se plaintiffs are to be construed liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct.
2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed’” (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))); see also Granda v. Schulman, No. 09-12564, 2010
WL 1337716, at *4 (11th Cir. Apr. 7, 2010) (construing the complaint liberally because the
plaintiff was acting pro se, even though the complaint did not allege whether the defendant was
acting under color of state law for a § 1983 claim); Cann v. Hayman, 346 F. App’x 822, 824 (3d
Cir. 2009) (noting the principle that pleadings of pro se litigants are liberally construed). This,
however, is an analytical approach that is of limited application.
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behavior and motivation was in the sole possession of the defendant?
And then how would a court of appeals effectively review that
dismissal? And what would be the result? Putting the question of
class certifiability aside, why should procedures not be available to
assure that the hypothetical class members have access to enough
information to provide an opportunity to present an intelligent,
principled, and nonspeculative statement of their claim?
Returning to Rule 1, I close with several questions worthy of
attention. Are we still serious about achieving “the just, speedy, and
495
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”? Can
we afford to preserve a gold standard procedural system? Can we
afford not to? Even assuming it is efficient, does the current
treatment of pleadings and pretrial motions undermine important
system values—meaningful citizen access, the quality of justice,
governance and private enforcement, and the societal values of
litigation? Should the rulemaking process be encouraged to construct
a procedural system that properly balances all of these values? After
all, embedded in Rule 1 there always has been a sense that the
Federal Rules and their application should accommodate all three of
496
the objectives it identifies. “Speedy” and “inexpensive” should not
be sought at the expense of what is “just.” The latter is a short word,
but it embraces societal objectives of enormous significance that
should not be subordinated to the other two.

495. FED R. CIV. P. 1.
496. Admittedly these objectives are somewhat in tension with each other.

